Economic Theory Commons^™

The Dual-Grant Theory Of Fair Use, Abraham Bell, Gideon Parchomovsky

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Fair use is one of modern law's most fascinating and troubling doctrines. It is amorphous and vague, and notoriously difficult to apply. It is, at the same time, vitally important in copyright and perhaps the most frequently raised and litigated issue in the law of intellectual property.

This article offers a novel theory of fair use that provides both a better understanding of the underlying principles and better tools for applying the doctrine.

In contrast with the dominant understanding of fair use in the literature — that fair use addresses market failure — the article proposes viewing fair use as …

Can Simple Mechanism Design Results Be Used To Implement The Proportionality Standard In Discovery?, Jonah B. Gelbach

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I point out that the Coase theorem suggests there should not be wasteful discovery, in the sense that the value to the requester is less than the cost to the responder. I use a toy model to show that a sufficiently informed court could design a mechanism under which the Coasean prediction is borne out. I then suggest that the actual information available to courts is too little to effect this mechanism, and I consider alternatives. In discussing mechanisms intended to avoid wasteful discovery where courts have limited information, I emphasize the role of normative considerations.

Antitrust And The Close Look: Transaction Cost Economics In Competition Policy, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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This paper briefly examines the contributions of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to antitrust analysis, focusing on vertical integration and its contractual substitutes, mainly, minimum and maximum resale price maintenance, vertical nonprice restraints, tying, bundled discounts and exclusive dealing and related exclusionary contracts.

TCE generally assumes that business firms organize their activities so as to maximize their value, which they can do both by economizing and also by obtaining higher prices. Sensible antitrust policy recognizes that both advantageous contracting and monopoly can be profitable to a firm, and it can be expected to pursue both when they are available. Nevertheless, the …

Resource Movement And The Legal System, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

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In "The Problem of Social Cost" Ronald Coase considered several common law disputes among neighbors whose economic activities conflicted with one another. For example, Sturges v. Bridgman was a nineteenth century nuisance case involving a pediatrician whose practice was hindered by his neighbor, a confectioner whose operation required a noisy mechanical mortar & pestle. Coase showed that if high transaction costs did not interfere, private bargaining would provide a solution which he characterized as efficient -- namely, that the right to continue would be given to the person who valued it most. For example, if the pediatrician valued the right …

Neoclassical Labor Economics: Its Implications For Labor And Employment Law, Michael L. Wachter

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Whereas law and economics appears throughout business law, it never caught on in legal commentary about labor and employment law. A major reason is that the goals of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the country’s foundational labor law, are at war with basic principles of economics. The lack of integration is unfortunate if understandable. Notwithstanding the NLRA’s normative goal to keep wages out of competition, economic analysis applies as centrally to labor markets as to any other market.

One of the NLRA’s primary goals is to equalize bargaining power. Its drafters envisioned achieving this goal through procedural and substantive …