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Formal Verification Applications For The Treekem Continuous Group Key Agreement Protocol, Alexander J. Washburn
Formal Verification Applications For The Treekem Continuous Group Key Agreement Protocol, Alexander J. Washburn
Theses and Dissertations
The features of Secure Group Messaging, the security guarantees of Message Layer Security, and the TreeKEM protocol designed to satisfy these guarantees and features are explored. A motivation and methodology for verification via explicit model checking is presented. Subsequently, a translation of the TreeKEM protocol into a Promela reference model is described, examining the nuances explicit model checking brings. Finally the results of the formal verification methods are discussed.
Pointing Analysis And Design Drivers For Low Earth Orbit Satellite Quantum Key Distribution, Jeremiah A. Specht
Pointing Analysis And Design Drivers For Low Earth Orbit Satellite Quantum Key Distribution, Jeremiah A. Specht
Theses and Dissertations
The world relies on encryption to perform critical and sensitive tasks every day. If quantum computing matures, the capability to decode keys and decrypt messages becomes possible. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a method of distributing secure cryptographic keys which relies on the laws of quantum mechanics. Current implementations of QKD use fiber-based channels which limit the number of users and the distance between users. Satellite-based QKD using free-space channels is proposed as a feasible secure global communication solution. Since a free-space link does not use a waveguide, pointing a transmitter to receiver is required to ensure signal arrival. In …
Effects Of Architecture On Information Leakage Of A Hardware Advanced Encryption Standard Implementation, Eric A. Koziel
Effects Of Architecture On Information Leakage Of A Hardware Advanced Encryption Standard Implementation, Eric A. Koziel
Theses and Dissertations
Side-channel analysis (SCA) is a threat to many modern cryptosystems. Many countermeasures exist, but are costly to implement and still do not provide complete protection against SCA. A plausible alternative is to design the cryptosystem using architectures that are known to leak little information about the cryptosystem's operations. This research uses several common primitive architectures for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and assesses the susceptibility of the full AES system to side-channel attack for various primitive configurations. A combined encryption/decryption core is also evaluated to determine if variation of high-level architectures affects leakage characteristics. These different configurations are evaluated under …
Implementation And Optimization Of The Advanced Encryption Standard Algorithm On An 8-Bit Field Programmable Gate Array Hardware Platform, Ryan J. Silva
Theses and Dissertations
The contribution of this research is three-fold. The first is a method of converting the area occupied by a circuit implemented on a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) to an equivalent as a measure of total gate count. This allows direct comparison between two FPGA implementations independent of the manufacturer or chip family. The second contribution improves the performance of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) on an 8-bit computing platform. This research develops an AES design that occupies less than three quarters of the area reported by the smallest design in current literature as well as significantly increases area efficiency. …
Cryptanalysis Of Pseudorandom Number Generators In Wireless Sensor Networks, Kevin M. Finnigin
Cryptanalysis Of Pseudorandom Number Generators In Wireless Sensor Networks, Kevin M. Finnigin
Theses and Dissertations
This work presents a brute-force attack on an elliptic curve cryptosystem implemented on UC Berkley's TinyOS operating system for wireless sensor networks. The attack exploits the short period of the pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) used by the cryptosystem to generate private keys. The attack assumes a laptop is listening promiscuously to network traffic for key messages and requires only the sensor node?s public key and network address to discover the private key. Experimental results show that roughly 50% of the address space leads to a private key compromise in 25 minutes on average. Furthermore, approximately 32% of the address space …