Economic Theory Commons^™

Three Essays On The Political Economy Of Cultural Production And Creative Labor, Luke Pretz

Doctoral Dissertations

This dissertation investigates the relationships between capital, cultural production, and creative labor. Essay one theorizes the basis for the intensification of pop music stardom following the introduction of on-demand streaming technology. Prior to the emergence of on-demand streaming, record labels and broadcasters had a mutualistic relationship, wherein the near cost-free music provided by record labels formed the basis for radio broadcasts, which in turn formed the basis for the consumption of that music. Following the emergence of on-demand streaming the mutualistic relationship was ruptured. Broadcasters, in the form of streaming platforms, transitioned to the cost-efficient cultivation of masses of highly …

Theory And Experiments Exploring Behavioral, Financial, And Public Economics, Matthew John Mcmahon

Doctoral Dissertations

I study three questions which relate to one another only in that each explores facets of economics. First, I theoretically examine the conditions under which introducing an impure public good decreases total public provision. I introduce a central planner who can tax the private good to correct this and identify the market characteristics that typify this scenario. Second, I test the two standard competing dividend puzzle hypotheses using a laboratory experiment. Evidence from the lab, including variables unobservable in the field, reinforces empirical work supporting the outcome model over the substitute. Last, I obscure from dictators information regarding recipients' income …

Essays On Industrial Organization And Environmental Economics, Cristina Marie Reiser

Doctoral Dissertations

This dissertation consists of three chapters that examine how regulation by a central authority motivates changes in behavior.

Chapter 1 identifies the role of a tolerance policy as a manager’s regulatory mechanism which can deter worker misconduct in rank-order tournaments. When contestants’ actions cannot be perfectly monitored or doing so is prohibitively costly, misconduct takes place. This chapter develops a theoretical model in which contestants compete for a prize in a symmetric tournament and in which the organizer tolerates some level of misconduct. In addition to showing that zero tolerance does not minimize equilibrium misconduct, it also shows there exists …