Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory
The Case For Affirmative Auction: From Conscience To Coffers, Ian Ayres, Peter Cramton
The Case For Affirmative Auction: From Conscience To Coffers, Ian Ayres, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
The Federal Communications Commission’s auction of wireless communication licenses last fall has been criticized as a huge Government giveaway because of the substantial bidding preferences granted to women and minorities. In March, Federal court action delayed the FCC’s June auction until August to consider the legality of similar preferences. But far from being a giveaway, affirmative action actually increased the total amount paid to the Government by about $15 million. Women and minority bidders were granted a 40 percent bidding credit on certain licenses and the right to pay the Government in installments over 10 years at a favorable rate. …
Money Out Of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband Pcs Auction, Peter Cramton
Money Out Of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband Pcs Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
The Federal Communications Commission held its first auction of radio spectrum at the Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction in July 1994. The simultaneous multiple-round auction, which lasted five days, was an ascending bid auction in which all licenses were offered simultaneously. This paper describes the auction rules and how bidders prepared for the auction. The full history of bidding is presented. Several questions for auction theory are discussed. In the end, the government collected $617 million for ten licenses. The auction was viewed by all as a huge success—an excellent example of bringing economic theory to bear on practical problems of …
Decption And Mutual Trust: A Reply To Strudler, Peter Cramton, J Gregory Dees
Decption And Mutual Trust: A Reply To Strudler, Peter Cramton, J Gregory Dees
Peter Cramton
Alan Strudler has written a stimulating and provocative article about deception in negotiation. He presents his views, in part, in contrast with our earlier work on the Mutual Trust Perspective. We believe that Strudler is wrong in his account of the ethics of deception in negotiation and in his quick dismissal of the Mutual Trust Perspective. Though his mistakes may be informative, his views are potentially harmful to business practice. In this paper, we present arguments against Strudler’s position and attempt to salvage the Mutual-Trust Perspective from his attack. Strudler’s work reaffirms the need for a more pragmatic approach to …
Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning From Disagreement, Peter Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey
Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning From Disagreement, Peter Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey
Peter Cramton
In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed mechanism to some status quo. If equilibrium play in the status quo mechanism depends on the players’ beliefs, then the inference drawn if someone objects to the proposed mechanism may alter the participation constraints. We investigate this issue by modeling the mechanism design problem as a two-stage process, consisting of a ratification stage followed by the actual play of the chosen game. We develop and illustrate a new concept, ratifiability, that takes account of inferences from a veto in a consistent way.