Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Finance
A Note On Social Welfare Orders Satisfying Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle, Ram Dubey
A Note On Social Welfare Orders Satisfying Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle, Ram Dubey
Department of Economics Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works
This paper studies the constructive nature of social welfare orders on infinite utility streams defined on X = Yℕ, satisfying the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (PD), which are known to be representable (see Alcantud (2010) and Sakamoto (2012)). We describe the restrictions on domain Y for explicit representation or construction of the social welfare orders satisfying (i) PD and monotonicity; or (ii) PD only. We show that the restrictions on Y for either (a) construction; or (b) explicit representation of the social welfare orders are identical in both cases.
On Construction Of Social Welfare Orders Satisfying Hammond Equity And Weak Pareto Axioms, Ram Dubey
On Construction Of Social Welfare Orders Satisfying Hammond Equity And Weak Pareto Axioms, Ram Dubey
Department of Economics Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works
This paper examines the constructive nature of a social welfare order that respects Hammond equity axiom and Weak Pareto axiom. It describes the domains (of the one period utilities) on which an explicit construction is possible. A social welfare order satisfying the Hammond equity and Weak Pareto admits an explicit construction if and only if the domain is a well-ordered set.
Project Selection: Commitment And Competition, Vidya Atal, Talia Bar, Sidartha Gordon
Project Selection: Commitment And Competition, Vidya Atal, Talia Bar, Sidartha Gordon
Department of Economics Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works
We examine project selection decisions of firms constrained in the number of projects they can handle at once. A new project opportunity arises every period. Taking on a project requires a commitment of uncertain duration, preventing the firm from selecting another project in subsequent periods until the commitment ends. In our dynamic game, when two firms are free of commitment, they move sequentially in random order. Symmetric pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria always exist. In equilibrium, the first mover strategically rejects some projects that are then selected by the second mover, even when the value of the project is the …
Open Questions In Open Source: Exploring Incentives, Licensing And Competition, Vidya Atal, Kameshwari Shankar
Open Questions In Open Source: Exploring Incentives, Licensing And Competition, Vidya Atal, Kameshwari Shankar
Department of Economics Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works
Open Source Software (OSS) has grown in importance over the last few decades and now constitutes an important part of the software market particularly in mobile and web technology. In this paper, we provide a preliminary theoretical framework for analyzing currently unexamined issues regarding developer participation in OSS and competition between open source and proprietary software. We start by looking at the upstream market where developers voluntarily contribute effort into the development of OSS without claiming any copyright for their contributions. We explore the relationship between open source licensing and developers' effort provision and suggest an empirical test of developer …