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Full-Text Articles in Industrial Organization
Geographic Access Markets And Investments, Marc Bourreau, Carlo Cambini, Steffen Hoernig
Geographic Access Markets And Investments, Marc Bourreau, Carlo Cambini, Steffen Hoernig
Carlo Cambini
We analyze geographic regulation of vertically-integrated operators who build infrastructures and provide access in di¤erent areas. We compare duplication-based remedies, where the regulator sets access prices that depend on the local degree of infrastructure competition, to competition-based remedies, where access is deregulated in competitive areas. We find that the latter regime leads to more regulatory uncertainty and lower welfare, as it leads to multiple and inefficient equilibria at the wholesale level, with either too little or too much investment.
Tariff Regulation With Energy Efficiency Goals, Laura Abrardi, Carlo Cambini
Tariff Regulation With Energy Efficiency Goals, Laura Abrardi, Carlo Cambini
Carlo Cambini
We study the optimal tari¤ structure that could induce a regulated utility to adopt energy efficiency activities given that it is privately informed about the effectiveness of its effort on demand reduction. The regulator should optimally offer a menu of incentive compatible two-part tariffs. If the firm's energy efficiency activities have a high impact on demand reduction, the consumer should pay a high fixed fee but a low per unit price, approximating the tariff structure to a decoupling policy, which strenghtens the firm's incentives to pursue energy conservation. Instead, if the firm's e¤ort to adopt energy efficiency actions is scarcely …
Independent Agencies, Political Interference And Firm Investment Evidence From The European Union, Carlo Cambini, Laura Rondi
Independent Agencies, Political Interference And Firm Investment Evidence From The European Union, Carlo Cambini, Laura Rondi
Carlo Cambini
This paper studies the impact of the inception of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) on the investment decisions of a sample of European publicly traded regulated firms. We investigate the impact of governments’ political influence on corporate investment and control for residual state ownership. We account for the measurement error in formal independence of IRAs by exploiting cross-country heterogeneity in the quality of political, financial and social institutions. Our results show that regulatory independence has a positive impact on firm investment, but, notwithstanding the presence of IRAs, political interference in the regulatory functions persists and is detrimental to firms’ investment.