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Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory
The Effect Of Wage Proposals On Efficiency And Income Distribution☆, Lara Ezquerra, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, Natalia Jiminez, Praveen Kujal
The Effect Of Wage Proposals On Efficiency And Income Distribution☆, Lara Ezquerra, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, Natalia Jiminez, Praveen Kujal
ESI Publications
Pre-play non-binding communication in organizations is prevalent. We study the implications of pre-play, private and public, wage proposals in labor markets. To that end, we develop a theoretical model from which we derive certain hypothesis that we test through a laboratory experiment. In the baseline, that depicts a typical labor market interaction, the employer makes a wage offer to the worker who may then accept or reject it. In subsequent treatments, workers, moving first, make private, non-binding, wage proposals to the employer. In a following treatment, the proposals are made public. Our findings suggest that both private and public wage …
An Experimental Test Of Algorithmic Dismissals, Brice Corgnet
An Experimental Test Of Algorithmic Dismissals, Brice Corgnet
ESI Working Papers
We design a laboratory experiment in which a human or an algorithm decides which of two workers to dismiss. The algorithm automatically dismisses the least productive worker whereas human bosses have full discretion over their decisions. Using performance metrics and questionnaires, we find that fired workers react more negatively to human than to algorithmic decisions in a broad range of tasks. We show that spitefulness exacerbated this negative reaction. Our findings suggest algorithms could help tame negative reactions to dismissals.
Agency, Benevolence And Justice, Prithvijit Mukherjee, J. Dustin Tracy
Agency, Benevolence And Justice, Prithvijit Mukherjee, J. Dustin Tracy
ESI Working Papers
We test for social norms regarding how Agents should select between risky prospects for Principals, including norms consistent with observations by Adam Smith. We elicit norms from subjects serving as ``impartial spectator[s]" about the choice of risky prospects selected by the Agents. We find strong evidence for the existence of norms, consistent with Smith's observations. Furthermore, we find that Agents are more likely to select more normative options. In contrast, we find that Principals' allocation for bonuses depends on the realization of the risky prospect rather than whether the Agents' choice was consistent with the norm.
Data For "Agency, Benevolence And Justice", Prithvijit Mukherjee, J. Dustin Tracy
Data For "Agency, Benevolence And Justice", Prithvijit Mukherjee, J. Dustin Tracy
ESI Data Sets
We test for social norms regarding how agents should select between risky prospects for principals, including norms consistent with beneficence and justice propositions from Adam Smith. We elicit norms from subjects serving as "impartial spectator[s]" about choice of risky prospect selected by the agents. We find strong evidence for the existence of norms, consistent with the Smith propositions. Furthermore we find that agents are more likely to select more normative options. In contrast, we find that principals' allocation for bonuses depends on the realization of the risky prospect rather than whether the agents choice was consistent with the norm.
Making It Public: The Effect Of (Private And Public) Wage Proposals On Efficiency And Income Distribution, Lara Ezquerra, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, Natalia Jiminez, Praveen Kujal
Making It Public: The Effect Of (Private And Public) Wage Proposals On Efficiency And Income Distribution, Lara Ezquerra, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, Natalia Jiminez, Praveen Kujal
ESI Working Papers
The implications of (public or private) pre-play communication and information revelation in a labour relationship is not well understood. We address these implications theoretically and experimentally. In our baseline experiments, the employer offers a wage to the worker who may then accept or reject it. In the public and private treatment, workers, moving first, make a non-binding private or public wage proposal. Our theoretical model assumes that wage proposals convey information about a worker’s minimum acceptable wage and are misreported with a certain probability. It predicts that, on average, wage proposals lead to higher wage offers and acceptance rates, with …
Labor Contracts, Gift-Exchange And Reference Wages: Your Gift Need Not Be Mine!, Hernán Bejerano, Brice Corgnet, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres
Labor Contracts, Gift-Exchange And Reference Wages: Your Gift Need Not Be Mine!, Hernán Bejerano, Brice Corgnet, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres
ESI Working Papers
We extend Akerlof’s (1982) gift-exchange model to the case in which reference wages respond to changes in the work environment such as those related to unemployment benefits or workers’ productivity levels. Our model shows that these changes spur disagreements between workers and employers regarding the value of the reference wage. These disagreements tend to weaken the gift-exchange relationship thus reducing production levels and wages. We find support for these predictions in a controlled, yet realistic, workplace environment. Our work also sheds light on several stylized facts regarding employment relationships such as the increased intensity of labor conflicts when economic conditions …
Selection In The Lab: A Network Approach, Aleksandr Alekseev, Mikhail Freer
Selection In The Lab: A Network Approach, Aleksandr Alekseev, Mikhail Freer
ESI Working Papers
We study the selection problem in economic experiments by focusing on its dynamic and network aspects. We develop a dynamic network model of student participation in a subject pool, which assumes that students' participation is driven by the two channels: the direct channel of recruitment and the indirect channel of student interaction. Using rich recruitment data from a large public university, we find that the patterns of participation and biases are consistent with the model. We also find evidence of both short- and long-run selection biases between males and females, as well as between cohorts of students. Males tend to …
Goal Setting In The Principal-Agent Model: Weak Incentives For Strong Performance, Brice Corgnet, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, Roberto Hernán-González
Goal Setting In The Principal-Agent Model: Weak Incentives For Strong Performance, Brice Corgnet, Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres, Roberto Hernán-González
ESI Publications
We study a principal–agent framework in which principals can assign wage-irrelevant goals to agents. We find evidence that, when given the possibility to set wage-irrelevant goals, principals select incentive contracts for which pay is less responsive to agents' performance. Agents' performance is higher in the presence of goal setting despite weaker incentives. We develop a principal–agent model with reference-dependent utility that illustrates how labor contracts combining weak monetary incentives and wage-irrelevant goals can be optimal. The pervasive use of non-monetary incentives in the workplace may help account for previous empirical findings suggesting that firms rely on unexpectedly weak monetary incentives.
Revisiting The Tradeoff Between Risk And Incentives: The Shocking Effect Of Random Shocks, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez
Revisiting The Tradeoff Between Risk And Incentives: The Shocking Effect Of Random Shocks, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez
ESI Working Papers
Despite its central role in the theory of incentives, empirical evidence of a tradeoff between risk and incentives remains scarce. We reexamine this empirical puzzle in a controlled laboratory environment so as to isolate possible confounding factors encountered in the field. In line with the principal-agent model, we find that principals increase fixed pay while lowering performance pay when the relationship between effort and output is noisier. Unexpectedly, agents produce substantially more in the noisy environment than in the baseline despite lesser pay for performance. We show that this result can be accounted for by introducing agents’ loss aversion in …
Generating Ambiguity In The Laboratory, Jack Douglas Stecher, Timothy W. Shields, John Dickhaut
Generating Ambiguity In The Laboratory, Jack Douglas Stecher, Timothy W. Shields, John Dickhaut
ESI Working Papers
This article develops a method for drawing samples from which it is impossible to infer any quantile or moment of the underlying distribution. The method provides researchers with a way to give subjects the experience of ambiguity. In any experiment, learning the distribution from experience is impossible for the subjects, essentially because it is impossible for the experimenter. We describe our method mathematically, illustrate it in simulations, and then test it in a laboratory experiment. Our technique does not withhold sampling information, does not assume that the subject is incapable of making statistical inferences, is replicable across experiments, and requires …