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Full-Text Articles in Industrial Organization
The Economic Impact Of Olympic Games: Effects Of Host Country Announcements On Stock Market Returns, Bryan Engelhardt, Victor Matheson, Alex Yen, Max Chisholm
The Economic Impact Of Olympic Games: Effects Of Host Country Announcements On Stock Market Returns, Bryan Engelhardt, Victor Matheson, Alex Yen, Max Chisholm
Economics Department Working Papers
Roughly seven years before an Olympic Games, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) accepts bids from countries to host an Olympics. Subsequently, the IOC determines and announces to the world who has won (and lost) the right to host. Contrary to prior evidence, we find the announcements do not affect the bidding countries’ stock markets. We complement prior studies by including additional, more recent, years of announcements, by investigating whether there are effects prior to the announcement, and by testing for an effect both parametrically and non-parametrically.
Regulation And The Marginalist Revolution, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Regulation And The Marginalist Revolution, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
The marginalist revolution in economics became the foundation for the modern regulatory State with its “mixed” economy. Marginalism, whose development defines the boundary between classical political economy and neoclassical economics, completely overturned economists’ theory of value. It developed in the late nineteenth century in England, the Continent and the United States. For the classical political economists, value was a function of past averages. One good example is the wage-fund theory, which saw the optimal rate of wages as a function of the firm’s ability to save from previous profits. Another is the theory of corporate finance, which assessed a corporation’s …
Antitrust And The Design Of Production, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Antitrust And The Design Of Production, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Both economics and antitrust policy have traditionally distinguished “production” from “distribution.” The former is concerned with how products are designed and built, the latter with how they are placed into the hands of consumers. Nothing in the language of the antitrust laws suggests much concern with production as such. Although courts do not view it that way, even per se unlawful naked price fixing among rivals is a restraint on distribution rather than production. Naked price fixing assumes a product that has already been designed and built, and the important cartel decision is what should be each firm’s output, or …