Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 13 of 13
Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory
A Review Of Markets For Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, Peter Cramton
A Review Of Markets For Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comment on deficiency charge in installed capability market. For ISO New England.
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Further comments on energy price cap as a response to design flaws. For ISO New England.
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comments on energy price cap as a response to design flaws. For ISO New England.
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comments on installed capability market. For ISO New England.
Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Peter Cramton
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We explore the extent that bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids in recent FCC …
Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Collusive Bidding: Lessons From The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz
Jesse A. Schwartz
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We explore the extent that bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids in recent FCC …
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Comments on one-part vs. three-part bidding in energy market. For ISO New England.
Eliminating The Flaws In New England's Reserve Markets, Peter Cramton, Jeffrey Lien
Eliminating The Flaws In New England's Reserve Markets, Peter Cramton, Jeffrey Lien
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Lessons From The United States Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton
Lessons From The United States Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, Jill E. Fisch
Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Corporate Law As A Facilitator Of Self Governance, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Corporate Law As A Facilitator Of Self Governance, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Peculiar Role Of The Delaware Courts In The Competition For Corporate Charters, Jill E. Fisch
The Peculiar Role Of The Delaware Courts In The Competition For Corporate Charters, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
From the classic Cary-Winter debate to current legal scholarship, commentators have struggled to explain Delaware's dominance in the market for corporate charters. Although scholars have offered nonsubstantive explanations such as network externalities, interest group dynamics, and Delaware's expert and specialized judiciary, much of the debate focuses on substantive law. This article takes another view. Arguing that a regulator can offer benefits through its lawmaking process, as well as its legal rules, the article suggests a process-oriented analysis of regulatory competition. The article focuses on the unique role of the Delaware judiciary in corporate lawmaking, a role that has received little …