Workplace Deviance And Recession, Aniruddha Bagchi, Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay
Nov 2016
Workplace Deviance And Recession, Aniruddha Bagchi, Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay
Aniruddha Bagchi
We examine the relationship between the incidence of workplace deviance (on-the-job crime) and the state of the economy. A worker's probability of future employment depends on whether she has been deviant as well as on the availability of jobs. Using a two period model we show that the net impact on deviant behavior to changes in unemployment can go either way depending upon the nature of the equilibrium. Two kinds of equilibria are possible. In one, a non-deviant's probability of being employed increases as expected market conditions improve which lowers the incentive to be a deviant. In contrast, in the …
Technology Licensing In A Differentiated Oligopoly, Aniruddha Bagchi, Arijit Mukherjee
Dec 2013
Technology Licensing In A Differentiated Oligopoly, Aniruddha Bagchi, Arijit Mukherjee
Aniruddha Bagchi
We show the effects of product differentiation and product market competition on technology licensing by an outside innovator. For a certain range of product differentiation, both the innovator and the society prefer royalty licensing compared to auction (or fixed-fee), irrespective of Cournot and Bertrand competition, if the number of potential licensees is sufficiently large. Hence, for such a range of product differentiation, neither the innovator nor the antitrust authority requires information about the type of product market competition in preferring the type of the licensing contract.
Second Chance Offers In Auctions, Aniruddha Bagchi, Brett Katzman, Timothy Mathews
Dec 2013
Second Chance Offers In Auctions, Aniruddha Bagchi, Brett Katzman, Timothy Mathews
Aniruddha Bagchi
This paper examines situations in which a seller might make a second chance (take-it-or-leave-it) offer to a non-winning bidder at a price equal to their bid at auction. This study is motivated by the take-it-or-leave-it second chance offer rules used by eBay and a number of state procurement agencies. Equilibrium bidder behavior is determined for IPV sealed bid first price, second price, English, and Vickrey auctions when a second chance offer will be made with an exogenous probability p. In all but the Vickrey auction (which elicits the dominant strategy of bidding one’s value) equilibrium bids are lower than if …
Workplace Deviance And Recession, Aniruddha Bagchi
Jun 2012
Workplace Deviance And Recession, Aniruddha Bagchi
Aniruddha Bagchi
No abstract provided.
Endogenous R&D And Intellectual Property Laws In Developed And Emerging Economies, Aniruddha Bagchi, Abhra Roy
Dec 2011
Endogenous R&D And Intellectual Property Laws In Developed And Emerging Economies, Aniruddha Bagchi, Abhra Roy
Aniruddha Bagchi
The incentive of providing protection of intellectual property has been analyzed, both for an emerging economy as well as for a developed economy. The optimal patent length and the optimal patent breadth within a country are found to be positively related to each other for a fixed structure of laws abroad. Moreover, a country can respond to stronger patent protection abroad by weakening its patent protection under certain circumstances and by strengthening its patent protection under other circumstances. These results depend upon the curvature of the R&D production function. Finally, we investigate the impact of an increase in the willingness-to-pay …
Licensing And Patent Protection, Aniruddha Bagchi, Arijit Mukherjee
Dec 2009
Licensing And Patent Protection, Aniruddha Bagchi, Arijit Mukherjee
Aniruddha Bagchi
We show the impact of technology licensing on optimal patent policy. Strong patent protection that eliminates imitation may not be the equilibrium outcome in the presence of licensing. Depending on the cost of innovation, licensing may either increase or reduce the strength of the patent protection.
“Selling Licenses For A Process Innovation: The Impact Of The Product Market On The Selling Mechanism, Aniruddha Bagchi
Dec 2007
“Selling Licenses For A Process Innovation: The Impact Of The Product Market On The Selling Mechanism, Aniruddha Bagchi
Aniruddha Bagchi
This article considers the sale by a research lab of licences for a cost-reducing innovation. The marginal cost of a firm that wins a licence is private information and the acquisition of a licence imposes a negative externality on the other firms. The lab’s optimal revenue is determined from a class of mechanisms in which the lab selects the number of licences and the reserve price before the sale. The role of the downstream product market in the determination of the number of licences is analyzed. Furthermore, it is also shown that the optimal reserve price may be zero.
