Industrial Organization Commons^™

Hunting Unicorns, Aaron Edlin

Aaron Edlin

Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. The Court came down strongly in favor of an antitrust solution to the problem, concluding that “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.” At the same time, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion acknowledged that the Court did not answer every relevant question. The opinion closed by “leav[ing] to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”This article is an effort to help courts and counsel …

Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply, serve to confirm …

Conservatism And Switcher's Curse, Aaron Edlin

Aaron Edlin

The Structural Transformation Of The Agricultural Sector, Neil E. Harl

Neil E. Harl

A major concern as we move into the Twenty-first Century is the structure of the agricultural sector. By structure, is meant considerations of size and scale as well as who is to manage, control and finance farming and agribusiness operations.

The Equity Beta Of Telcos Operating In Small Island Nations, Bruno E. Viani

Bruno E. Viani

Analysts often use the capital assets pricing model (CAPM) to estimate the cost of equity capital. A key parameter in estimating that cost is the so-called equity beta. Estimates of equity betas for telecommunications firms, or telcos, in small island nations are not readily available, so analysts often rely on estimated equity betas from larger firms in jurisdictions with much larger markets. Doing so may introduce significant errors if the equity risk premium for telcos in large markets differs significantly from those in small markets. In this research note we explore this hypothesis. We find that the equity betas of …

All-Units Discounts As A Partial Foreclosure Device, Yong Chao, Guofu Tan

Yong Chao

All-units discounts (AUD) are pricing schemes that lower a buyer’s marginal price on every unit purchased when the buyer’s purchase exceeds or is equal to a pre-specified threshold. The AUD and related conditional rebates are commonly used in both final-goods and intermediate-goods markets. Although the existing literature has thus far focused on interpreting the AUD as a price discrimination tool, investment incentive program, or rent-shifting instrument, the antitrust concerns on the AUD and related conditional rebates are often their plausible exclusionary effects.

In this article, we investigate strategic effects of volume-threshold based AUD used by a dominant firm in the …

Cartelization Through Buyer Groups, Chris Doyle, Martijn Han

Martijn A. Han

Retailers may enjoy stable cartel rents in their output market through the formation of a buyer group in their input market. A buyer group allows retailers to commit credibly to increased input prices, which serve to reduce combined final output to the monopoly level; increased input costs are then refunded from suppliers to retailers through slotting allowances or rebates. The stability of such an ‘implied cartel’ depends on the retailers’ incentives to source their inputs secretly from a supplier outside of the buyer group arrangement at lower input prices. Cheating is limited if retailers sign exclusive dealing or minimum purchase …

Barreras A La Competencia Y Libre Concurrencia E Insumos Esenciales, Carlos Mena-Labarthe

Carlos Mena-Labarthe

En la Constitución Mexicana y la Ley Federal de Competencia Económica se establecen facultades para que la autoridad de competencia elimine barreras y regule insumos.

Las investigaciones de mercado son una herramienta adicional que permite obtener una perspectiva integral de los mercados para la corrección de fallas conductuales y estructurales.

Se trata de un procedimiento muy riguroso con plazos establecidos para su ejecución.

Las investigaciones de mercado han resultado exitosas en otras jurisdicciones con una sólida tradición en competencia económica.

Patent Assertion Entities & Privateers: Economic Harms To Innovation And Competition, Robert G. Harris

Robert G Harris

This paper addresses the problems of aggressive rent-seeking activities by patent assertion entities (PAEs) and privateers. Section II explains why aggressive patent assertion is especially problematic in patent thick products and systems (such as computers, smartphones and software), and why technological developments have increased the number and “density” of patent thickets. Section III addresses the fundamental differences in the strategic positions and interests of practicing entities and PAEs, and explains why those differences affect the conduct of PAEs and increase the opportunities for, and economic harm caused by, their rent-seeking conduct and efforts to engage in patent hold-up. Section IV …

Patent Assertion Entities & Privateers: Economic Harms To Innovation & Competition, Robert G. Harris

Robert G Harris

This paper addresses the problems of aggressive rent-seeking activities by patent assertion entities (PAEs) and privateers. Section II explains why aggressive patent assertion is especially problematic in patent thick products and systems (such as computers, smartphones and software), and why technological developments have increased the number and “density” of patent thickets. Section III addresses the fundamental differences in the strategic positions and interests of practicing entities and PAEs, and explains why those differences affect the conduct of PAEs and increase the opportunities for, and economic harm caused by, their rent-seeking conduct and efforts to engage in patent hold-up. Section IV …

New Powers- New Vulnerabilities? A Critical Analysis Of Market Inquiries Performed By Competition Authorities, Tamar Indig, Michal Gal

Michal Gal

In the past two decades the number of jurisdictions which have empowered their Competition Authorities to engage in market inquiries (MIs) has grown substantially. Although jurisdictions differ in the scope and procedure adopted for such studies, they all share an important common trait: attempting to allocate the roots of limited competition in the studied market. Market studies differ from traditional competition law tools in their triggers, range, object, and the level of pro-activity of the Competition Authority. They are not triggered by a suspicion of anti-competitive conduct of specific firm(s), but rather allow the Authority to use a broad prism …

Cartel Detection And Collusion Screening: An Empirical Analysis Of The London Metal Exchange, Danilo Samà

Dr. Danilo Samà

Cartel detection and collusion screening: an empirical analysis of the London Metal Exchange
Author:Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)
Abstract:In order to fight collusive behaviors, the best scenario for competition authorities would be the possibility to analyze detailed information on firms’ costs and prices, being the price-cost margin a robust indicator of market power. However, information on firms’ costs is rarely available. In this context, a fascinating technique to detect data manipulation and rigged prices is offered by an odd phenomenon called Benford’s law, otherwise known as First-digit law, which has been successfully …

Essays On Economic Analysis Of Competition Law: Theory And Practice (Ph.D. Dissertation Defence), Dr. Danilo Samà

Dr. Danilo Samà

Essays on economic analysis of competition law: theory and practice
Author:Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)
Abstract:The Ph.D. dissertation, submitted to LUISS “Guido Carli” University of Rome in fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economic Analysis of Competition Law (XXV cicle), is the result of a scientific research in the field of the economic analysis of competition law developed through academic experiences at the Erasmus Rotterdam University in the Netherlands, the Ghent University in Belgium, the University of Hamburg in Germany and the Toulouse School of Economics in …

Essays On Economic Analysis Of Competition Law: Theory And Practice, Danilo Samà

Dr. Danilo Samà

Essays on economic analysis of competition law: theory and practice
Author:Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)
Abstract:The Ph.D. dissertation, submitted to LUISS “Guido Carli” University of Rome in fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economic Analysis of Competition Law (XXV cicle), is the result of a scientific research in the field of the economic analysis of competition law developed through academic experiences at the Erasmus Rotterdam University in the Netherlands, the Ghent University in Belgium, the University of Hamburg in Germany and the Toulouse School of Economics …

The Hidden Costs Of Free Goods: Implications For Antitrust Enforcement, Michal Gal, Daniel Rubinfeld

Michal Gal

Today a growing number of goods and services are provided in the marketplace free of charge; indeed, free or the appearance of free, have become part of our ecosystem. More often than not, free goods and services provide real benefits to consumers and are clearly pro-competitive. Yet free goods may also create significant costs. We show that despite the fact that the consumer does not pay a direct price, there are indirect prices that reflect the opportunity cost associated with the consumption of free goods. These indirect costs can be overt or covert, in the same market in which the …

Voice Without Say: Why Capital-Managed Firms Aren’T (Genuinely) Participatory, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

Why are most capitalist enterprises of any size organized as authoritarian bureaucracies rather than incorporating genuine employee participation that would give the workers real authority? Even firms with employee participation programs leave virtually all decision-making power in the hands of management. The standard answer is that hierarchy is more economically efficient than any sort of genuine participation, so that participatory firms would be less productive and lose out to more traditional competitors. This answer is indefensible. After surveying the history, legal status, and varieties of employee participation, I examine and reject as question-begging the argument that the rarity of genuine …

Strategic Effects Of Three-Part Tariffs Under Oligopoly, Yong Chao

Yong Chao

The distinct element of a three-part tariff, compared with linear pricing or a two-part tariff, is its quantity target within which the marginal price is zero. This quantity target instrument enriches the firm's strategy set in dictating the competition to a specific level, even in the absence of usual price discrimination motive. With general differentiated linear demand system, the competitive effect of a three-part tariff in contrast to linear pricing depends on the degree of substitutability between products: competition is intensified when two products are more differentiated, yet softened when two products are more substitutable.

Reformando Las Telecomunicaciones, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

The Effectiveness Of Competition Policy: An Econometric Assessment In Developed And Developing Countries, Danilo Samà

Dr. Danilo Samà

The effectiveness of competition policy: an econometric assessment in developed and developing countries
Author:Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)
Abstract:The ultimate objective of the present paper is to empirically investigate the effectiveness of competition policy in developed and developing countries. Although its importance is continuously increasing, the effectiveness of competition policy still seems to lack the attention that it would deserve. At the present state of art, the number of academic contributions that attempts to estimate its impact on relevant economic variables appears very limited, in particular for the less developed countries. However, …

Freedom To Trade And The Competitive Process, Aaron S. Edlin, Joseph Farrell

Aaron Edlin

Although antitrust courts sometimes stress the competitive process, they have not deeply explored what that process is. Inspired by the theory of the core, we explore the idea that the competitive process is the process of sellers and buyers forming improving coalitions. Much of antitrust can be seen as prohibiting firms’ attempts to restrain improving trade between their rivals and customers. In this way, antitrust protects firms’ and customers’ freedom to trade to their mutual betterment.

The Role Of Switching Costs In Antitrust Analysis: A Comparison Of Microsoft And Google, Aaron Edlin, Robert Harris

Aaron Edlin

No abstract provided.

Regulatory Challenges For Mvnos In Latin America, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

A Comparison Of Anti-Manipulation Rules In U.S. And Eu Electricity And Natural Gas Markets: A Proposal For A Common Standard, Shaun D. Ledgerwood, Dan Harris

Shaun D. Ledgerwood

In this paper, we describe the development and current status of anti-manipulation rules as they apply to wholesale electricity and natural gas markets in the United States and the European Union, including the institutions that are responsible for overseeing these rules. We then compare and contrast these jurisdictions to discuss similarities, differences, and potential gaps in coverage within and across their internal markets. We note that while the behavior prohibited by the U.S. and EU statutes is remarkably similar, there is in fact no common standard for defining market manipulation. The absence of a common EU/U.S. framework for examining manipulative …

Rummaging Through The Bottom Of Pandora’S Box: Funding Predatory Pricing Through Contemporaneous Recoupment, Shaun D. Ledgerwood, Wesley J. Heath

Shaun D. Ledgerwood

Predatory pricing doctrine is currently a dead area of the law. To proceed beyond summary judgment, a plaintiff must prove the predation created a "dangerous probability" of supracompetitive pricing as the mechanism for recouping the losses “invested” in the predation. This requires proof that the predator sold products below its average variable cost and raised an entry barrier that ultimately enabled the recoupment of profits at some later time. We offer an alternative to this two-phased recoupment model. In this paper we show that a multiproduct retailer can target loss leading behavior in a market segment to punish or eliminate …

La Valutazione Antitrust Degli Sconti Fedeltà Nel Diritto Della Concorrenza Europeo: Alla Ricerca Di Un Approccio Economico E Di Una Teoria Del Danno Per Il Consumatore, Danilo Samà

Dr. Danilo Samà

La valutazione antitrust degli sconti fedeltà nel diritto della concorrenza europeo: alla ricerca di un approccio economico e di una teoria del danno per il consumatore
Author:Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)
Abstract:L’articolo si propone di comprendere in base a quali condizioni sconti fedeltà adottati da un’impresa dominante comportino effetti anticoncorrenziali. Gli schemi fidelizzanti, infatti, sebbene estremamente frequenti nelle transazioni di mercato, qualora applicati da un’impresa dominante, rischiano di essere giudicati illeciti per sé, come comprovato dalla casistica giurisprudenziale finora emersa a livello europeo e dal severo scrutinio riservato delle autorità nazionali della …

The Antitrust Treatment Of Loyalty Discounts And Rebates In The Eu Competition Law: In Search Of An Economic Approach And A Theory Of Consumer Harm, Danilo Samà

Dr. Danilo Samà

The antitrust treatment of loyalty discounts and rebates in the EU competition law: in search of an economic approach and a theory of consumer harm
Author:Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)
Abstract:In the paper, the fundamental question is under what conditions loyalty discounts and rebates adopted by a dominant firm cause anti-competitive effects. Fidelity schemes, although extremely frequent in the market, if applied by a dominant firm, are likely to be judged as illegal per se, as demonstrated by the EU case-law delivered so far and the severe scrutiny reserved by the national …

La Sociedad Mercantil Unipersonal: Pertinencia De Su Utilización En México, Max Garcia

Max Garcia Sanchez

No abstract provided.

Merger Control Reform In Brazil, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.

Challenges Of Implementing Incentive Auctions In Other Economies: A Mexican Perspective, Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

Víctor Pavón-Villamayor

No abstract provided.