Other Economics Commons^™

How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon

Steven Davidoff Solomon

This Article presents a case study of a corporate governance innovation—the incentive compensation arrangement for activist-nominated director candidates colloquially known as the “golden leash.” Golden leash compensation arrangements are a potentially valuable tool for activist shareholders in election contests. In response to their use, several issuers adopted bylaw provisions banning incentive compensation arrangements. Investors, in turn, viewed director adoption of golden leash bylaws as problematic and successfully pressured issuers to repeal them. The study demonstrates how corporate governance provisions are developed and deployed, the sequential response of issuers and investors, and the central role played by governance intermediaries—activist investors, institutional …

I Share, Therefore It's Mine, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

Private Value Determinations And The Potential Effect On The Future Of Research And Development, Amy L. Landers

Amy L. Landers

Although the promise of an emerging patent market is thought to provide future benefits to invention, innovation, and the public, this essay examines the possibility that the aggregate influence of this activity could instead destabilize patent values in a manner that mirrors the "bubble" phenomenon that occurred in certain markets in the past. To the extent that this occurs, this would destabilize the patent system and might have negative consequences for the future of investment in research, development and innovation.

Book Review: Capital And Its Discontents: Conversations With Radical Thinkers In A Time Of Tumult By Sasha Lilly (Pm Press, 2011), Nick J. Sciullo

Nick J. Sciullo

No abstract provided.

Corrupção E Judiciário: A (In)Eficácia Do Sistema Judicial No Combate À Corrupção, Ivo T. Gico Jr., Carlos H. R. De Alencar

Ivo Teixeira Gico Jr.

HÁ UMA PERCEPÇÃO GENERALIZADA NO BRASIL DE QUE FUNCIONÁRIOS PÚBLICOS CORRUPTOS NÃO SÃO PUNIDOS. NÃO OBSTANTE, ATÉ O MOMENTO, NÃO HÁ EVIDÊNCIAS EMPÍRICAS QUE APÓIEM ESSA AFIRMAÇÃO E MUITOS ARGUMENTAM QUE SE TRATA DE UMA PERCEPÇÃO EQUIVOCADA DECORRENTE DO AUMENTO DE MEDIDAS ANTICORRUPÇÃO. UMA DAS PRINCIPAIS RAZÕES PARA ESSA NOTÁVEL AUSÊNCIA É A GRANDE DIFICULDADE DE SE IDENTIFICAR CASOS COMPROVADOS DE CORRUPÇÃO PARA, ENTÃO, SE AVERIGUAR SE ELES FORAM OU NÃO PUNIDOS PELO SISTEMA JUDICIAL. ESTE ARTIGO USA O SISTEMA BRASILEIRO DE RESPONSABILIDADE TRÍPLICE COMO UM EXPERIMENTO NATURAL PARA MEDIR O DESEMPENHO DO SISTEMA JUDICIAL CONTRA CORRUPÇÃO. NOSSOS RESULTADOS MOSTRAM …

Testing For Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets, Alma Cohen, Peter Siegelman

Peter Siegelman

This paper reviews and evaluates the empirical literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. We focus on empirical work that seeks to test the basic coverage–risk prediction of adverse selection theory—that is, that policyholders who purchase more insurance coverage tend to be riskier. The analysis of this body of work, we argue, indicates that whether such a correlation exists varies across insurance markets and pools of insurance policies. We discuss various reasons why a coverage–risk correlation may not be found in some pools of insurance policies. The presence of a coverage-risk correlation can be explained either by moral hazard or …

Treating Yourself Instrumentally Internalization, Rationality, And The Law, Robert D. Cooter

Robert Cooter

No abstract provided.