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Full-Text Articles in Industrial Organization
Bilateral Bargaining With Externalities, Catherine De Fontenay, Joshua Gans
Bilateral Bargaining With Externalities, Catherine De Fontenay, Joshua Gans
Catherine de Fontenay
This paper provides an analysis of a non-cooperative pairwise bargaining game between agents in a network. We establish that there exists an equilibrium that generates a coalitional bargaining division of the reduced surplus that arises as a result of externalities between agents. That is, we provide a non-cooperative justification for a cooperative division of a non-cooperative surplus. The resulting division is akin to the Myerson-Shapley value with properties that are particularly useful and tractable in applications. We demonstrate this by examining buyer-seller networks and vertical foreclosure.
Bargaining In Hospital Merger Models, David J. Balan, Keith Brand
Bargaining In Hospital Merger Models, David J. Balan, Keith Brand
David J. Balan
Hospital prices for commercially-insured patients are generally set through bilateral negotiations with health insurance companies. Reflecting common industry practice, contemporary models of hospital/health insurer bargaining usually assume that multi-hospital systems bargain on an all-or-nothing basis. However, hospitals within systems may bargain separately, and a commitment to do so is sometimes put forward as a remedy for an otherwise anticompetitive merger. We analyze and compare the merger-induced changes in equilibrium prices in a Nash Bargaining framework under these two modes of bargaining. We show that, while the magnitude of price effects under either mode depends critically on the degree of pre-merger …