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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics
There Should Be Little Or No Liquidity Discounts For Controlling Interests In Closely Held Businesses, Michael Sack Elmaleh
There Should Be Little Or No Liquidity Discounts For Controlling Interests In Closely Held Businesses, Michael Sack Elmaleh
Michael Sack Elmaleh
The application of liquidity discounts to the appraised values of controlling interests in closely held businesses reflects a failure of the valuation community to fully appreciate the fact that these equity interests belong to a fundamentally different investment class than publicly traded securities. Investors in publicly traded securities have dramatically different expectations about the benefits and sacrifices of such investments, compared to the expectations of benefits and sacrifices of investors in closely held companies. Investors in publicly traded securities expect their minority interest investments to be highly liquid, yield free cash flow, and require no participation in the management of …
A Two-Sided Auction For Legacy Loans, Peter Cramton
A Two-Sided Auction For Legacy Loans, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
On Monday, 23 March 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner presented the Public-Private Investment Program as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis (www.financialstability.gov). The Treasury’s description still leaves many issues unanswered. We flesh out the auction design for legacy loans. A two-sided auction is required. Both banks and private investors must compete in a transparent and competitive process.
Enabling Environments For Social Enterprise Development. Analytical Framework And International Exploratory Study Of Good Practices, Raf Peels, Caroline Gijselinckx, Wim Van Opstal, Li Zhao
Enabling Environments For Social Enterprise Development. Analytical Framework And International Exploratory Study Of Good Practices, Raf Peels, Caroline Gijselinckx, Wim Van Opstal, Li Zhao
Wim Van Opstal
The ILO Social Enterprise Development Targeting Unemployed Youth in South Africa (SETYSA) project seeks to promote social enterprise development in South Africa by supporting progress towards a conducive enabling environment and the development of appropriate business development service (BDS) products for potential social entrepreneurs, with a particular focus on young entrepreneurs. The ultimate objective of the project is to encourage the creation of employment opportunities within social enterprises, as well as the social value delivered by the goods and services they produce.
This report presents a selection of policy measures that governments worldwide are taking to create a supportive environment …
Een Monitor Voor De Sociale Inschakelingseconomie In Vlaanderen. Methodologierapport., Eva Deraedt, Wim Van Opstal
Een Monitor Voor De Sociale Inschakelingseconomie In Vlaanderen. Methodologierapport., Eva Deraedt, Wim Van Opstal
Wim Van Opstal
Dit rapport beschrijft de gehanteerde methodologie bij het opstellen van een monitoringinstrument dat ontwikkeld werd om de sociale inschakelingseconomie in Vlaanderen in kaart te brengen (Deraedt & Van Opstal, 2009). De ontwikkeling van dit instrument vond plaats aan het HIVA (K.U.Leuven), kadert in de onderzoekswerkzaamheden van het Steunpunt Werk en Sociale Economie en werd uitgevoerd in opdracht van de Vlaamse administratie. De opdracht bestond erin bestaande databanken maximaal te valoriseren om zo het veelkleurige pallet van de sociale inschakelingseconomie in kaart te brengen. Het uiteindelijke resultaat levert ons de nodige indicatoren op om een profielschets te kunnen maken van de …
Een Monitor Voor De Sociale Inschakelingseconomie In Vlaanderen. Resultatenrapport., Eva Deraedt, Wim Van Opstal
Een Monitor Voor De Sociale Inschakelingseconomie In Vlaanderen. Resultatenrapport., Eva Deraedt, Wim Van Opstal
Wim Van Opstal
Dit rapport toont de resultaten van een monitoring- instrument dat ontwikkeld werd om de sociale inschakelingseconomie in Vlaanderen in kaart te brengen. De ontwikkeling van dit instrument vond plaats aan het HIVA (K.U.Leuven), kadert in de onderzoekswerkzaamheden van het Steunpunt Werk en Sociale Economie en werd uitgevoerd in opdracht van de Vlaamse administratie. De opdracht bestond erin bestaande databanken maximaal te valoriseren om zo het veelkleurige pallet van de sociale inschakelingseconomie in kaart te brengen.
Het uiteindelijke resultaat levert ons de nodige indicatoren op om een profielschets te kunnen maken van de ondernemingen die actief zijn in de sociale inschakelingseconomie, …
La Economía Que Devuelve España A Los Españoles, Mario Šilar
La Economía Que Devuelve España A Los Españoles, Mario Šilar
Mario Šilar
No abstract provided.
The Irreduceable Moral Nature Of Human Action, Mario Šilar, José María Torralba
The Irreduceable Moral Nature Of Human Action, Mario Šilar, José María Torralba
Mario Šilar
No abstract provided.
How Best To Auction Natural Resources, Peter Cramton
How Best To Auction Natural Resources, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
I study the design of auctions of natural resources, such as oil or mineral rights. A good auction design promotes both an efficient assignment of rights and competitive revenues for the seller. The structure of bidder preferences and the degree of competition are key factors in determining the best design. With weak competition and additive values, a simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auction may suffice. With more complex value structures, a dynamic auction with package bids, such as the clock-proxy auction, likely is needed to promote the efficiency and revenue objectives. Bidding on production shares, rather than bonuses, typically increases government take …
Auctioning The Digital Dividend, Peter Cramton
Auctioning The Digital Dividend, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
I begin by describing some of the problems of the simultaneous ascending auction. Then I present the package clock auction, which retains the benefits, while addressing the weaknesses, of the simultaneous ascending auction. I emphasize two essential elements of the package clock auction: the pricing rule and the activity rule. Along the way, I summarize both experimental and field results with the package clock auction.