Economic Theory Commons^™

Trust In Cohesive Communities, Felipe Balmaceda Assoc Prof., Juan Escobar Assistant Professor

Felipe Balmaceda

This paper studies which social networks maximize trust and welfare when agreements are implicitly enforced. We study a repeated trust game in which trading opportunities arise exogenously and a social network determines the information each player has. We show that cohesive communities, modeled as social networks of complete components, emerge as the optimal community design. Cohesive communities generate some degree of common knowledge of transpired play that allows players to coordinate their punishments and, as a result, yield relatively high equilibrium payoffs. We also show that when news swiftly travel through the network, Pareto efficient networks are minimally connected: the …

Competitive Intensity And Its Two-Sided Effect On The Boundaries Of Firm Performance, Joao Montez, Francisco Ruiz-Aliseda, Michael D. Ryall

Michael D Ryall

The new perspective emerging from strategy's value-capture stream is that the effects of competition are two-fold: competition for an agent bounds its performance from below, while that for its transaction partners bounds from above. Thus, assessing the intensity of competition on either side is essential to understanding firm performance. Yet, the literature provides no formal notion of "competitive intensity" with which to make such assessments. Rather, some authors use added value as their central analytic concept, others the core. Added value is simple, but misses the crucial, for-an-agent side of competition. The core is theoretically complete, but difficult to interpret …

Research And Development Cooperatives And Market Collusion: A Global Dynamic Approach, Jeroen Hinloopen, Grega Smrkolj, Florian Wagener

Jeroen Hinloopen

We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal research and development model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (Am Econ Rev 78(5):1133–1137, 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in research and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. Weshow the existence of a solution to the optimal investment problem using a combination of results from viscosity theory and the theory of planar dynamical systems. In particular, we show that there is a critical level of marginal cost at which firms are indifferent between doing nothing and starting to develop the technology.We findthat colluding firms …

Optimal Task Assignments, Felipe Balmaceda Assoc Prof.

Felipe Balmaceda

This paper studies optimal task assignments in a risk neutral principal-agent model in which agents are compensated according to an aggregated performance measure. The main trade-off involved is one in which specialization allows the implementation of any possible effort profile, while multitasking constraint the set of implementable effort profiles. Yet, the implementation of any effort profile in this set is less expensive than that under specialization. The principal prefers multitasking to specialization except when tasks are complements and the output after success is small enough so that it is not second-best optimal to implement high effort in each task. This …

The Price Of Unobservability: Moral Hazard And Limited Liability, Felipe Balmaceda Assoc Prof.

Felipe Balmaceda

This article studies a principal-agent problem with discrete outcome and effort space. The principal and the agent are risk neutral and the latter is subject to limited liability. For a given monitoring technology, we consider the maximum possible ratio between the first best social welfare to the social welfare arising from the principal's optimal pay-for-performance contract (the price of unobservability). Our main results provide tight bounds for this price. Key parameters to these bounds are number of possible efforts, the likelihood ratio evaluated at the highest outcome, and the ratio between costs of the highest and the lowest efforts. The …

Essays On Economic Analysis Of Competition Law: Theory And Practice (Ph.D. Dissertation Defence), Dr. Danilo Samà

Dr. Danilo Samà

Essays on economic analysis of competition law: theory and practice
Author:Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)
Abstract:The Ph.D. dissertation, submitted to LUISS “Guido Carli” University of Rome in fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economic Analysis of Competition Law (XXV cicle), is the result of a scientific research in the field of the economic analysis of competition law developed through academic experiences at the Erasmus Rotterdam University in the Netherlands, the Ghent University in Belgium, the University of Hamburg in Germany and the Toulouse School of Economics in …

Voice Without Say: Why Capital-Managed Firms Aren’T (Genuinely) Participatory, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

Why are most capitalist enterprises of any size organized as authoritarian bureaucracies rather than incorporating genuine employee participation that would give the workers real authority? Even firms with employee participation programs leave virtually all decision-making power in the hands of management. The standard answer is that hierarchy is more economically efficient than any sort of genuine participation, so that participatory firms would be less productive and lose out to more traditional competitors. This answer is indefensible. After surveying the history, legal status, and varieties of employee participation, I examine and reject as question-begging the argument that the rarity of genuine …

La Valutazione Antitrust Degli Sconti Fedeltà Nel Diritto Della Concorrenza Europeo: Alla Ricerca Di Un Approccio Economico E Di Una Teoria Del Danno Per Il Consumatore, Danilo Samà

Dr. Danilo Samà

La valutazione antitrust degli sconti fedeltà nel diritto della concorrenza europeo: alla ricerca di un approccio economico e di una teoria del danno per il consumatore
Author:Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)
Abstract:L’articolo si propone di comprendere in base a quali condizioni sconti fedeltà adottati da un’impresa dominante comportino effetti anticoncorrenziali. Gli schemi fidelizzanti, infatti, sebbene estremamente frequenti nelle transazioni di mercato, qualora applicati da un’impresa dominante, rischiano di essere giudicati illeciti per sé, come comprovato dalla casistica giurisprudenziale finora emersa a livello europeo e dal severo scrutinio riservato delle autorità nazionali della …

The Antitrust Treatment Of Loyalty Discounts And Rebates In The Eu Competition Law: In Search Of An Economic Approach And A Theory Of Consumer Harm, Danilo Samà

Dr. Danilo Samà

The antitrust treatment of loyalty discounts and rebates in the EU competition law: in search of an economic approach and a theory of consumer harm
Author:Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)
Abstract:In the paper, the fundamental question is under what conditions loyalty discounts and rebates adopted by a dominant firm cause anti-competitive effects. Fidelity schemes, although extremely frequent in the market, if applied by a dominant firm, are likely to be judged as illegal per se, as demonstrated by the EU case-law delivered so far and the severe scrutiny reserved by the national …

Collective Choice, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

This short nontechnical article reviews the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and its implications for rational democratic decisionmaking. In the 1950s, economist Kenneth J. Arrow proved that no method for producing a unique social choice involving at least three choices and three actors could satisfy four seemingly obvious constraints that are practically constitutive of democratic decisionmaking. Any such method must violate such a constraint and risks leading to disturbingly irrational results such and Condorcet cycling. I explain the theorem in plain, nonmathematical language, and discuss the history, range, and prospects of avoiding what seems like a fundamental theoretical challenge to the possibility …

Using Spectrum Auctions To Enhance Competition In Wireless Services, Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz1

Peter Cramton

Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments regulators can use to enhance competition and thereby improve market outcomes.

Letter To Deputy Administrator Blum (Cms) On Medicare Auction, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Reducing Healthcare Costs Requires Good Market Design, Peter Cramton, Brett Katzman

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Letter From 167 Concerned Auction Experts On Medicare Competitive Bidding Program, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Wind Energy In Colombia: A Framework For Market Entry, Peter Cramton, Walter Vergara, Alejandro Deeb, Natsuko Toba, Irene Leino

Peter Cramton

The purpose of this report is to provide decision makers in Colombia (and by extension other countries or regions), who are considering the deployment or consolidation of wind power, with a set of options to promote its use. The options presented are the result of an analysis of the Colombian market; this analysis included simulations and modeling of the country’s power sector, and extensive consultations with operators, managers, and agents. More information on the analysis and simulations is presented in the appendixes. Wind was chosen to exemplify the range of renewable energy alternatives available to complement traditional power sector technologies …

Using Forward Markets To Improve Electricity Market Design, Peter Cramton, Lawrence Ausubel

Peter Cramton

Forward markets, both medium term and long term, complement the spot market for wholesale electricity. The forward markets reduce risk, mitigate market power, and coordinate new investment. In the medium term, a forward energy market lets suppliers and demanders lock in energy prices and quantities for one to three years. In the long term, a forward reliability market assures adequate resources are available when they are needed most. The forward markets reduce risk for both sides of the market, since they reduce the quantity of energy that trades at the more volatile spot price. Spot market power is mitigated by …

Virtual Power Plant Auctions, Peter Cramton, Lawrence Ausubel

Peter Cramton

Since their advent in 2001, virtual power plant (VPP) auctions have been implemented widely. In this paper, we describe the simultaneous ascending-clock auction format that has been used for virtually all VPP auctions to date, elaborating on other design choices that most VPP auctions have had in common as well as discussing a few aspects that have varied significantly among VPP auctions. We then evaluate the various objectives of regulators in requiring VPP auctions, concluding that the auctions have been effective devices for facilitating new entry into electricity markets and for developing wholesale power markets.

Competition-Based Environmental Policy: An Analysis Of Farmland Preservation In Maryland, John K. Horowitz, Lori Lynch, Andrew J. Stocking

Andrew J Stocking

Policy makers have turned to competition-based voluntary-enrollment programs as a cost-effective way to achieve preferred land uses. This paper studies bidder behavior in an innovative auction-based program in which farmers compete to sell and retire the right to develop their land. We derive a reduced-form bidding model that includes private and common values. This model allows us to estimate the role of bidder competition, winner’s curse correction, and the underlying distribution of private values. We estimate that the auction enrolled as many as 3,000 acres (12%) more than a take-it-or-leave-it offer would have enrolled for the same budgetary cost.

Charitable Memberships, Volunteering, And Discounts: Evidence From A Large-Scale Online Field Experiment, Andreas Lange, Andrew J. Stocking

Andrew J Stocking

Despite the increasing use by charities, significant uncertainty exists about optimal online fundraising mechanisms, especially when large donor pools show substantial heterogeneities. We use an online natural field experiment with over 700,000 subjects to test theory on price discounts and show large differences in donation behavior between donors who have previously given money and/or volunteered. For example, framing the charity’s membership price as a discount increases response rates and decreases conditional contributions from former volunteers, but not from past money donors. Our study thereby demonstrates the importance of conditioning fundraising strategies on the specifics of past donation dimensions.

A Two-Sided Auction For Legacy Loans, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

On Monday, 23 March 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner presented the Public-Private Investment Program as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis (www.financialstability.gov). The Treasury’s description still leaves many issues unanswered. We flesh out the auction design for legacy loans. A two-sided auction is required. Both banks and private investors must compete in a transparent and competitive process.

Bringing Growth Theory Down To Earth, Andrew J. Stocking, Ramon Lopez

Andrew J Stocking

Explicitly accounting for certain basic physical laws governing the “earth” sector dramatically enriches our ability to explain a high degree of diversity in observed patterns of economic growth. We provide a theoretical explanation of why some countries have been able to sustain a more or less constant and positive rate of economic growth for many decades while so many others have failed to do so. The analysis predicts that countries that have an over abundance of physical capital (a concept that is precisely defined in the text) may be unable to sustain a positive rate of economic growth over the …

Competition, Market Selection And Growth, Vincenzo Denicolo, Piercarlo Zanchettin

Vincenzo Denicolo

We study the effect of the competitive selection process on the economy's rate of growth. In an extension of standard quality-ladder models of endogenous growth, we allow for the possibility that in each period several asymmetric firms (representing an endogenously determined number of past innovators) may be simultaneously active in an industry. Stronger competitive pressure then has conflicting effects on the incentive to innovate, lowering prices but also selecting the more efficient firms. We show that the market selection effect of competition always increases the incentive to innovate and find circumstances in which it can outweigh the traditional negative effect …

How Best To Auction Natural Resources, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

I study the design of auctions of natural resources, such as oil or mineral rights. A good auction design promotes both an efficient assignment of rights and competitive revenues for the seller. The structure of bidder preferences and the degree of competition are key factors in determining the best design. With weak competition and additive values, a simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auction may suffice. With more complex value structures, a dynamic auction with package bids, such as the clock-proxy auction, likely is needed to promote the efficiency and revenue objectives. Bidding on production shares, rather than bonuses, typically increases government take …

Auctioning The Digital Dividend, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

I begin by describing some of the problems of the simultaneous ascending auction. Then I present the package clock auction, which retains the benefits, while addressing the weaknesses, of the simultaneous ascending auction. I emphasize two essential elements of the package clock auction: the pricing rule and the activity rule. Along the way, I summarize both experimental and field results with the package clock auction.

Report On Key Design Elements Of Auctions Under Australia's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Auctions For Injecting Bank Capital (Addendum To 'A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction'), Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel

Peter Cramton

Public discussion has turned, in the past few days, toward using some of the $700 billion in rescue funds for the injection of government money into banks in return for ownership stakes. The purpose of this short note, an addendum to “A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction,” is to describe an auction mechanism suitable for injections of capital into banks. The auctions would price the equity purchases through a competitive process.

Auctioning Long-Term Gas Contracts In Colombia, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

This paper presents an approach to auctioning long-term gas contracts in Colombia. I propose an annual auction for long-term firm gas contracts. The auction would assign and price all firm gas contracts, with the exception of gas from the Guajira field, which is assigned administratively at a regulated price. The proposal is a partial market design in that it does not address the transportation of gas from producer to consumer.

The goal of the approach is to improve the transparency and efficiency of the gas market with a coordinated auction for long-term gas contracts. Currently, gas contracts are sold in …

A Review Of The L-Band Auction, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

In May 2008, Ofcom’s L-band auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s second combinatorial clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an efficient assignment of the 17 lots. Eight bidders competed for the lots. In sharp contrast to the first combinatorial clock auction, the 10-40 GHz auction, in which each of the ten bidders won spectrum, in the L-band auction there was a single winner—Qualcomm won all the lots. This note briefly reviews the auction.

A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel

Peter Cramton

The US Treasury has proposed purchasing $700 billion of troubled assets to restore liquidity and solve the current financial crisis, using market mechanisms such as reverse auctions where appropriate. This paper presents a high-level design for a troubled asset reverse auction and discusses the auction design issues. We assume that the key objectives of the auction are to: 1) provide a quick and effective means to purchase troubled assets and increase liquidity; 2) protect the taxpayer by yielding a price for assets related to their value; and 3) offer a transparent rules-based process that minimizes discretion and favoritism. We propose …

The Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rule For Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Robert Day

Peter Cramton

We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe, and proposed for use in the FAA’s landing-slot auctions in the United States. Specifically, we compute a unique point “in the core” that minimizes the sum of squared deviations from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments. Analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we demonstrate that the resulting payments can be decomposed into a series of economically meaningful and equitable penalties, adding to the perceived “fairness” of this payment rule. Further, we discuss the many benefits of this combinatorial auction paradigm.