Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Restricted domains (2)
- Strategy-proofness (2)
- Tops-only domains (2)
- Asymptotic expansion (1)
- DDS Theorem. (1)
-
- Exact and approximate implementation (1)
- HAC estimation (1)
- Incentive compatibility (1)
- Iteratively undominated strategies (1)
- Level Effect (1)
- Long run variance (1)
- Loss function (1)
- Mathematical models (1)
- Measurability (1)
- Mechanism design (1)
- Nonlinear Diffusion (1)
- Normalizing Transformation (1)
- Optimal smoothing parameter (1)
- Power kernel (1)
- Power maximization (1)
- Restricted deception-proofness (1)
- Size control (1)
- Social choice functions (1)
- Tops-only property (1)
- Type I error (1)
- Type II error (1)
- Voting (1)
- Voting rules (1)
- Voting-rules (1)
- Publication
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory
Power Maximization And Size Control Of Heteroscedasticity And Autocorrelation Robust Tests With Exponentiated Kernels, Yixiao Sun, Peter C. B. Phillips, Sainan Jin
Power Maximization And Size Control Of Heteroscedasticity And Autocorrelation Robust Tests With Exponentiated Kernels, Yixiao Sun, Peter C. B. Phillips, Sainan Jin
Research Collection School Of Economics
Using the power kernels of Phillips, Sun, and Jin (2006, 2007), we examine the large sample asymptotic properties of the t-test for different choices of power parameter (ρ). We show that the nonstandard fixed-ρ limit distributions of the t-statistic provide more accurate approximations to the finite sample distributions than the conventional large-ρ limit distribution. We prove that the second-order corrected critical value based on an asymptotic expansion of the nonstandard limit distribution is also second-order correct under the large-ρ asymptotics. As a further contribution, we propose a new practical procedure for selecting the test-optimal power parameter that addresses the central …
A New Necessary Condition For Implementation In Iteratively Undominated Strategies, Takashi Kunimoto, Roberto Serrano
A New Necessary Condition For Implementation In Iteratively Undominated Strategies, Takashi Kunimoto, Roberto Serrano
Research Collection School Of Economics
We uncover a new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies by mechanisms that satisfy the “best element property” where for each agent, there exists a strategy profile that gives him the highest payoff in the mechanism. This class includes finite and regular mechanisms. We conclude that either the quasilinearity-like assumptions of available sufficiency results cannot be completely dispensed with or some mechanisms that do not satisfy the best element property must be employed. We term the condition “restricted deception-proofness.” It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it …
Predictions For Protection: A System To Measure And Detect Asset Bubbles, Singapore Management University
Predictions For Protection: A System To Measure And Detect Asset Bubbles, Singapore Management University
Perspectives@SMU
The damage wrecked by the bursting of asset bubbles can have a devastating impact on investors' fortunes. In the Internet bubble, some US$8 trillion of shareholder wealth was destroyed. What is even more pertinent, however, is how the popping of a bubble can create a financial crisis, impacting nations and their economies. As a result, understanding how to identify bubbles is an important first step in combating these speculative bubbles, with interested parties ranging from the academic and investment community to central bankers and policy makers.
Tops-Only Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen
Tops-Only Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen
Research Collection School Of Economics
In this paper we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and n voters and address the following question: what are the characteristics of domains D" role="presentation">D that induce the property that every strategy-proof social choice function f:Dn→A" role="presentation">f:Dn→A satisfying unanimity, has the tops-only property? We first impose a minimal richness condition which ensures that for every alternative a, there exists an admissible ordering where a is maximal. We identify conditions on D" role="presentation">D that are sufficient for strategy-proofness and unanimity to imply tops onlyness in the general case of n …
Tops-Only Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen
Tops-Only Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen
Research Collection School Of Economics
In this paper we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternativesA and n voters and address the following question: what are the characteristics ofdomains D that induce the property that every strategy-proof social choice functionf : Dn → A satisfying unanimity, has the tops-only property? We first impose aminimal richness condition which ensures that for every alternative a, there exists anadmissible ordering where a is maximal. We identify conditions on D that are sufficientfor strategy-proofness and unanimity to imply tops onlyness in the general case of nvoters and in the special case, n = 2. We …
Corrigendum To "A Gaussian Approach For Continuous Time Models Of The Short Term Interest Rate", Peter C. B. Phillips, Jun Yu
Corrigendum To "A Gaussian Approach For Continuous Time Models Of The Short Term Interest Rate", Peter C. B. Phillips, Jun Yu
Research Collection School Of Economics
An error is corrected in Yu and Phillips (2001) (Econometrics Journal, 4, 210-224) where a time transformation was used to induce Gaussian disturbances in the discrete time equivalent model. It is shown that the error process in this model is not a martingale and the Dambis, Dubins-Schwarz (DDS) theorem is not directly applicable. However, a detrended error process is a martingale, the DDS theorem is applicable, and the corresponding stopping time correctly induces Gaussianity. We show that the two stopping time sequences differ by O(a2), where a is the pre-specified normalized timing constant.
A Sufficient Condition For The Tops-Only Property Of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions In The Case Of Two Voters, Huaxia Zeng
A Sufficient Condition For The Tops-Only Property Of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions In The Case Of Two Voters, Huaxia Zeng
Dissertations and Theses Collection (Open Access)
In this thesis, we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and 2 voters, and address the following question: besides Domains D satisfying the
Property T (Chatterji & Sen (2011) ), what are other characteristics of domains that induce every strategy-proof and unanimous social choice function f : Dn → A to satisfy the tops-only property? We impose a minimal richness condition which ensures that for every alternative a ∈ A, there exists a preference ordering where a is maximal. We identify a more general condition on domains that is sufficient for strategy-proofness …