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Articles 1 - 16 of 16
Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory
Religion And Growth, Sascha O. Becker, Jared Rubin, Ludger Woessmann
Religion And Growth, Sascha O. Becker, Jared Rubin, Ludger Woessmann
ESI Working Papers
We use the elements of a macroeconomic production function—physical capital, human capital, labor, and technology—together with standard growth models to frame the role of religion in economic growth. Unifying a growing literature, we argue that religion can enhance or impinge upon economic growth through all four elements because it shapes individual preferences, societal norms, and institutions. Religion affects physical capital accumulation by influencing thrift and financial development. It affects human capital through both religious and secular education. It affects population and labor by influencing work effort, fertility, and the demographic transition. And it affects total factor productivity by constraining or …
Institutions And Opportunistic Behavior: Experimental Evidence, Antonio Cabrales, Irma Clots-Figueras, Roberto Hernán-González, Praveen Kujal
Institutions And Opportunistic Behavior: Experimental Evidence, Antonio Cabrales, Irma Clots-Figueras, Roberto Hernán-González, Praveen Kujal
ESI Working Papers
Risk mitigating institutions have long been used by societies to protect against opportunistic behavior. We know little about how they are demanded, who demands them or how they impact subsequent behavior. To study these questions, we run a large-scale online experiment where insurance can be purchased to safeguard against opportunistic behavior. We compare two different selection mechanisms for risk mitigation, the individual and the collective (voting). We find that, whether individual or collective, there is demand for riskmitigating institutions amongst high-opportunism individuals, while low-opportunism individuals demand lesser levels of insurance. However, high-opportunism individuals strategically demand lower insurance institutions when they …
Culture, Institutions & The Long Divergence, Alberto Bisin, Jared Rubin, Avner Seror, Thierry Verdier
Culture, Institutions & The Long Divergence, Alberto Bisin, Jared Rubin, Avner Seror, Thierry Verdier
ESI Working Papers
During the medieval and early modern periods the Middle East lost its economic advantage relative to the West. Recent explanations of this historical phenomenon— called the Long Divergence—focus on these regions’ distinct political economy choices regarding religious legitimacy and limited governance. We study these features in a political economy model of the interactions between rulers, secular and clerical elites, and civil society. The model induces a joint evolution of culture and political institutions converging to one of two distinct stationary states: a religious and a secular regime. We then map qualitatively parameters and initial conditions characterizing the West and …
A Theory Of Cultural Revivals, Murat Iyigun, Jared Rubin, Avner Seror
A Theory Of Cultural Revivals, Murat Iyigun, Jared Rubin, Avner Seror
ESI Working Papers
Why do some societies have political institutions that support productively inefficient outcomes? And why does the political power of elites vested in these outcomes often grow over time, even when they are unable to block more efficient modes of production? We propose an explanation centered on the interplay between political and cultural change. We build a model in which cultural values are transmitted inter-generationally. The cultural composition of society, in turn, determines public good provision as well as the future political power of elites from different cultural groups. We characterize the equilibrium of the model and provide sufficient conditions for …
Institutions, Opportunism And Prosocial Behavior: Some Experimental Evidence, Antonio Cabrales, Irma Clots-Figueras, Roberto Hernán-González, Praveen Kujal
Institutions, Opportunism And Prosocial Behavior: Some Experimental Evidence, Antonio Cabrales, Irma Clots-Figueras, Roberto Hernán-González, Praveen Kujal
ESI Working Papers
Formal or informal institutions have long been adopted by societies to protect against opportunistic behavior. However, we know very little about how these institutions are chosen and their impact on behavior. We experimentally investigate the demand for different levels of institutions that provide low to high levels of insurance and its subsequent impact on prosocial behavior. We conduct a large-scale online experiment where we add the possibility of purchasing insurance to safeguard against low reciprocity to the standard trust game. We compare two different mechanisms, the private (purchase) and the social (voting) choice of institutions. Whether voted or purchased, we …
Kinship, Fractionalization And Corruption, Mahsa Akbari, Duman Bahrami-Rad, Erik O. Kimbrough
Kinship, Fractionalization And Corruption, Mahsa Akbari, Duman Bahrami-Rad, Erik O. Kimbrough
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We examine the roots of variation in corruption across societies, and we argue that marriage practices and family structure are an important, overlooked determinant of corruption. By shaping patterns of relatedness and interaction, marriage practices influence the relative returns to norms of nepotism/favoritism versus norms of impartial cooperation. In-marriage (e.g. consanguineous marriage) generates fractionalization because it yields relatively closed groups of related individuals and thereby encourages favoritism and corruption. Out-marriage creates a relatively open society with increased interaction between non-relatives and strangers, thereby encouraging impartiality. We report a robust association between in-marriage practices and corruption both across countries and within …
Money Is More Than Memory, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari
Money Is More Than Memory, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari
ESI Working Papers
Impersonal exchange is the hallmark of an advanced society and money is one key institution that supports it. Economic theory regards money as a crude arrangement for monitoring counterparts’ past conduct. If so, then a public record of past actions—or memory—should supersede the function performed by money. This intriguing theoretical postulate remains untested. In an experiment, we show that the suggested functional equivalence between money and memory does not translate into an empirical equivalence: money removed the incentives to free ride, while memory did not. Monetary systems performed a richer set of functions than just revealing past behaviors.
Testing The Boundaries Of The Double Auction: The Effects Of Complete Information And Market Power, Erik O. Kimbrough
Testing The Boundaries Of The Double Auction: The Effects Of Complete Information And Market Power, Erik O. Kimbrough
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We report boundary experiments testing the robustness of price convergence in double auction markets for non-durable goods in which there is extreme earnings inequality at the competitive equilibrium (CE). Following up on a conjecture by Smith (1976a), we test whether the well-known equilibrating power of the double auction institution is robust to the presence of complete information about traders’ values and costs and the presence of symmetric market power. We find that complete information is insufficient to impede convergence to CE prices; however, introducing market power consistently causes prices to deviate from the CE, whether or not subjects possess complete …
The Ideological Roots Of Institutional Change, Murat Iyigun, Jared Rubin
The Ideological Roots Of Institutional Change, Murat Iyigun, Jared Rubin
ESI Working Papers
Why do some societies fail to adopt more efficient institutions in response to changing economic conditions? And why do such conditions sometimes generate ideological backlashes and at other times lead to transformative sociopolitical movements? We propose an explanation that highlights the interplay--or lack thereof--between new technologies, ideologies, and institutions. When new technologies emerge, uncertainty results from a lack of understanding how the technology will fit with prevailing ideologies and institutions. This uncertainty discourages investment in institutions and the cultural capital necessary to take advantage of new technologies. Accordingly, increased uncertainty during times of rapid technological change may generate an ideological …
Information Effects In Uniform Price Multi-Unit Dutch Auctions, Joy A. Buchanan, Steven Gjerstad, David Porter
Information Effects In Uniform Price Multi-Unit Dutch Auctions, Joy A. Buchanan, Steven Gjerstad, David Porter
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We design a multi-unit descending-price (Dutch) auction mechanism that has applications for resource allocation and pricing problems. We address specific auction design choices by theoretically and experimentally determining optimal information disclosure along two dimensions. Bidders are either informed of the number of bidders in the auction, or know that it is one of two possible sizes; they also either know the number of units remaining for sale or are unaware of how many units have been taken by other bidders. We find that revealing group size decreases bids, and therefore revenue, if units remaining are not shown. When group size …
Information Effects In Multi-Unit Dutch Auctions, Joy A. Buchanan, Steven Gjerstad, David Porter
Information Effects In Multi-Unit Dutch Auctions, Joy A. Buchanan, Steven Gjerstad, David Porter
ESI Working Papers
We design a multi-unit descending-price (Dutch) auction mechanism that has applications for resource allocation and pricing problems. We address specific auction design choices by theoretically and experimentally determining optimal information disclosure along two dimensions. Bidders are either informed of the number of bidders in the auction, or know that it is one of two possible sizes; they also either know the number of units remaining for sale or are unaware of how many units have been taken by other bidders. We find that revealing group size decreases bids, and therefore revenue, if units remaining are not shown. When group size …
Empowerment, Corruption And Economic Chaos In Sudan, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
Empowerment, Corruption And Economic Chaos In Sudan, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
In a country on the eve of losing one third of its land, 80% of potential natural resources and 75% of external exports value, economic future seems gloomy. Many opinions were given for economic solutions after the Southern Sudan secession. However, that does not support a theoretical framework that those are the only reasons for the expected economic collapse. Our theory here is that such collapse already happened because of economic mismanagement, corruption and hoarding initiated by the calls for empowerment and carried out by the regime's members. Such acts extended to the banks, economic institutions and randomized privatization. The …
Pillars Of Demise: Empowerment And Corruption, Economic Chaos And Political Disintegration In Sudan, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
Pillars Of Demise: Empowerment And Corruption, Economic Chaos And Political Disintegration In Sudan, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
In a country on the eve of losing one third of its land, 80% of potential natural resources and 75% of external exports value, economic future seems gloomy. Many opinions were given for economic solutions after the Southern Sudan secession. However, that does not support a theoretical framework that those are the only reasons for the expected economic collapse. Our theory here is that such collapse already happened because of economic mismanagement, corruption and hoarding initiated by the calls for empowerment and carried out by the regime's members. Such acts extended to the banks, economic institutions and randomized privatization. The …
Institutional Structure And Decision Making In Sudan, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
Institutional Structure And Decision Making In Sudan, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
The study here presented reviews the institutional structure of the Sudanese government. Truly, though it is stigmatized as totalitarian, the structure is phenotypically perfect. Ministry of Ministries council is supposed to cater for analyzing data concerning ministries performance, drawing strategic planning, executing them through ministries and conduct the follow-ups. Department of decision-making was created and packages for data collection and analyses were improvised. However, all these structures seem skeletal as the final decisions structurally seem to be lost between the Presidency Institution and the executive institutions. An introduced flowing chart indicates that the cycle of all decisions end up at …
The Social Infrastructure And The Civil Institutions In Sudan, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
The Social Infrastructure And The Civil Institutions In Sudan, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
Contemporary Sudanese society endures many hardships which are manifested in economic retraction, inflation, recession and stagflation. However, social conflicts are also manifested in simple man's daily complaints to open rebellions. Most academicians agree on one point, that the society endures abnormal conditions. The current paper aims delves into a historical context of civil society as a concept in general which originated in the west. Next it displays differences between it and the Sudan supposing that there is unique experience appropriate to the Sudanese state of affairs. Therefore that possibility of creating an appropriate term that fully describes the social structures …
Politics, Hegemony And Survival In Sudan, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
Politics, Hegemony And Survival In Sudan, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed
Since the beginning of the year 2010, the political crisis of Sudan expands everyday. The inevitable secession of Southern Sudan amplifies with the chronic crisis of Abyei pocket between the north and the south. However, most analysts vocalize their astonishment at irrational official behavior as the de facto state of war that currently prevails in the country and call it pure stupidity. In this paper we analyze what is behind the regime structure and the conception of the Hakimya that makes their regime fortified from accepting rationality, resilience and sense of truth to respond for solutions and help of the …