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Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory
Anything For A Cheerio: Brown Capuchins (Sapajus [Cebus] Apella) Consistently Coordinate In An Assurance Game For Unequal Payoffs, Lauren M. Robinson, Mayte Martínez, Kelly L. Leverett, Mattea S. Rossettie, Bart J. Wilson, Sarah F. Brosnan
Anything For A Cheerio: Brown Capuchins (Sapajus [Cebus] Apella) Consistently Coordinate In An Assurance Game For Unequal Payoffs, Lauren M. Robinson, Mayte Martínez, Kelly L. Leverett, Mattea S. Rossettie, Bart J. Wilson, Sarah F. Brosnan
ESI Publications
Unequal outcomes disrupt cooperation in some situations, but this has not been tested in the context of coordination in economic games. To explore this, we tested brown capuchins (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) on a manual version of the Stag Hunt (or Assurance) Game, in which individuals sequentially chose between two options, Stag or Hare, and were rewarded according to their choices and that of their partner. Typically, coordination on Stag results in an equal highest payout, whereas coordinating on Hare results in a guaranteed equal but lower payoff and uncoordinated play results in the lowest payoff when playing …
Responses To The Assurance Game In Monkeys, Apes, And Humans Using Equivalent Procedures, Sarah F. Brosnan, Audrey E. Parrish, Michael J. Beran, Timothy Flemming, Lisa Heimbauer, Catherine F. Talbot, Susan P. Lambeth, Steven J. Schapiro, Bart J. Wilson
Responses To The Assurance Game In Monkeys, Apes, And Humans Using Equivalent Procedures, Sarah F. Brosnan, Audrey E. Parrish, Michael J. Beran, Timothy Flemming, Lisa Heimbauer, Catherine F. Talbot, Susan P. Lambeth, Steven J. Schapiro, Bart J. Wilson
ESI Publications
There is great interest in the evolution of economic behavior. In typical studies, species are asked to play one of a series of economic games, derived from game theory, and their responses are compared. The advantage of this approach is the relative level of consistency and control that emerges from the games themselves; however, in the typical experiment, procedures and conditions differ widely, particularly between humans and other species. Thus, in the current study, we investigated how three primate species, capuchin monkeys, chimpanzees, and humans, played the Assurance (or Stag Hunt) game using procedures that were, to the best of …