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Robust Virtual Implementation With Almost Complete Information, Takashi Kunimoto
Robust Virtual Implementation With Almost Complete Information, Takashi Kunimoto
Research Collection School Of Economics
Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2013a,b, henceforth, AKS) study amechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the setof first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, they adopt Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003)) and show that Δ-incentivecompatibility and Δ-measurability are necessary and sufficient conditions forrobust virtual implementation. By appropriately defining Δ in order to restrictattention to complete information environments, I exploit the implicationsof AKS and show that the permissive implementation result of Abreu andMatsushima (1992a) is robust to how the underlying type space is specified.However, AKS need to fix a complete information environment throughouttheir analysis and therefore does not …
Robust Virtual Implementation: Toward A Reinterpretation Of The Wilson Doctrine, Georgy Artemov, Takashi Kunimoto, Roberto Serrano
Robust Virtual Implementation: Toward A Reinterpretation Of The Wilson Doctrine, Georgy Artemov, Takashi Kunimoto, Roberto Serrano
Research Collection School Of Economics
We study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the sets of first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, we use Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003, [5]) as our solution concept, and require that a mechanism virtually implement a socially desirable outcome. We obtain two necessary conditions, Δ-incentive compatibility and Δ-measurability and show that the latter is satisfied as long as a particular zero-measure set of first-order beliefs is ruled out. In environments allowing small transfers of utility among agents, these two conditions are also sufficient.