Economic Theory Commons^™

Cnn-Lstm Vs Ann: Option Pricing Theory, Edward Chang

Undergraduate Student Research Internships Conference

The modern derivatives market has been steadily growing since the development of the first accurate option pricing model by Fischer Black, Robert Merton, and Myron Scholes. Since then, there have been many different approaches to more accurately price options like the binomial option pricing model and approaches using technology such as machine learning. There are many different research papers on option pricing with artificial neural networks (“ANN”) but not many with other neural network types. We contribute to the existing literature by developing a convolutional neural network – long short-term memory (“CNN-LSTM”) model to price options and compare it to …

Analysis Of Credit Risk And Single / Two Factor Model, Siwen Chen

Undergraduate Student Research Internships Conference

Since 2008, businesses and banks must manage and track more risk than ever before. Financial risk management helps companies and banks decrease the risk of investment and trade. Additionally, financial risk management gives a guide on how to forecast and manage the risk efficiently. More specifically, the three major risks are market risk, credit risk, and operational risk. This report will focus on the credit risk: introducing the definition of credit risk, single factor model, the relationship between coefficient and default probability, and the relationship of m coefficient and default probability. Using the single factor model, we will extend the …

A Psychological Profile Of The Digitized Economy: Who Buys Cryptocurrencies, Nfts, And Meme-Stocks (And Why)?, Nicole Wolfe

Undergraduate Student Research Internships Conference

As the global digital economy continues to grow in interest and financial worth, it is imperative to harvest data to gain early information on this nuanced economy. Already, we have witnessed billions of dollars in losses and wins at the blink of an eye, encouragement to invest from well-known celebrities and politicians, and high anxiety from the newness, power consumption, and potential outcomes of this nuanced system. Stemming from the lack of solid evidence in this emerging field, we hope to gain more insight on the early players and variation within the digitized economy. Similarly, we hope to identify specific …

Essays On Conflict Mediation, Ali Kamranzadeh

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

An important barrier to conflict resolution is asymmetric information. That is adversaries have private information about their objectives, resources, and strengths during the conflict and have incentives to misrepresent this information during the negotiations. Third-party institutions, like mediators, can help adversaries to reach an agreement by making a peace proposal. In this thesis, I explore the implication of asymmetric information of players to the design of an optimal peace proposal by a mediator.

Chapter 2, co-authored with Charles Zheng, studies a problem of conflict mediation where a mediator proposes a split of a good between two ex-ante identical contestants thereby …

Essays On The All-Pay Auction, Henk Schouten

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

Three all-pay auction models are examined. The first is a symmetric two-player binary-signal all-pay auction with correlated signals and interdependent valuations. The first chapter provides a complete characterization of each form of equilibrium and gives conditions for their existence. The main finding is that there generically exists a unique equilibrium. The unique equilibrium can only be one of four forms of equilibria. I apply my all-pay auction model to elections, where a candidate that receives good news from the polls behaves in a rationally overconfident manner and reduces her equilibrium effort. Consequently, the other candidate can win the election in …

Essays On Market Design And Auctions, Mingshi Kang

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

My thesis consists of three chapters that contribute to redistribution-driven market design and sponsored link auctions.

Chapter 2 and 3 (co-authored with Charles Zheng) study redistribution-driven market design with endogenous buyers and sellers. In Chapter 2, we consider a large market environment with each individual endowed with equal shares of a limited resources and allowed to buy or sell the shares. We characterize the interim (incentive-constrained) Pareto frontier subject to market clearance and budget balance, and find that at most two prices are needed to attain any (interim) Pareto optimum. Under robust conditions of the primitives, the Pareto optimal allocation …