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Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory
Asymptotic Properties Of Equilibrium In Discriminatory And Uniform Price Ipv Multi-Unit Auctions, Brett E. Katzman
Asymptotic Properties Of Equilibrium In Discriminatory And Uniform Price Ipv Multi-Unit Auctions, Brett E. Katzman
Faculty and Research Publications
This paper confronts the tractability problems that accompany IPV auction models with multi-unit bidder demands. Utilizing a first order approach, the asymptotic properties of symmetric equilibria in discriminatory and uniform price auctions are derived. It is shown that as the number of bidders increases, equilibrium bids converge to valuations in both discriminatory auctions and uniform price auctions where the price paid is determined by the lowest winning bid, thus indicating that the limiting case of these auctions correspond to price taking as in neoclassical models of consumer behavior. However, when the uniform price paid is tied to the highest losing …
The Consequences Of Information Revealed In Auctions, Brett E. Katzman, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf
The Consequences Of Information Revealed In Auctions, Brett E. Katzman, Matthew Rhodes-Kropf
Faculty and Research Publications
This paper considers the ramifications of post-auction competition on bidding behavior under different bid announcement policies. In equilibrium, the auctioneer’s announcement policy has two distinct effects. First, announcement entices players to signal information to their post-auction competitors through their bids. Second, announcement can lead to greater bidder participation in certain instances while limiting participation in others. Specifically, the participation effect works against the signalling effect, thus reducing the impact of signalling found in other papers. Revenue, efficiency, and surplus implications of various announcement policies are examined.
A Revelation Principle For Dominant Strategy Implementation, Jesse Schwartz, Quan Wen
A Revelation Principle For Dominant Strategy Implementation, Jesse Schwartz, Quan Wen
Faculty and Research Publications
We introduce a perfect price discriminating (PPD) mechanism for allocation problems with private information. A PPD mechanism treats a seller, for example, as a perfect price discriminating monopolist who faces a price schedule that does not depend on her report. In any PPD mechanism, every player has a dominant strategy to truthfully report her private information. We establish a revelation principle for dominant strategy implementation: any outcome that can be dominant strategy implemented can also be dominant strategy implemented using a PPD mechanism. We apply this principle to derive the optimal, budget-balanced, dominant strategy mechanisms for public good provision and …