Industrial Organization Commons^™

Hunting Unicorns, Aaron Edlin

Aaron Edlin

Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. The Court came down strongly in favor of an antitrust solution to the problem, concluding that “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.” At the same time, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion acknowledged that the Court did not answer every relevant question. The opinion closed by “leav[ing] to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”This article is an effort to help courts and counsel …

Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply, serve to confirm …

Conservatism And Switcher's Curse, Aaron Edlin

Aaron Edlin

Freedom To Trade And The Competitive Process, Aaron S. Edlin, Joseph Farrell

Aaron Edlin

Although antitrust courts sometimes stress the competitive process, they have not deeply explored what that process is. Inspired by the theory of the core, we explore the idea that the competitive process is the process of sellers and buyers forming improving coalitions. Much of antitrust can be seen as prohibiting firms’ attempts to restrain improving trade between their rivals and customers. In this way, antitrust protects firms’ and customers’ freedom to trade to their mutual betterment.

The Role Of Switching Costs In Antitrust Analysis: A Comparison Of Microsoft And Google, Aaron Edlin, Robert Harris

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Professor's Update To Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text And Cases, Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Academic Testimony On Unilateral Conduct Before The U.S. Dept. Of Justice & Federal Trade Commission Hearings, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

The Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Exclusion Or Efficient Pricing: The "Big Deal" Bundling Of Academic Journals, Aaron S. Edlin, Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Aaron Edlin

Prices of academic journals have climbed enormously in the past two decades. This article explains the substantial barriers to entry that established journals enjoy. It points out that the Big Deal bundling that the large commercial publishers have adopted in the past few years creates a substantial additional strategic barrier to entry. We consider whether these bundling offers violate the antitrust laws and conclude that they may.

The American Airlines Case: A Chance To Clarify Predation Policy, Aaron S. Edlin, Joseph Farrell

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron Edlin

Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, And Optimal Investment, Aaron S. Edlin, Stefan J. Reichelstein

Aaron Edlin

In bilateral trading problems, the parties may be hesitant to make relationship-specific investments without adequate contractual protection. We postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing, and can freely renegotiate them after information about the desirability of trade is revealed. We find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when courts impose either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages. Moreover, specific performance can induce both parties to invest efficiently if a separability condition holds. Expectation damages, on the other hand, is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems.