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Full-Text Articles in Information Security
Lightweight Fine-Grained Search Over Encrypted Data In Fog Computing, Yinbin Miao, Jianfeng Ma, Ximeng Liu, Jian Weng, Hongwei Li, Hui Li
Lightweight Fine-Grained Search Over Encrypted Data In Fog Computing, Yinbin Miao, Jianfeng Ma, Ximeng Liu, Jian Weng, Hongwei Li, Hui Li
Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems
Fog computing, as an extension of cloud computing, outsources the encrypted sensitive data to multiple fog nodes on the edge of Internet of Things (IoT) to decrease latency and network congestion. However, the existing ciphertext retrieval schemes rarely focus on the fog computing environment and most of them still impose high computational and storage overhead on resource-limited end users. In this paper, we first present a Lightweight Fine-Grained ciphertexts Search (LFGS) system in fog computing by extending Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE) and Searchable Encryption (SE) technologies, which can achieve fine-grained access control and keyword search simultaneously. The LFGS can shift …
Securing Messaging Services Through Efficient Signcryption With Designated Equality Test, Yujue Wang, Hwee Hwa Pang, Robert H. Deng, Yong Ding, Qianhong Wu, Bo Qin
Securing Messaging Services Through Efficient Signcryption With Designated Equality Test, Yujue Wang, Hwee Hwa Pang, Robert H. Deng, Yong Ding, Qianhong Wu, Bo Qin
Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems
To address security and privacy issues in messaging services, we present a public key signcryption scheme with designated equality test on ciphertexts (PKS-DET) in this paper. The scheme enables a sender to simultaneously encrypt and sign (signcrypt) messages, and to designate a tester to perform equality test on ciphertexts, i.e., to determine whether two ciphertexts signcrypt the same underlying plaintext message. We introduce the PKS-DET framework, present a concrete construction and formally prove its security against three types of adversaries, representing two security requirements on message confidentiality against outsiders and the designated tester, respectively, and a requirement on message unforgeability …