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Articles 1 - 10 of 10
Full-Text Articles in Industrial Organization
Prediction Markets To Forecast Electricity Demand, Peter Cramton, Luciano De Castro
Prediction Markets To Forecast Electricity Demand, Peter Cramton, Luciano De Castro
Luciano I. de Castro
Forecasting electricity demand for future years is an essential step in resource planning. A common approach is for the system operator to predict future demand from the estimates of individual distribution companies. However, the predictions thus obtained may be of poor quality, since the reporting incentives are unclear. We propose a prediction market as a form of forecasting future demand for electricity. We describe how to implement a simple prediction market for continuous variables, using only contracts based on binary variables. We also discuss specific issues concerning the implementation of such a market.
Mergers And Ceo Power, Felipe Balmaceda Assoc Prof.
Mergers And Ceo Power, Felipe Balmaceda Assoc Prof.
Felipe Balmaceda
In this paper I propose a model of mergers in which synergies and CEO power play a crucial role. A merger is modeled as a bargaining game between the acquiring and target board of directors with the gains from a merger divided according to the generalized Nash-bargaining solution. The model's implications are consistent with the available empirical evidence on stock returns, and yield some new untested implications that are mainly related to the relationship between CEO power, cor- porate governance and mergers. Finally, the model sheds light on the relationship between aggregate merger activity, synergies and CEO power. (JEL: G34, …
A Two-Sided Auction For Legacy Loans, Peter Cramton
A Two-Sided Auction For Legacy Loans, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
On Monday, 23 March 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner presented the Public-Private Investment Program as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis (www.financialstability.gov). The Treasury’s description still leaves many issues unanswered. We flesh out the auction design for legacy loans. A two-sided auction is required. Both banks and private investors must compete in a transparent and competitive process.
Foreword To Ross Baldick's 'Single Clearing Price In Electricity Markets', Peter Cramton
Foreword To Ross Baldick's 'Single Clearing Price In Electricity Markets', Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Argues that consumers and suppliers are better off with the clearing-price auction in electricity markets.
The Gettysburg Economic Review, Volume 3, Spring 2009
The Gettysburg Economic Review, Volume 3, Spring 2009
Gettysburg Economic Review
No abstract provided.
Enabling Environments For Social Enterprise Development. Analytical Framework And International Exploratory Study Of Good Practices, Raf Peels, Caroline Gijselinckx, Wim Van Opstal, Li Zhao
Enabling Environments For Social Enterprise Development. Analytical Framework And International Exploratory Study Of Good Practices, Raf Peels, Caroline Gijselinckx, Wim Van Opstal, Li Zhao
Wim Van Opstal
The ILO Social Enterprise Development Targeting Unemployed Youth in South Africa (SETYSA) project seeks to promote social enterprise development in South Africa by supporting progress towards a conducive enabling environment and the development of appropriate business development service (BDS) products for potential social entrepreneurs, with a particular focus on young entrepreneurs. The ultimate objective of the project is to encourage the creation of employment opportunities within social enterprises, as well as the social value delivered by the goods and services they produce.
This report presents a selection of policy measures that governments worldwide are taking to create a supportive environment …
Een Monitor Voor De Sociale Inschakelingseconomie In Vlaanderen. Methodologierapport., Eva Deraedt, Wim Van Opstal
Een Monitor Voor De Sociale Inschakelingseconomie In Vlaanderen. Methodologierapport., Eva Deraedt, Wim Van Opstal
Wim Van Opstal
Dit rapport beschrijft de gehanteerde methodologie bij het opstellen van een monitoringinstrument dat ontwikkeld werd om de sociale inschakelingseconomie in Vlaanderen in kaart te brengen (Deraedt & Van Opstal, 2009). De ontwikkeling van dit instrument vond plaats aan het HIVA (K.U.Leuven), kadert in de onderzoekswerkzaamheden van het Steunpunt Werk en Sociale Economie en werd uitgevoerd in opdracht van de Vlaamse administratie. De opdracht bestond erin bestaande databanken maximaal te valoriseren om zo het veelkleurige pallet van de sociale inschakelingseconomie in kaart te brengen. Het uiteindelijke resultaat levert ons de nodige indicatoren op om een profielschets te kunnen maken van de …
Een Monitor Voor De Sociale Inschakelingseconomie In Vlaanderen. Resultatenrapport., Eva Deraedt, Wim Van Opstal
Een Monitor Voor De Sociale Inschakelingseconomie In Vlaanderen. Resultatenrapport., Eva Deraedt, Wim Van Opstal
Wim Van Opstal
Dit rapport toont de resultaten van een monitoring- instrument dat ontwikkeld werd om de sociale inschakelingseconomie in Vlaanderen in kaart te brengen. De ontwikkeling van dit instrument vond plaats aan het HIVA (K.U.Leuven), kadert in de onderzoekswerkzaamheden van het Steunpunt Werk en Sociale Economie en werd uitgevoerd in opdracht van de Vlaamse administratie. De opdracht bestond erin bestaande databanken maximaal te valoriseren om zo het veelkleurige pallet van de sociale inschakelingseconomie in kaart te brengen.
Het uiteindelijke resultaat levert ons de nodige indicatoren op om een profielschets te kunnen maken van de ondernemingen die actief zijn in de sociale inschakelingseconomie, …
How Best To Auction Natural Resources, Peter Cramton
How Best To Auction Natural Resources, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
I study the design of auctions of natural resources, such as oil or mineral rights. A good auction design promotes both an efficient assignment of rights and competitive revenues for the seller. The structure of bidder preferences and the degree of competition are key factors in determining the best design. With weak competition and additive values, a simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auction may suffice. With more complex value structures, a dynamic auction with package bids, such as the clock-proxy auction, likely is needed to promote the efficiency and revenue objectives. Bidding on production shares, rather than bonuses, typically increases government take …
Auctioning The Digital Dividend, Peter Cramton
Auctioning The Digital Dividend, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
I begin by describing some of the problems of the simultaneous ascending auction. Then I present the package clock auction, which retains the benefits, while addressing the weaknesses, of the simultaneous ascending auction. I emphasize two essential elements of the package clock auction: the pricing rule and the activity rule. Along the way, I summarize both experimental and field results with the package clock auction.