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Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory

Cooperation In Temporary Partnerships, Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré Apr 2024

Cooperation In Temporary Partnerships, Gabriele Camera, Alessandro Gioffré

ESI Working Papers

The literature on cooperation in infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmas covers the extreme opposites of the matching spectrum: partners, a player’s opponent never changes, and strangers, a player’s opponent randomly changes in every period. Here, we extend the analysis to settings where the opponent changes, but not in every period. In these temporary partnerships, players can deter some deviations by directly sanctioning their partner. Hence, relaxing the extreme assumption of one-period matchings can support some cooperation also off equilibrium because a class of strategies emerges that are less extreme than the typical “grim” strategy. We establish conditions supporting full …


Who Helps Tsimane Children And Adults?, Eric Schniter, Daniel K. Cummings, Paul L. Hooper, Maguin Gutierrez Cayuba, Jonathan Stieglitz, Benjamin C. Trumble, Hillard S. Kaplan, Michael D. Gurven Apr 2024

Who Helps Tsimane Children And Adults?, Eric Schniter, Daniel K. Cummings, Paul L. Hooper, Maguin Gutierrez Cayuba, Jonathan Stieglitz, Benjamin C. Trumble, Hillard S. Kaplan, Michael D. Gurven

ESI Working Papers

We consider several forms of helping behavior among Tsimane Amerindians of Bolivia, including provision of shelter, childcare, food, sickcare, loans, advice, and cultural influence. While kin selection theory is traditionally invoked to explain nepotistic nurturing of youngsters by closely related kin, much less attention has been given to understanding the help provided to children and adults by individuals without close genetic relatedness. To explain who provides the various forms of help that we consider, we evaluate support for several predictions derived from kin selection theory: that helpers are most often closely related and from an older generation, provide more help …


Ambiguity And Ambiguity Attitudes Across Auctions, Cary Deck, Paan Jindapon, Tigran Melkonyan, Mark Schneider Mar 2024

Ambiguity And Ambiguity Attitudes Across Auctions, Cary Deck, Paan Jindapon, Tigran Melkonyan, Mark Schneider

ESI Working Papers

Studies of ambiguity perceptions and attitudes are moving beyond the Ellsberg urn to examine people’s responses to ambiguity in naturally occurring events, games, and financial markets. In this study, we measure ambiguity perceptions and attitudes for market prices and allocations in four classical auction formats (first-price and second-price sealed bid auctions, English and Dutch clock auctions). We find ambiguity attitudes, representing individual preferences, are stable across auctions. However, the perceived ambiguity surrounding auction prices is lowest for English clock auctions which are obviously strategyproof (OSP), followed by second-price auctions which are strategyproof (SP), followed by a tie between first-price and …


Cognitive Abilities And Individual Earnings In Hybrid Continuous Double Auctions, Yan Peng, Jason Shachat, Lijia Wei, S. Sarah Zhang Feb 2024

Cognitive Abilities And Individual Earnings In Hybrid Continuous Double Auctions, Yan Peng, Jason Shachat, Lijia Wei, S. Sarah Zhang

ESI Working Papers

We study the influence of cognitive abilities, in particular reaction time, trader intuition (Theory of Mind), and cognitive reflection abilities, on human participants’ individual earnings when competing alongside algorithmic traders in continuous double auctions. In balanced markets, where each human trader has an algorithmic trader clone with the same valuations or costs, faster human reaction time significantly improves trading performance, while Theory of Mind can be detrimental to human trading performance, particularly for sellers. For unbalanced markets with humans and algorithmic traders on opposite sides of the market, the effects of cognitive abilities depend on trader role as well as …


One-Half Heuristic In Overconfidence Research, Vojtěch Zíka Feb 2024

One-Half Heuristic In Overconfidence Research, Vojtěch Zíka

ESI Working Papers

This laboratory experiment (N=120) explored the possibility that overconfidence research concerning overestimation and overplacement may be affected by the one-half heuristic, a tendency of individuals to estimate quantities with unknown distributions at half of the maximum value. The data from multiple rounds of the computerized hand game Rock–Paper–Scissors provide convincing evidence that half of the maximum is the most popular estimate and that manipulating the game’s average score can affect the direction and magnitude of estimation, averaging, and placement levels. The resulting methodological proposal is that the score participants estimate should have an expected value equal to half of the …


How Does Passive Investing Effect The Informational Efficiency Of Prices?, Brice Corgnet, Mark Desantis, Yan Peng, David Porter, Jason Shachat Feb 2024

How Does Passive Investing Effect The Informational Efficiency Of Prices?, Brice Corgnet, Mark Desantis, Yan Peng, David Porter, Jason Shachat

ESI Working Papers

We investigate the causal effects of passive investing on informational efficiency and market quality metrics by developing a novel laboratory experiment that introduces Index trackers with exogenous passive investment flows. We find that, while improving liquidity, Index tracking hurts informational efficiency, confirming our main hypothesis. Furthermore, we observe violations of the law of one price, leading to widespread and persistent arbitrage opportunities. Additionally, our research uncovers that Active traders, particularly those with private information about asset values and high cognitive ability, reap benefits from the introduction of Index tracking.


Representation And Bracketing In Repeated Games, Mouli Modak Feb 2024

Representation And Bracketing In Repeated Games, Mouli Modak

ESI Working Papers

In this experimental paper, the author investigates the framing effect of different representations of multiple strategic settings or games on a player’s strategic behavior. Two representations of the same environment are employed, wherein a player engages in two infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. In the first representation (termed Split), the stage games are shown separately. In contrast, the second representation (termed Linked) displays a combined stage game. The choice bracketing, distinguishing between Narrow and Broad bracketing, is considered a potential cause behind any disparity in behavior between the two representations. The Split representation does not necessitate broad bracketing, whereas the …


How Personalized Networks Can Limit Free Riding: A Multi-Group Version Of The Public Goods Game, Aaron S. Berman, Laurence R. Iannaccone, Mouli Modak Jan 2024

How Personalized Networks Can Limit Free Riding: A Multi-Group Version Of The Public Goods Game, Aaron S. Berman, Laurence R. Iannaccone, Mouli Modak

ESI Working Papers

People belong to many different groups, and few belong to the same network of groups. Moreover, people routinely reduce their involvement in dysfunctional groups while increasing involvement in those they find more attractive. The net effect can be an increase in overall cooperation and the partial isolation of free-riders, even if free-riders are never punished, excluded, or recognized. We formalize and test this conjecture with an agent-based social simulation and a multi-good extension of the standard repeated public goods game. Our initial results from three treatments suggest that the multi-group setting indeed raises overall cooperation and dampens the impact of …


Personal Lies, Gary Charness, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara Jan 2024

Personal Lies, Gary Charness, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara

ESI Working Papers

Using the mind game, we provide experimental evidence that people are more likely to lie when they disclose non-personal information (e.g., reporting a number they thought of) compared with personal information (e.g., reporting the last digit of their birth year). Our findings suggest that the type of information is an important factor for lying behavior.