Databases and Information Systems Commons^™

Sustainability Of Rewards-Based Crowdfunding: A Quasi-Experimental Analysis Of Funding Targets And Backer Satisfaction, Michael Wessel, Rob Gleasure, Robert John Kauffman

Research Collection School Of Computing and Information Systems

Rewards-based crowdfunding presents an information asymmetry for participants due to the funding mechanism used. Campaign-backers trust creators to complete projects and deliver rewards as outlined prior to the fundraising process, but creators may discover better opportunities as they progress with a project. Despite this, the all-or-nothing (AON) mechanism on crowdfunding platforms incentivizes creators to set meager funding-targets that are easier to achieve but may offer limited slack when creators wish to simultaneously pursue emerging opportunities later in the project. We explore the related issues of how funding targets seem to be selected by the creators, and how dissatisfaction with the …