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Industrial Organization Commons

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Full-Text Articles in Industrial Organization

Tick Size Constraints, Two-Sided Markets, And Competition Between Stock Exchanges, Yong Chao, Chen Yao, Mao Ye Dec 2014

Tick Size Constraints, Two-Sided Markets, And Competition Between Stock Exchanges, Yong Chao, Chen Yao, Mao Ye

Yong Chao

We investigate competition between stock exchanges that choose the number of trading platforms to establish and the fee structure on each platform. U.S. exchanges compete for order flow by setting “make” fees for limit orders and “take” fees for market orders. When traders can quote continuous prices, the manner in which exchanges divide the total fee between makers and takers is irrelevant, because traders can choose prices that perfectly counteract any division of the fee. In such a case, order flow will simply consolidate to the platform with the lowest total fee. The one-cent minimum tick size constraints imposed by …


Collusive Bidding In The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz May 2014

Collusive Bidding In The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz

Jesse A. Schwartz

This paper describes the bid signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. Bidders in these auctions bid on numerous spectrum licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to raise the bid on any license. Simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. This “code bidding” occurs when one bidder tags the last few digits of its bid with the market number of a related license. We examine how extensively bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids …


Prediction Markets To Forecast Electricity Demand, Peter Cramton, Luciano De Castro Mar 2010

Prediction Markets To Forecast Electricity Demand, Peter Cramton, Luciano De Castro

Luciano I. de Castro

Forecasting electricity demand for future years is an essential step in resource planning. A common approach is for the system operator to predict future demand from the estimates of individual distribution companies. However, the predictions thus obtained may be of poor quality, since the reporting incentives are unclear. We propose a prediction market as a form of forecasting future demand for electricity. We describe how to implement a simple prediction market for continuous variables, using only contracts based on binary variables. We also discuss specific issues concerning the implementation of such a market.