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Articles 1 - 23 of 23
Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory
Modeling Interactions Between Risk, Time, And Social Preferences, Mark Schneider
Modeling Interactions Between Risk, Time, And Social Preferences, Mark Schneider
ESI Working Papers
Recent studies have observed systematic interactions between risk, time, and social preferences that constitute violations of `dimensional independence' and are not explained by the leading models of decision making. This note provides a simple approach to modeling such interaction effects while predicting new ones. In particular, we present a model of rational-behavioral preferences that takes the convex combination of `behavioral' System 1 preferences and `rational' System 2 preferences. The model provides a unifying approach to analyzing risk, time, and social preferences, and predicts how these preferences are correlated with reliance on System 1 or System 2 thinking.
Money Is More Than Memory, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari
Money Is More Than Memory, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari
ESI Working Papers
Impersonal exchange is the hallmark of an advanced society and money is one key institution that supports it. Economic theory regards money as a crude arrangement for monitoring counterparts’ past conduct. If so, then a public record of past actions—or memory—should supersede the function performed by money. This intriguing theoretical postulate remains untested. In an experiment, we show that the suggested functional equivalence between money and memory does not translate into an empirical equivalence: money removed the incentives to free ride, while memory did not. Monetary systems performed a richer set of functions than just revealing past behaviors.
A Dual System Model Of Risk And Time Preferences, Mark Schneider
A Dual System Model Of Risk And Time Preferences, Mark Schneider
ESI Working Papers
Discounted Expected Utility theory has been a workhorse in economic analysis for over half a century. However, it cannot explain empirical violations of 'dimensional independence' demonstrating that risk interacts with time preference and time interacts with risk preference, nor does it explain present bias or magnitude-dependence in risk and time preferences, or correlations between risk preference, time preference, and cognitive reflection. We demonstrate that these and other anomalies are explained by a dual system model of risk and time preferences that unless models of a rational economic agent, models based on prospect theory, and dual process models of decision making.
Using Response Times To Measure Ability On A Cognitive Task, Aleksandr Alekseev
Using Response Times To Measure Ability On A Cognitive Task, Aleksandr Alekseev
ESI Working Papers
I show how using response times as a proxy for effort coupled with an explicit process-based model can address a long-standing issue of how to separate the effect of cognitive ability on performance from the effect of motivation. My method is based on a dynamic stochastic model of optimal effort choice in which ability and motivation are the structural parameters. I show how to estimate these parameters from the data on outcomes and response times in a cognitive task. In a laboratory experiment, I find that performance on a Digit-Symbol test is a noisy and biased measure of cognitive ability. …
Semiparametric Maximum Likelihood Inference For Nonignorable Nonresponse With Callbacks, Zhong Guan, Denis H. Y. Leung, Jing Qin
Semiparametric Maximum Likelihood Inference For Nonignorable Nonresponse With Callbacks, Zhong Guan, Denis H. Y. Leung, Jing Qin
Research Collection School Of Economics
We model the nonresponse probabilities as logistic functions ofthe outcome variable and other covariates in the survey sampling study withcallback. The identification aspect of this callback model is investigated. Semiparametricmaximum likelihood estimators of the parameters in the responseprobabilities are proposed and studied. As a result, an efficient estimator ofthe mean of the outcome variable is constructed using the estimated responseprobabilities. Moreover, if a regression model for conditional mean of the outcomevariable given some covariate is available, then we can obtain an evenmore efficient estimate of the mean of the outcome variable by fitting the regressionmodel using an adjusted least squares …
On Booms That Never Bust: Ambiguity In Experimental Asset Markets With Bubbles, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González, Praveen Kujal
On Booms That Never Bust: Ambiguity In Experimental Asset Markets With Bubbles, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González, Praveen Kujal
ESI Working Papers
We study the effect of ambiguity on the formation of bubbles and on the occurrence of crashes in experimental asset markets à la Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988). We extend their framework to an environment where the fundamental value of the asset is ambiguous. We show that, when the fundamental value is ambiguous, asset prices tend to be lower than when it is risky although bubbles form in both the ambiguous and the risky environments. Additionally, bubbles do not crash in the ambiguous case whereas they do so in the risky one. These findings regarding depressed prices and the absence …
Conditional Independence In A Binary Choice Experiment, Nathaniel Wilcox
Conditional Independence In A Binary Choice Experiment, Nathaniel Wilcox
ESI Working Papers
Experimental and behavioral economists, as well as psychologists, commonly assume conditional independence of choices when constructing likelihood functions for structural estimation. I test this assumption using data from a new experiment designed for this purpose. Within the limits of the experiment’s identifying restriction and designed power to detect deviations from conditional independence, conditional independence is not rejected. In naturally occurring data, concerns about violations of conditional independence are certainly proper and well-taken (for well-known reasons). However, when an experimenter employs contemporary state-of-the-art experimental mechanisms and designs, the current evidence suggests that conditional independence is an acceptable assumption for analyzing data …
Selection In The Lab: A Network Approach, Aleksandr Alekseev, Mikhail Freer
Selection In The Lab: A Network Approach, Aleksandr Alekseev, Mikhail Freer
ESI Working Papers
We study the selection problem in economic experiments by focusing on its dynamic and network aspects. We develop a dynamic network model of student participation in a subject pool, which assumes that students' participation is driven by the two channels: the direct channel of recruitment and the indirect channel of student interaction. Using rich recruitment data from a large public university, we find that the patterns of participation and biases are consistent with the model. We also find evidence of both short- and long-run selection biases between males and females, as well as between cohorts of students. Males tend to …
Agglomeration And The Extent Of The Market: An Experimental Investigation Into Spatially Coordinated Exchange, Jordan Adamson
Agglomeration And The Extent Of The Market: An Experimental Investigation Into Spatially Coordinated Exchange, Jordan Adamson
ESI Working Papers
How and why do agglomerations emerge? While economic historians emphasize trade and economic geographers emphasize variety, we still don’t understand the role of coordination. I fill this gap by extending the model of Fudenberg and Ellison (2003) to formalize Smith’s (1776) theory of agglomeration. I then test the model in a laboratory experiment and find individuals tend to coalesce purely to coordinate exchange, with more agglomeration when there is a larger variety of goods in the economy. I also find that tying individuals to the land reduces agglomeration, but magnifies the effect of variety.
The Supply Side Determinants Of Territory And Conflict, Jordan Adamson, Erik O. Kimbrough
The Supply Side Determinants Of Territory And Conflict, Jordan Adamson, Erik O. Kimbrough
ESI Working Papers
What determines the geographic extent of territory? We microfound and extend Boulding’s “Loss of Strength Gradient” to predict the extensive and intensive margins of conflict across space. We show how economies of scale in the production of violence and varying costs of projecting violence at a distance combine to affect the geographic distribution of conflict and territory. We test and probe the boundaries of this model in an experiment varying the fixed costs of conflict entry. As predicted, higher fixed costs increase the probability of exclusive territories; median behavior closely tracks equilibrium predictions in all treatments.
Experimental Research On Contests, Roman M. Sheremeta
Experimental Research On Contests, Roman M. Sheremeta
ESI Working Papers
Costly competitions between economic agents are modeled as contests. Researchers use laboratory experiments to study contests and test comparative static predictions of contest theory. Commonly, researchers find that participants’ efforts are significantly higher than predicted by the standard Nash equilibrium. Despite overbidding, most comparative static predictions, such as the incentive effect, the size effect, the discouragement effect and others are supported in the laboratory. In addition, experimental studies examine various contest structures, including dynamic contests (such as multi-stage races, wars of attrition, tug-of-wars), multi-dimensional contests (such as Colonel Blotto games), and contests between groups. This article provides a short review …
The Distribution Of Information And The Price Efficiency Of Markets, Brice Corgnet, Mark Desantis, David Porter
The Distribution Of Information And The Price Efficiency Of Markets, Brice Corgnet, Mark Desantis, David Porter
ESI Working Papers
Apparently contradictory evidence has accumulated regarding the extent to which financial markets are informationally efficient. Shedding new light on this old debate, we show that differences in the distribution of private information may explain why informational efficiency can vary greatly across markets. We find that markets are informationally efficient when complete information is concentrated in the hands of competing insiders whereas they are less efficient when private information is dispersed across traders. A learning model helps to illustrate why inferring others’ private information from prices takes more time when information is more dispersed. We discuss the implications of our findings …
Causal Versus Consequential Motives In Mental Models Of Agent Social And Economic Action: Experiments, And The Neoclassical Diversion In Economics, Vernon L. Smith
Causal Versus Consequential Motives In Mental Models Of Agent Social And Economic Action: Experiments, And The Neoclassical Diversion In Economics, Vernon L. Smith
ESI Working Papers
"In this paper I want to begin with the neoclassical supply and demand model of markets (SDM), whose static equilibrium consequences predicted outcomes far more accurately than were anticipated in laboratory experimental tests of the theory actuated by Jevons (1862, 1871; Smith, 1962). The observed predictive accuracy of SDM was not anticipated because complete information on supply and demand was widely believed, thought and taught to be a necessary condition for finding equilibrium. 1 Jevons’ model required him to have complete information in any particular market, as he only articulated a model of market optimal outcomes, and no model of …
Younger Federal District Court Judges Favor Presidential Power, Tom Campbell, Nathaniel T. Wilcox
Younger Federal District Court Judges Favor Presidential Power, Tom Campbell, Nathaniel T. Wilcox
ESI Working Papers
From 1960 to 2015, Federal District Court opinions involving challenges to Executive Branch authority show that U.S. Federal District Court judges (trial judges) support such authority less as they age, with a sharp decline beginning near age 57. We argue that District judges know that elevation to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals becomes increasingly improbable, and hence have less reason to ‘cooperate’ with the Executive, with advancing age. Political variables (and other variables) introduced as extra regressors do not reverse our main results. When there are contemporaneous vacancies on their Circuit courts, District judges in the eleven State Circuits …
Partners Or Strangers? Cooperation, Monetary Trade, And The Choice Of Scale Of Interaction, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari
Partners Or Strangers? Cooperation, Monetary Trade, And The Choice Of Scale Of Interaction, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari
ESI Working Papers
We show that monetary exchange facilitates the transition from small to large-scale economic interactions. In an experiment, subjects chose to play an “intertemporal cooperation game” either in partnerships or in groups of strangers where payoffs could be higher. Theoretically, a norm of mutual support is sufficient to maximize efficiency through large-scale cooperation. Empirically, absent a monetary system, participants were reluctant to interact on a large scale; and when they did, efficiency plummeted compared to partnerships because cooperation collapsed. This failure was reversed only when a stable monetary system endogenously emerged: the institution of money mitigated strategic uncertainty problems.
Equilibrium Wage Rigidity In Directed Search, Gabriele Camera, Jaehong Kim
Equilibrium Wage Rigidity In Directed Search, Gabriele Camera, Jaehong Kim
ESI Working Papers
Matching frictions and downward wage rigidity emerge as equilibrium phenomena in a twosided labor market where firms sustain variable wage adjustment costs. Firms post wages to attract workers and matches are endogenous. Reducing the wage relative to the wage previously posted is costly to the firm, where the cost is proportional to the size of the proposed cut. Shocks to the firm’s profitability may yield an equilibrium wage above what the firm would offer absent proportional adjustment costs. Wage cuts can be partial or full, immediate or delayed, and are non-linear in the shock size. Importantly, wages are sticky even …
Impulsive Behavior In Competition: Testing Theories Of Overbidding In Rent-Seeking Contests, Roman M. Sheremeta
Impulsive Behavior In Competition: Testing Theories Of Overbidding In Rent-Seeking Contests, Roman M. Sheremeta
ESI Working Papers
Contests are commonly used in the workplace to motivate workers, determine promotion, and assign bonuses. Although contests can be very effective at eliciting high effort, they can also lead to inefficient effort expenditure (overbidding). Researchers have proposed various theories to explain overbidding in contents, including mistakes, systematic biases, the utility of winning, and relative payoff maximization. Using an eight-part experiment, we test and find significant support for the existing theories. Also, we discover some new explanations based on cognitive ability and impulsive behavior. Out of all explanations examined, we find that impulsivity is the most important factor explaining overbidding in …
Your Money Or Your Time? Experimental Evidence On Overbidding In All-Pay Auctions, Adriana Breaban, Charles N. Noussair, Andreea Victoria Popescu
Your Money Or Your Time? Experimental Evidence On Overbidding In All-Pay Auctions, Adriana Breaban, Charles N. Noussair, Andreea Victoria Popescu
ESI Working Papers
Competition for a prize frequently takes the form of dedicating time toward winning a contest. Those who spend the most time become more likely to obtain the prize. We model this competition as an all-pay auction under incomplete information, and report an experiment in which expenditures and rewards are in terms of time. In the experiment, subjects must stay in the laboratory doing nothing for an initially prespecified length of time. However, they can bid, in terms of time, to leave early. The auction has an allpay structure so that if an individual does not submit the highest bid within …
Experimental Evidence On The Cyclicality Of Investment, Cortney S. Rodet, Andrew Smyth
Experimental Evidence On The Cyclicality Of Investment, Cortney S. Rodet, Andrew Smyth
ESI Working Papers
We report laboratory experiments investigating the cyclicality of investment. In our setting, optimal investment is counter-cyclical because investment costs fall following market downturns. However, we do not observe counter-cyclical investment. Instead, heuristic investment models where firms invest a fixed percentage of their liquidity, or a fixed percentage of anticipated market demand, better fit our data on average than does optimal investment. We also report a control treatment without cost changes and a treatment with asymmetric investment liquidity. Both of these extensions support our main result.
Indefinitely Repeated Contests: An Experimental Study, Philip Brookins, Dmitry Ryvkin, Andrew Smyth
Indefinitely Repeated Contests: An Experimental Study, Philip Brookins, Dmitry Ryvkin, Andrew Smyth
ESI Working Papers
We experimentally explore indefinitely repeated contests. Theory predicts more cooperation, in the form of lower expenditures, in indefinitely repeated contests with a longer expected time horizon, yet our data do not support this prediction. Theory also predicts more cooperation in indefinitely repeated contests compared to finitely repeated contests of the same expected length, but we find no significant difference empirically. When controlling for risk and gender, we actually find significantly higher long-run expenditure in some indefinite contests relative to finite contests. Finally, theory predicts no difference in cooperation across indefinitely repeated winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests. We find significantly less cooperation …
The Tug-Of-War In The Laboratory, Cary Deck, Roman Sheremeta
The Tug-Of-War In The Laboratory, Cary Deck, Roman Sheremeta
ESI Working Papers
The tug-of-war is a multi-battle contest often used to describe extended interactions in economics, operations management, political science, and other disciplines. While there has been some theoretical work, to the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first experimental study of the tug-of-war. The results show notable deviations of behavior from theory derived under standard assumptions. In the first battle of the tug-of-war, subjects often bid less, while in the follow-up battles, they bid more than predicted. Also, contrary to the prediction, bids tend to increase in the duration of the tug-of-war. Finally, extending the margin necessary to win …
Culture And Colonial Legacy: Evidence From Public Goods Games, Latika Chaudhary, Jared Rubin, Sriya Iyer, Anand Shrivastava
Culture And Colonial Legacy: Evidence From Public Goods Games, Latika Chaudhary, Jared Rubin, Sriya Iyer, Anand Shrivastava
ESI Working Papers
We conduct a public goods game in three small towns in the Indian state of Rajasthan. Due to historical military conquest, until 1947 these towns were on (barely) opposite sides of a colonial border separating British India from the Princely States. Our research design offers a treatment comparison between the towns of (British) Kekri and (Princely) Sarwar, and a control comparison between (Princely) Sarwar and (Princely) Shahpura. We find no significant difference in contributions to home town groups, but a significant difference in contributions to mixed town groups. Participants in (British) Kekri are more co-operative (i.e., contribute more) in mixed …
Trust In Humans And Robots: Economically Similar But Emotionally Different, Eric Schniter, Timothy W. Shields, Daniel Sznycer
Trust In Humans And Robots: Economically Similar But Emotionally Different, Eric Schniter, Timothy W. Shields, Daniel Sznycer
ESI Working Papers
Trust-based interactions with robots are increasingly common in the marketplace, workplace, on the road, and in the home. However, a looming concern is that people may not trust robots as they do humans. While trust in fellow humans has been studied extensively, little is known about how people extend trust to robots. Here we compare trust-based investments and emotions from across three nearly identical economic games: human-human trust games, human-robot trust games, and human-robot trust games where the robot decision impacts another human. Robots in our experiment mimic humans: they are programmed to make reciprocity decisions based on previously observed …