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The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac–Module F: Federal Reserve’S Large-Scale Asset Purchase (Lsap) Program, Daniel Thompson, Adam Kulam Apr 2021

The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac–Module F: Federal Reserve’S Large-Scale Asset Purchase (Lsap) Program, Daniel Thompson, Adam Kulam

Journal of Financial Crises

By late 2008, the secondary mortgage markets were suffering high default rates, causing mortgage lending to slow and the value of mortgage securities to plummet. The Federal Reserve lowered the federal funds rate, and the government placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, yet credit in housing and other financial markets remained tight. On November 25, the Fed announced its intent to purchase up to $500 billion in agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and $100 billion in agency debt to reduce the cost and increase the availability of mortgage credit, which would support housing markets and improve conditions in financial …


The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac – Module E: The Housing And Economic Recovery Act Of 2008, Daniel Thompson Apr 2021

The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac – Module E: The Housing And Economic Recovery Act Of 2008, Daniel Thompson

Journal of Financial Crises

As the U.S. housing crisis worsened in 2007, and through 2008, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) headed towards insolvency. At the same time, contractions in private securitization resulted in these two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) purchasing nearly half of all new mortgages. In July, the government passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) to provide a more effective regulator and to address public uncertainty regarding whether the government would back the GSEs’ assets and liabilities. HERA provided Treasury and the newly formed Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) …


The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac – Module D: Treasury’S Gse Mbs Purchase Program, Michael Zanger-Tishler, Rosalind Z. Wiggins Apr 2021

The Rescue Of Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac – Module D: Treasury’S Gse Mbs Purchase Program, Michael Zanger-Tishler, Rosalind Z. Wiggins

Journal of Financial Crises

As the housing crisis escalated during the second half of 2007, two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), occupied an increasingly central role in the secondary mortgage market, purchasing a greater percentage of new mortgages as private securitization rapidly contracted. As their importance in this market grew, the two GSEs also began to suffer billion-dollar losses, inciting concerns that they might not be able to stay solvent throughout the remainder of the crisis. On September 6, 2008, fearing the systemic consequences of the two firms’ failures, the …


The United Kingdom's Secured Commercial Paper Facility (U.K. Gfc), Claire Simon Oct 2020

The United Kingdom's Secured Commercial Paper Facility (U.K. Gfc), Claire Simon

Journal of Financial Crises

In mid-2009, the Bank of England (Bank) opened the Secured Commercial Paper Facility (SCPF) as part of its larger Asset Purchase Facility (APF). Through the facility, the Bank offered to purchase secured commercial paper (SCP), a form of asset backed commercial paper, issued by approved programs from both dealers acting as principal in the primary market and after issue from secondary market holders. The facility was designed to establish the Bank as a ready buyer of SCP in the primary market and as a backstop purchaser in the secondary market. In extending the APF to include purchases of SCP, the …


Market Liquidity Programs: Gfc And Before, June Rhee, Greg Feldberg, Ariel Smith, Andrew Metrick Oct 2020

Market Liquidity Programs: Gfc And Before, June Rhee, Greg Feldberg, Ariel Smith, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

The virulence of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09 (GFC) was explained in large part by the increased reliance of the global financial system on market-based funding and the lack of preexisting tools to address a disruption in that type of system. This paper surveys market liquidity programs (MLPs), which we define as government interventions in which the key motivation is to stabilize liquidity in a specific wholesale funding market that is under stress. Most of the MLPs surveyed in this paper were launched during and after the GFC, but two pre-GFC MLPs are included. A subsequent survey on MLPs …


Restructuring And Forgiveness In Financial Crises D: The Japanese Financial Crisis Of The 1990s, Christian M. Mcnamara, Andrew Metrick Apr 2020

Restructuring And Forgiveness In Financial Crises D: The Japanese Financial Crisis Of The 1990s, Christian M. Mcnamara, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In November 1997 the Japanese government confronted a problem of enormous proportions when the turmoil that had been roiling the financial markets since the collapse of a real estate and stock market asset bubble in 1990 reached a crescendo with the failure of four major financial institutions in quick succession in the space of a month. Prior to these failures, the damage done by the collapsing bubble had seemed to be limited to certain segments of the financial landscape, and the government’s response consisted largely of targeted intervention when necessary for clearly insolvent financial institutions, with a more comprehensive approach …


Restructuring And Forgiveness In Financial Crises C: The Swedish Banking Crisis Of 1990-94, Christian M. Mcnamara, Dr. Lars Thunell, Andrew Metrick Apr 2020

Restructuring And Forgiveness In Financial Crises C: The Swedish Banking Crisis Of 1990-94, Christian M. Mcnamara, Dr. Lars Thunell, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In the Spring of 1992, the Swedish government faced a dilemma. The country was in the midst of an economic downturn stemming from the collapse of asset prices (especially in real estate) that had spiked as a result of a credit boom that followed the deregulation of the Swedish banking system in the mid-1980s. Initially the impact of the downturn on the country’s banks had seemed to be limited to a small number of specific firms that the government moved to assist on an ad hoc basis in 1991. However, evidence was mounting that the banking crisis was reaching a …


Restructuring And Forgiveness In Financial Crises B: The Asian Crisis Of 1997, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick Apr 2020

Restructuring And Forgiveness In Financial Crises B: The Asian Crisis Of 1997, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Asia’s economy, Thailand in particular, was booming when the financial crises hit in the 1990s. However, troubles were brewing underneath the seemingly buoyant economy. With a fragile financial system and ineffective domestic government responses to these troubles, an exchange rate crisis took over Thailand, and this crisis started a financial contagion in the neighboring countries. This case reviews the background and domestic government responses to contain the crisis, and the international intervention provided by the International Monetary Fund including the assistance and the required reforms accompanying the support.


Restructuring And Forgiveness In Financial Crises A: The Mexican Peso Crisis Of 1994-95, Christian M. Mcnamara, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick Apr 2020

Restructuring And Forgiveness In Financial Crises A: The Mexican Peso Crisis Of 1994-95, Christian M. Mcnamara, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Following a year in which repeated political turmoil sapped investor confidence in Mexico, putting pressure on the peso and draining the country’s foreign exchange reserves, on December 22, 1994, the Mexican government sparked a financial crisis by unexpectedly abandoning its policy of anchoring the peso to the US dollar and instead allowing it to float freely. The resulting collapse of the peso left Mexico with $40 billion to $50 billion in external debt (much of it dollar-indexed) coming due in the near term and almost no foreign exchange reserves. Faced with the prospect that Mexico would either default on its …


Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises B: U.S. Guarantees During The Global Financial Crisis, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick Apr 2020

Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises B: U.S. Guarantees During The Global Financial Crisis, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

During 2008-09, the federal government extended multiple guarantee programs in an effort to restore the financial market and contain the panic and crisis in the market. For example, the Treasury provided a temporary guarantee program for the money market funds, the FDIC decided to stand behind certain debts and non-interest-bearing transaction accounts, and the Treasury, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve agreed to share losses in certain assets belonging to Citigroup. This case reviews these guarantee programs implemented during the global financial crisis by the government and explores the different rationale that shaped certain design features of each program.


Basel Iii G: Shadow Banking And Project Finance, Christian M. Mcnamara, Andrew Metrick Jan 2020

Basel Iii G: Shadow Banking And Project Finance, Christian M. Mcnamara, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), a liquidity standard introduced by Basel III, seeks to promote a better match between the liquidity of a bank’s assets and the manner in which the bank funds those assets. The NSFR requires banks to maintain a minimum amount of funding deemed “stable” by the Basel framework based on the liquidity of the banks’ assets and activities over a one-year timeframe. One of the areas seen as most affected by this development may be bank participation in project finance for infrastructure development. Since the global demand for infrastructure development remains robust, the shadow banking …


Basel Iii D: Swiss Finish To Basel Iii, Christian M. Mcnamara, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick Jan 2020

Basel Iii D: Swiss Finish To Basel Iii, Christian M. Mcnamara, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

After the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced the Basel III framework in 2010, individual countries confronted the question of how best to implement the framework given their unique circumstances. Switzerland, with a banking industry that is both heavily concentrated and very large relative to the size of its overall economy, faced a special challenge. It ultimately adopted what is sometimes referred to as the “Swiss Finish” to Basel III—enhanced requirements applicable to Switzerland’s “too-big-to-fail” banks Credit Suisse and UBS that go beyond the base requirements established by the BCBS. Yet the prominent role played by relatively new contingent …


Basel Iii B: Basel Iii Overview, Christian M. Mcnamara, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick Jan 2020

Basel Iii B: Basel Iii Overview, Christian M. Mcnamara, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-09, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) faced the critical task of diagnosing what went wrong and then updating regulatory standards aimed at preventing it from occurring again. In seeking to strengthen the microprudential regulation associated with the earlier Basel Accords while also adding a macroprudential overlay, Basel III consists of proposals in three main areas intended to address 1) capital reform, 2) liquidity standards, and 3) systemic risk and interconnectedness. This case considers the causes of the 2007-09 financial crisis and what they suggest about weaknesses in the Basel regime …


Jpmorgan Chase London Whale Z: Background & Overview, Arwin G. Zeissler, Rosalind Bennett, Andrew Metrick Jan 2020

Jpmorgan Chase London Whale Z: Background & Overview, Arwin G. Zeissler, Rosalind Bennett, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In December 2011, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of JPMorgan Chase (JPM) instructed the bank’s Chief Investment Office to reduce the size of its Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) during 2012, so that JPM could decrease its Risk-Weighted Assets as the bank prepared to adopt the impending Basel III bank capital regulations. However, the SCP traders were also told to minimize the trading costs incurred to reduce Risk-Weighted Assets, while still maintaining the opportunity to profit from unexpected corporate bankruptcies. In an attempt to balance these competing objectives, head SCP derivatives trader Bruno Iksil suggested in January 2012 …


Incorporating Macroprudential Financial Regulation Into Monetary Policy, Aaron Klein Jan 2020

Incorporating Macroprudential Financial Regulation Into Monetary Policy, Aaron Klein

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper proposes two insights into financial regulation and monetary policy. The first enhances understanding the relationship between them, building on the automobile metaphor that describes monetary policy: when to accelerate or brake for curves miles ahead. Enhancing the metaphor, financial markets are the transmission. In a financial crisis, markets cease to function, equivalent to a transmission shifting into neutral. This explains both monetary policy’s diminished effectiveness in stimulating the economy and why the financial crisis shock to real economic output greatly exceeded central bank forecasts.

The second insight is that both excess leverage and fundamental mispricing of asset values …


European Banking Union D: Cross-Border Resolution—Dexia Group, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick Nov 2019

European Banking Union D: Cross-Border Resolution—Dexia Group, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In September 2008, Dexia Group, SA, the world’s largest provider of public finance, experienced a sudden liquidity crisis. In response, the governments of Belgium, France, and Luxembourg provided the company a capital infusion and credit support. In February 2010, the company adopted a European Union (EU)-approved restructuring plan that required it to scale back its businesses and cease proprietary trading. In June 2011, Dexia withdrew from the government-sponsored credit support program before its expiration date, and in July, the company announced that it had passed an EU stress test. However, just three months later, Dexia wrote down its substantial position …


European Central Bank Tools And Policy Actions A: Open Market Operations, Collateral Expansion And Standing Facilities, Chase P. Ross, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick Nov 2019

European Central Bank Tools And Policy Actions A: Open Market Operations, Collateral Expansion And Standing Facilities, Chase P. Ross, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Beginning in August 2007, the European Central Bank (ECB) responded to market turmoil with a variety of standard and non-standard monetary policy tools. This case discusses the operational framework of the ECB’s open market operation tools and standing facilities before and during the financial crisis. Specifically, this case describes the ECB’s use of its main refinancing and longer-term refinancing operations, the expansion of collateral eligible for use in Eurosystem credit operations, and the ECB’s standing facilities, including its marginal lending and deposit facilities.


Ireland And Iceland In Crisis C: Iceland’S Landsbanki Icesave, Arwin G. Zeissler, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick Nov 2019

Ireland And Iceland In Crisis C: Iceland’S Landsbanki Icesave, Arwin G. Zeissler, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

At year-end 2005, almost all of the total assets of Iceland’s banking system were concentrated in just three banks (Glitnir, Kaupthing, and Landsbanki). These banks were criticized by certain financial analysts in early 2006 for being overly dependent on wholesale funding, much of it short-term, that could easily disappear if creditors’ confidence in these banks faltered for any reason. Landsbanki, followed later by Kaupthing and then Glitnir, responded to this criticism and replaced part of their wholesale funding by using online accounts to gather deposits from individuals across Europe. In Landsbanki’s case, these new deposits were marketed under the name …


Ireland And Iceland In Crisis A: Increasing Risk In Ireland, Arwin G. Zeissler, Karen Braun-Munzinger, Andrew Metrick Nov 2019

Ireland And Iceland In Crisis A: Increasing Risk In Ireland, Arwin G. Zeissler, Karen Braun-Munzinger, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Ireland went from being the poorest member of the European Economic Community in 1973 to enjoying the second highest per-capita income among European countries by 2007. Healthy growth in the 1990s eventually gave way to a concentrated boom in property-related lending in the 2000s. The growth in the aggregate loan balances of Ireland’s six major banks greatly exceeded the growth in gross domestic product (GDP); as a result, bank loan balances grew from 1.1 times GDP in 2000 to over 2.0 times GDP by 2007. Given the small size of the domestic retail depositor base, the Irish banks increasingly funded …


Jpmorgan Chase London Whale H: Cross-Border Regulation, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick Aug 2019

Jpmorgan Chase London Whale H: Cross-Border Regulation, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

As a global financial service provider, JPMorgan Chase (JPM) is supervised by banking regulatory agencies in different countries. Bruno Iksil, the derivatives trader primarily responsible for the $6 billion trading loss in 2012, was based in JPM’s London office. This office was regulated both by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) of the United States (US) and by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which served as the sole regulator of all financial services in the United Kingdom (UK). Banking regulators in the US and the UK have entered into agreements with one another to define basic parameters …


Jpmorgan Chase London Whale D: Risk-Management Practices, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick Aug 2019

Jpmorgan Chase London Whale D: Risk-Management Practices, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

JPMorgan Chase (JPM) prided itself on having the best risk-management practices in the financial industry, having survived the 2007-09 financial crisis in better shape than many competitors. Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon often spoke of the bank’s “fortress balance sheet.” A keen focus on risk management is vital to JPM’s longevity, as is the case with all highly leveraged financial institutions. However, the JPM Task Force that investigated the $6 billion 2012 London Whale trading loss concluded that risk-management practices at the bank’s Chief Investment Office (CIO), the unit in which the loss occurred, were given less scrutiny by senior …


Jpmorgan Chase London Whale C: Risk Limits, Metrics, And Models, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick Aug 2019

Jpmorgan Chase London Whale C: Risk Limits, Metrics, And Models, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Value at Risk (VaR) is one of the most commonly used ways to measure and monitor market risk. At JPMorgan Chase (JPM), very large derivative positions established by Bruno Iksil in the Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) caused the bank’s Chief Investment Office (CIO) to exceed its VaR limit for four days in a row in January 2012. In response, the CIO changed to a new VaR model on January 30, which appeared to immediately reduce VaR by half. However, JPM soon discovered that this new VaR model had not been properly implemented and the bank went back to using the …


Jpmorgan Chase London Whale B: Derivatives Valuation, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick Aug 2019

Jpmorgan Chase London Whale B: Derivatives Valuation, Arwin G. Zeissler, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

After consistently producing positive results through 2011, the JPMorgan Chase (JPM) traders who oversaw the bank’s Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) grew alarmed by a consistent string of losses beginning in January 2012. (The SCP was maintained by JPM to help hedge default risk and was the source of the 2012 London Whale trading loss.) To minimize the losses reported to their superiors until such time that market prices hopefully turned in their favor, the SCP traders began valuing their largest derivative positions in a manner that was not consistent with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and JPM policy. The fair …


Jpmorgan Chase London Whale A: Risky Business, Arwin G. Zeissler, Daisuke Ikeda, Andrew Metrick Aug 2019

Jpmorgan Chase London Whale A: Risky Business, Arwin G. Zeissler, Daisuke Ikeda, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In December 2011, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of JPMorgan Chase (JPM) instructed the bank’s Chief Investment Office to reduce the size of its Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) during 2012, so that JPM could decrease its RiskWeighted Assets as the bank prepared to adopt the impending Basel III bank capital regulations. However, the SCP traders were also told to minimize the trading costs incurred to reduce Risk-Weighted Assets, while still maintaining the opportunity to profit from unexpected corporate bankruptcies. In an attempt to balance these competing objectives, head SCP derivatives trader Bruno Iksil suggested in January 2012 …


The Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program: A Systemwide Systemic Risk Exception, Lee Davison Aug 2019

The Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program: A Systemwide Systemic Risk Exception, Lee Davison

Journal of Financial Crises

In the fall of 2008, short-term credit markets were all but frozen, creating liquidity issues for banks and bank holding companies that could not rollover their debt at reasonable rates. Fearing that the situation would worsen if something was not done, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve Board invoked, and the Secretary of the Treasury approved, the use of the “systemic risk exception” (SRE) under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, to provide unprecedented broad-based relief to struggling banks. The SRE permitted the FDIC to depart from its “least-cost” requirement when addressing failing …


The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy A: Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick Mar 2019

The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy A: Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., the fourth-largest U.S. investment bank, sought Chapter 11 protection, initiating the largest bankruptcy proceeding in U.S. history. The demise of the 164-year old firm was a seminal event in the global financial crisis. Under the direction of its long-time Chief Executive Officer Richard Fuld, Lehman had been very successful pursuing a high-leverage, high-risk business model that required it to daily raise billions of dollars to fund its operations. Beginning in 2006, Lehman began to invest aggressively in real-estate-related assets and soon had significant exposures to housing and subprime mortgages, just as these …