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Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory
Implementation With Near Complete Information: The Case Of Subgame Perfection, Takashi Kunimoto, Olivier Tercieux
Implementation With Near Complete Information: The Case Of Subgame Perfection, Takashi Kunimoto, Olivier Tercieux
Research Collection School Of Economics
While monotonicity is a necessary and almost sufficient condition for Nash implementationand often a demanding one, almost any (non-monotonic, for instance) socialchoice rule can be implemented using undominated Nash or subgame perfect equilibrium.By requiring solution concepts to have closed graph in the limit of completeinformation, Chung and Ely (2003) show that only monotonic social choice rules canbe implemented in the closure of the undominated Nash equilibrium correspondence.In this paper, we show that only monotonic social choice rules can be implemented inthe closure of the subgame perfect equilibrium/sequential equilibrium correspondence.Our robustness result helps understand the limits of subgame pefect implementation,which is …
Technology, Unilateral Commitments And Cumulative Emissions Reduction, Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal
Technology, Unilateral Commitments And Cumulative Emissions Reduction, Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal
Research Collection School Of Economics
In this article, we argue that weak property rights over transnational pollution and the limited threat of retaliatory punishments blunts the effectiveness of a broad-based multilateral agreement to deliver the emission reductions required to mitigate climate change. Instead, we propose a policy framework that builds on unilateral commitments, endogenous innovation and technology transfer that could lead to cumulative emissions reduction by altering the participation constraints of nations over time.
Tops-Only Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen
Tops-Only Domains, Shurojit Chatterji, Arunava Sen
Research Collection School Of Economics
In this paper we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and n voters and address the following question: what are the characteristics of domains D that induce the property that every strategy-proof social choice function f : Dn → A satisfying unanimity, has the tops-only property? We first impose a minimal richness condition which ensures that for every alternative a, there exists an admissible ordering where a is maximal. We identify conditions on D that are sufficient for strategy-proofness and unanimity to imply tops onlyness in the general case of n voters and in …