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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory
Information, Competition, And The Quality Of Charities, Silvana Krasteva, Huseyin Yildirim
Information, Competition, And The Quality Of Charities, Silvana Krasteva, Huseyin Yildirim
Huseyin Yildirim
Drawing upon the all-pay auction literature, we propose a model of charity competition in which informed giving alone can account for the significant quality heterogeneity across similar charities. Our analysis identifies a negative effect of competition and a positive effect of informed giving on the equilibrium quality of charity. In particular, we show that as the number of charities grows, so does the percentage of charity scams, approaching one in the limit. In light of this and other results, we discuss the need for regulating nonprofit entry and conduct as well as promoting informed giving.
Optimal Task Assignments, Felipe Balmaceda Assoc Prof.
Optimal Task Assignments, Felipe Balmaceda Assoc Prof.
Felipe Balmaceda
This paper studies optimal task assignments in a risk neutral principal-agent model in which agents are compensated according to an aggregated performance measure. The main trade-off involved is one in which specialization allows the implementation of any possible effort profile, while multitasking constraint the set of implementable effort profiles. Yet, the implementation of any effort profile in this set is less expensive than that under specialization. The principal prefers multitasking to specialization except when tasks are complements and the output after success is small enough so that it is not second-best optimal to implement high effort in each task. This …
A Unified Model Of Adaptive Learning In Normal Form Games, Naoki Funai
A Unified Model Of Adaptive Learning In Normal Form Games, Naoki Funai
Naoki Funai
We investigate an adaptive learning model which nests several existing learning models such as payoff assessment learning, valuation learning, stochastic fictitious play learning, experience-weighted attraction learning and delta learning with indirect payoff information in normal form games. In this paper, we consider adaptive players each of whom (i) assigns payoff assessments to his own actions, (ii) chooses an action which has the highest assessment with some perturbations, and (iii) updates the assessments using observed payoffs, which may include payoffs from unchosen actions, in each period. Utilising the asynchronous stochastic approximation method introduced by Tsitsiklis (1994), we provide conditions under which …
Debt Dilution And Sovereign Default Risk, Juan Carlos Hatchondo, Leonardo Martinez, Cesar Sosa Padilla
Debt Dilution And Sovereign Default Risk, Juan Carlos Hatchondo, Leonardo Martinez, Cesar Sosa Padilla
Leonardo Martinez
No abstract provided.
Fiscal Rules And The Sovereign Default Premium, Juan Carlos Hatchondo, Leonardo Martinez, Francisco Roch
Fiscal Rules And The Sovereign Default Premium, Juan Carlos Hatchondo, Leonardo Martinez, Francisco Roch
Leonardo Martinez
No abstract provided.
The Price Of Unobservability: Moral Hazard And Limited Liability, Felipe Balmaceda Assoc Prof.
The Price Of Unobservability: Moral Hazard And Limited Liability, Felipe Balmaceda Assoc Prof.
Felipe Balmaceda
This article studies a principal-agent problem with discrete outcome and effort space. The principal and the agent are risk neutral and the latter is subject to limited liability. For a given monitoring technology, we consider the maximum possible ratio between the first best social welfare to the social welfare arising from the principal's optimal pay-for-performance contract (the price of unobservability). Our main results provide tight bounds for this price. Key parameters to these bounds are number of possible efforts, the likelihood ratio evaluated at the highest outcome, and the ratio between costs of the highest and the lowest efforts. The …
"Giving" In To Social Pressure, Alvaro J. Name-Correa, Huseyin Yildirim
"Giving" In To Social Pressure, Alvaro J. Name-Correa, Huseyin Yildirim
Huseyin Yildirim
We develop a theory of charitable giving in which donors feel social pressure from adirect solicitation. We show that equilibrium donations are concentrated around a socialnorm. Despite a higher level of the public good, relatively poor and/or low altruism giversfare worse under social pressure and would avoid the solicitor at a cost. Aggregate donorwelfare improves to the extent that the added social motive alleviates the underprovision ofthe public good; however, overprovision may result. Our theory therefore predicts a lighthandedregulation for charitable solicitations, which is consistent with their exemption fromthe popular Do Not Call list in the U.S. We further show …