Economic Theory Commons^™

Dwelling In Time, Dwelling In Structures: Disintegration In World Politics, Jan Adam Nalaskowski

Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & Dissertations

This dissertation aims to propose a general theory of disintegration. This subject is not treated directly by some theoretical accounts and mistreated by others. European integration theories are fashioned to explain the greater integration process while game-theoretic approaches to withdrawals and secessions, even if treating disintegration directly, fail to include critically responsible factors. This dissertation offers a constructive criticism of both accounts. Since neither turning integration theories symmetrically around nor direct, game-theoretic assessment of disintegration help to provide sufficient explanation, it is suggested that the problem of symmetrical reversal and rational conduct must be revised.

Disintegration fails to follow the …

A Theoretical And Experimental Investigation Of Efficiency, Equity, And Uncertainty In Tournaments, Nicholas Busko

Doctoral Dissertations

This dissertation consists of three essays centered around labor incentives that arise in relative compensation contracts. Chapter 1 poses the question: if devotion to a core competence were truly optimal, why would firms do otherwise? We argue that the behavior of drifting from the core may be motivated by the competitive incentives faced by managers who seek to rise within a firm. We find competition creates an incentive for a manager to look for less correlated opportunities that pull the firm in a new direction. In a symmetric equilibrium all managers behave this way, leading to lower expected output for …

Firing Threats: Incentive Effects And Impression Management, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez, Stephen J. Rassenti

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We study the effect of firing threats in a virtual workplace that reproduces features of existing organizations. We show that organizations in which bosses can fire up to one third of their workforce produce twice as much as organizations for which firing is not possible. Firing threats sharply decrease on-the-job leisure. Nevertheless, organizations endowed with firing threats underperformed those using individual incentives. In the presence of firing threats, employees engage in impression management activities to be seen as hard-working individuals in line with our model. Finally, production levels dropped substantially when the threat of being fired was removed, whereas on-the-job …