Industrial Organization Commons^™

Workplace Deviance And Recession, Aniruddha Bagchi, Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay

Faculty and Research Publications

We examine the relationship between the incidence of workplace deviance (on-the-job crime) and the state of the economy. A worker's probability of future employment depends on whether she has been deviant as well as on the availability of jobs. Using a two period model we show that the net impact on deviant behavior to changes in unemployment can go either way depending upon the nature of the equilibrium. Two kinds of equilibria are possible. In one, a non-deviant's probability of being employed increases as expected market conditions improve which lowers the incentive to be a deviant. In contrast, in the …

Workplace Deviance And Recession, Aniruddha Bagchi, Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay

Aniruddha Bagchi

Optimal Task Assignments, Felipe Balmaceda Assoc Prof.

Felipe Balmaceda

This paper studies optimal task assignments in a risk neutral principal-agent model in which agents are compensated according to an aggregated performance measure. The main trade-off involved is one in which specialization allows the implementation of any possible effort profile, while multitasking constraint the set of implementable effort profiles. Yet, the implementation of any effort profile in this set is less expensive than that under specialization. The principal prefers multitasking to specialization except when tasks are complements and the output after success is small enough so that it is not second-best optimal to implement high effort in each task. This …

Sharing The Prosperity: Why We Still Need Organized Labor, Angela B. Cornell

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Today economic inequality is greater in the United States than in any other advanced nation. Bringing the minimum wage up to a true living wage is a crucial step forward, as are other employment-related benefits like broadening access to overtime and instituting paid sick leave. But employment statutes such as minimum-wage regulations cannot replace the broad-based benefits that come from organized labor. Unionization places the ability to influence what happens in the workplace directly in workers’ own hands, even as it creates institutions that can advocate for working people at the community, state, and national level. Under an effective labor-law …

Economic Impact Of Legalizing Retail Alcohol Sales In Crawford County, Katherine A. Deck, Mervin Jebaraj

Publications and Presentations

Converting from a dry county to wet county status would have a number of tangible and intangible economic benefits for Crawford County. Legal retail alcohol sales are a signal of a contemporary economic development environment. Quantifying the value of that perception is quite difficult, but it is entirely possible to estimate sales effects, tax collections, and other economic impacts of becoming a wet county. This study was conducted by the Center for Business and Economic Research to assess the magnitude of those economic effects.

Economic Impact Of Legalizing Retail Alcohol Sales In Randolph County, Katherine A. Deck, Mervin Jebaraj

Publications and Presentations

Converting from a dry county to wet county status would have a number of tangible and intangible economic benefits for Randolph County. Legal retail alcohol sales are a signal of a contemporary economic development environment. Quantifying the value of that perception is quite difficult, but it is entirely possible to estimate sales effects, tax collections, and other economic impacts of becoming a wet county. This study was conducted by the Center for Business and Economic Research to assess the magnitude of those economic effects.

Economic Impact Of Legalizing Retail Alcohol Sales In Independence County, Katherine A. Deck, Mervin Jebaraj

Publications and Presentations

Converting from a dry county to wet county status would have a number of tangible and intangible economic benefits for Independence County. Legal retail alcohol sales are a signal of a contemporary economic development environment. Quantifying the value of that perception is quite difficult, but it is entirely possible to estimate sales effects, tax collections, and other economic impacts of becoming a wet county. This study was conducted by the Center for Business and Economic Research to assess the magnitude of those economic effects.

Economic Impact Of Legalizing Retail Alcohol Sales In Little River County, Katherine A. Deck, Mervin Jebaraj

Publications and Presentations

Converting from a dry county to wet county status would have a number of tangible and intangible economic benefits for Little River County. Legal retail alcohol sales are a signal of a contemporary economic development environment. Quantifying the value of that perception is quite difficult, but it is entirely possible to estimate sales effects, tax collections, and other economic impacts of becoming a wet county. This study was conducted by the Center for Business and Economic Research to assess the magnitude of those economic effects.

Economic Impact Of Legalizing Retail Alcohol Sales In Johnson County, Katherine A. Deck, Mervin Jebaraj

Publications and Presentations

Converting from a dry county to wet county status would have a number of tangible and intangible economic benefits for Johnson County. Legal retail alcohol sales are a signal of a contemporary economic development environment. Quantifying the value of that perception is quite difficult, but it is entirely possible to estimate sales effects, tax collections, and other economic impacts of becoming a wet county. This study was conducted by the Center for Business and Economic Research to assess the magnitude of those economic effects.

The Price Of Unobservability: Moral Hazard And Limited Liability, Felipe Balmaceda Assoc Prof.

Felipe Balmaceda

This article studies a principal-agent problem with discrete outcome and effort space. The principal and the agent are risk neutral and the latter is subject to limited liability. For a given monitoring technology, we consider the maximum possible ratio between the first best social welfare to the social welfare arising from the principal's optimal pay-for-performance contract (the price of unobservability). Our main results provide tight bounds for this price. Key parameters to these bounds are number of possible efforts, the likelihood ratio evaluated at the highest outcome, and the ratio between costs of the highest and the lowest efforts. The …