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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in International Economics
The European Central Bank's Securities Markets Programme (Ecb Gfc), Ariel Smith
The European Central Bank's Securities Markets Programme (Ecb Gfc), Ariel Smith
Journal of Financial Crises
The Eurozone struggled during the escalation of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. In order to aid malfunctioning securities markets, restore liquidity, and enable proper functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, the European Central Bank (ECB) instituted the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) on May 9, 2010. This program enabled Eurosystem central banks to purchase securities from entities in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, and Spain. The program ended on September 6, 2012, and evaluations of its effectiveness are mixed.
The European Central Bank's Three-Year Long-Term Refinancing Operations (Ecb Gfc), Aidan Lawson
The European Central Bank's Three-Year Long-Term Refinancing Operations (Ecb Gfc), Aidan Lawson
Journal of Financial Crises
The announcement of the three-year Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) by the European Central Bank (ECB) on December 8, 2011, signaled the beginning of the largest ECB market liquidity programs to date. Continued and increasing liquidity-related pressures in the form of ballooning financial market credit default swap (CDS) spreads, Euro-area volatility, and interbank lending rates prompted a much more forceful ECB response than what had been done previously. The LTROs, using a repurchase (repo) agreement auction mechanism, allowed any Eurozone financial institution to tap essentially unlimited funding at a fixed rate of just 1%. Because the three-year LTROs were so similar …
The Federal Reserve’S Financial Crisis Response C: Providing U.S. Dollars To Foreign Central Banks, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick
The Federal Reserve’S Financial Crisis Response C: Providing U.S. Dollars To Foreign Central Banks, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
The financial crisis that began in late 2007 with the decline in the United States (U.S.) subprime mortgage markets quickly spread to other markets and eventually disrupted the interbank funding markets in the U.S. as well as overseas. To address the strain in the U.S. dollar (USD) funding markets, the Federal Reserve worked with foreign central banks around the world to provide USD liquidity to affected overseas markets by entering into currency swap agreements. Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, and the resulting further destabilization of the world’s financial systems, the size and utilization of these swaps …
The Federal Reserve’S Financial Crisis Response A: Lending & Credit Programs For Depository Institutions, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick
The Federal Reserve’S Financial Crisis Response A: Lending & Credit Programs For Depository Institutions, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
Beginning in summer 2007, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) was called upon to address a severe disruption in the interbank lending markets sparked by a downturn in the subprime mortgage market. As these developments began to impact the ability of banks to raise adequate funding, the Fed encouraged them to utilize the Discount Window (DW), its standing facility for lending to depository institutions, and repeatedly decreased the lending rate to make the facility more accessible. Despite the Fed’s efforts, for a number of reasons, including historical perceptions of stigma, banks were reluctant to utilize the DW. In December 2007, the …
Basel Iii D: Swiss Finish To Basel Iii, Christian M. Mcnamara, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick
Basel Iii D: Swiss Finish To Basel Iii, Christian M. Mcnamara, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
After the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced the Basel III framework in 2010, individual countries confronted the question of how best to implement the framework given their unique circumstances. Switzerland, with a banking industry that is both heavily concentrated and very large relative to the size of its overall economy, faced a special challenge. It ultimately adopted what is sometimes referred to as the “Swiss Finish” to Basel III—enhanced requirements applicable to Switzerland’s “too-big-to-fail” banks Credit Suisse and UBS that go beyond the base requirements established by the BCBS. Yet the prominent role played by relatively new contingent …
Basel Iii B: Basel Iii Overview, Christian M. Mcnamara, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick
Basel Iii B: Basel Iii Overview, Christian M. Mcnamara, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-09, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) faced the critical task of diagnosing what went wrong and then updating regulatory standards aimed at preventing it from occurring again. In seeking to strengthen the microprudential regulation associated with the earlier Basel Accords while also adding a macroprudential overlay, Basel III consists of proposals in three main areas intended to address 1) capital reform, 2) liquidity standards, and 3) systemic risk and interconnectedness. This case considers the causes of the 2007-09 financial crisis and what they suggest about weaknesses in the Basel regime …
Basel Iii A: Regulatory History, Christian M. Mcnamara, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick
Basel Iii A: Regulatory History, Christian M. Mcnamara, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
From the earliest efforts to mandate the amount of capital banks must maintain, regulators have grappled with how best to accomplish this task. Until the 1980s, regulation had been based largely on discretion and judgment. In the wake of two bank failures, the central bank governors of the G10 countries established the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and in 1988, the BCBS introduced a capital measurement system, Basel I. The system represented a triumph of the fixed numerical approach, however, critics worried that it was too blunt an instrument. In 1999, the BCBS issued Basel II, a proposal to …