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Full-Text Articles in Other Economics

The New Basel Capital Accord: Making It Effective With Stronger Market Discipline, Harald Benink, Clas Wihlborg Jan 2002

The New Basel Capital Accord: Making It Effective With Stronger Market Discipline, Harald Benink, Clas Wihlborg

Business Faculty Articles and Research

In January 2001 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision proposed a new capital adequacy framework to respond to deficiencies in the 1988 Capital Accord on credit risk. The main elements or ‘pillars’ of the proposal are capital requirements based on the internal risk-ratings of individual banks, expanded and active supervision, and information disclosure requirements to enhance market discipline. We discuss the incentive effects of the proposed regulation. In particular, we argue that it provides incentives for banks to develop new ways to evade the intended consequences of the proposed regulation. Supervision alone cannot prevent banks from ‘gaming and manipulation’ of …


Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration And The Failure Of Festo, R. Polk Wagner Jan 2002

Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration And The Failure Of Festo, R. Polk Wagner

All Faculty Scholarship

Last Term, in Festo Corporation v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabashuki Co., the United States Supreme Court missed perhaps the most important opportunity for patent law reform in two decades. At the core of the failure to grasp the implications of "prosecution history estoppel" - a judicially-crafted principle limiting the enforceable scope of patents based on acts occurring during their application process - is the heretofore universal (but ultimately unsupportable) view of the doctrine as an arbitrary ex post limitation on patent scope. This Article demonstrates the serious flaws in this traditionalist approach, and develops a new theory of prosecution history …


Meeting By Signals, Playing By Norms: Complementary Accounts Of Non-Legal Cooperation In Institutions, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter Jan 2002

Meeting By Signals, Playing By Norms: Complementary Accounts Of Non-Legal Cooperation In Institutions, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.