Securities Law Commons^™

The Sec At 70: Time For Retirement?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the pathologies of the SEC and explores the relation between those pathologies and the SEC's status as an independent agency. Part II then outlines an alternative regulatory structure primarily situated within the executive branch. I also argue that such a relocation of authority would enhance regulatory effectiveness while simultaneously reducing the cost of excessive regulation. The Article concludes with some thoughts about the viability of my proposal.

The Sec At 70: Time For Retirement?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

As one grows older, birthdays gradually shift from being celebratory events to more reflective occasions. One's 40th birthday is commemorated rather differently from one's 2lst, which is, in turn, celebrated quite differently from one's first. After a certain point, the individual birthdays become less important and it is the milestone years to whch we pay particular attention. Sadly for entities like the Securities and Exchange Commission, it is only the milestone years (the ones ending in five or zero, for some reason), that draw any attention at all. No one held a conference to celebrate the SEC's 67th anniversary. Clearly …

Should Issuers Be On The Hook For Laddering? An Empirical Analysis Of The Ipo Market Manipulation Litigation, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi

Articles

On December 6, 2000, the Wall Street Journal ran a front-page story exposing abuses in the market for initial public offerings (IPOs). The story revealed "tie-in" agreements between investment banks and initial investors seeking to participate in "hot" offerings. Under those agreements, initial investors would commit to buy additional shares of the offering company's stock in secondary market trading in return for allocations of shares in the IPO. As the Wall Street Journal related, those "[c]ommitments to buy in the after-market lock in demand for additional stock at levels above the IPO price. As such, they provide the rocket fuel …

Should Congress Repeal Securities Class Action Reform?, Adam C. Pritchard

Other Publications

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was designed to curtail class action lawsuits by the plaintiffs’ bar. In particular, the high-technology industry, accountants, and investment bankers thought that they had been unjustly victimized by class action lawsuits based on little more than declines in a company’s stock price. Prior to 1995, the plaintiffs’ bar had free rein to use the discovery process to troll for evidence to support its claims. Moreover, the high costs of litigation were a powerful weapon with which to coerce companies to settle claims. The plaintiffs’ bar and its allies in Congress have called …

Beyond The Business Judgment Rule: Protecting Bidder Firm Shareholders From Value-Reducing Acquisitions, Ryan Houseal

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

During the takeover transactions of the 1980s, bidder firms paid target firm shareholders average premiums of approximately 50% for their shares. Did the sizable premiums paid to target firm shareholders during the 1980s reflect post-takeover improvement in the target's performance? Or were the premiums a result of the mismanagement of the bidder firms' assets?

The answer will help determine whether additional legal mechanisms should be established to protect bidder firm shareholders from the threat of management's consummation of value reducing acquisitions. Accordingly, this Note examines various studies which attempt to identify the source of the premiums paid to target firm …

Markets As Monitors: A Proposal To Replace Class Actions With Exchanges As Securities Fraud Enforcers, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Fraud in the securities markets has been a focus of legislative reform in recent years. Corporations-especially those in the high-technology industry-have complained that they are being unfairly targeted by plaintiffs' lawyers in class action securities fraud lawsuits. The corporations' complaints led to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("Reform Act"). The Reform Act attempted to reduce meritless litigation against corporate issuers by erecting a series of procedural barriers to the filing of securities class actions. Plaintiffs' attorneys warned that the Reform Act and the resulting decrease in securities class actions would leave corporate fraud unchecked and deprive defrauded …

Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism By Labor Unions, Stewart J. Schwab, Randall S. Thomas

Michigan Law Review

Labor unions are active again - but this time as capitalists. The potential strength of union pension funds has long been noted, but until recently unions have held their stock passively or invested in union-friendly companies. In the 1990s, however, unions have become the most aggressive of all institutional shareholders. In most cases, it is hard to find a socialist or proletarian plot in what unions are doing with their shares. Rather, labor activism is a model for any large institutional investor attempting to maximize return on capital. Unions, union pension funds, individual union members, and labor-oriented investment funds are …

United States V. O'Hagan: Agency Law And Justice Powell's Legacy For The Law Of Insider Trading, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

The law of insider trading is judicially created; no statutory provision explicitly prohibits trading on the basis of material, non-public information. The Supreme Court's insider trading jurisprudence was forged, in large part, by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. His opinions for the Court in United States v. Chiarella and SEC v. Dirks were, until recently, the Supreme Court's only pronouncements on the law of insider trading. Those decisions established the elements of the classical theory of insider trading under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"). Under this theory, corporate insiders and their tippees who …

The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act Of 1998: The Sun Sets On California's Blue Sky Laws, David M. Lavine, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

It is often said that California sets the pace for changes in America's tastes. Trends established in California often find their way into the heartland, having a profound effect on our nation's cultural scene. Nouvelle cuisine, the dialect of the Valley Girl and rollerblading all have their genesis on the West Coast. The most recent trend to emerge from California, instead of catching on in the rest of the country, has been stopped dead in its tracks by a legislative rebuke from Washington, D.C. California's latest, albeit short-lived, contribution to the nation was a migration of securities fraud class actions …

Cook And The Corporate Shareholder: A Belated Review Of William W. Cook's Publications On Corporations, Alfred F. Conard

Michigan Law Review

A Review of A Treatise on the Law of Stock and Stockholders, as Applicable to Railroad, Banking, Insurance, Manufacturing, Commercial, Business, Turnpike, Bridge, Canal, and Other Private Corporations by William W. Cook

Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee Jr.

Michigan Law Review

The two authors of this article have been on opposite sides of this debate, but both recognize that no single explanation is complete and that other factors, such as the self-interest of fund managers, the conflicts of interest faced by institutions who want to retain corporate business, cultural forces, collective action problems, and what we can call path dependence- the difficulty of changing the structure and behavior of highly evolved and specialized institutions - have causal roles in explaining shareholder passivity. The central question in research on American corporate governance is how these forces interact to produce the characteristic …

Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, Bernard S. Black

Michigan Law Review

This article argues that shareholder monitoring is possible: It's an idea that hasn't been tried, rather than an idea that has failed. I defer to a second article currently in draft the question of whether more monitoring by institutional shareholders is desirable. Will direct shareholder oversight, or indirect oversight through shareholder-nominated directors, improve corporate performance, prove counterproductive, or, perhaps, not matter much one way or the other? What are the benefits and risks in giving money managers - themselves imperfectly monitored agents - more power over corporate managers? If more shareholder voice is desirable, how much more and …

Protecting Nonshareholder Interests In The Market For Corporate Control: A Role For State Takeover Statutes, Frank J. Garcia

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Part I of this Note describes a phenomenon of modern corporate activity first identified over fifty years ago as the "separation of ownership and control." This separation gives rise to the need for a governing corporate norm; recognizing the normative aspect of this phenomenon has direct implications for the takeover debate.

Part II analyzes the problem of a target board's fiduciary duty as the modern version of the fundamental normative issue of corporate law. It argues that the norm of shareholder wealth maximization, assumed as the starting point by those most in favor of an active and minimally regulated control …

Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, Alfred F. Conard

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Capitalism, in most large public corporations, has been subtly transformed from a system of dominance by the suppliers of capital to a system of dominance by the managers, dubbed "managerialism." In many respects, managerialism is beneficial to investors and other enterprise constituencies, since managers' rewards typically grow with the profitability of the enterprise. But managerialism permits drastic wastes of resources when managers hang on to their jobs after they have become inefficient or spend lavishly to defend themselves against takeover bids. Derivative suits, shareholder proposals, independent directors, and other prescriptions have failed to stifle managerial abuses. This is the message …

Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain In The Corporate Web, John C. Coffee Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Part I will seek to understand why firms trade in the stock market at a substantial discount from their asset value. It will answer that existing theories of the firm have not given adequate attention to a critical area where shareholders and managers have an inherent conflict, one that the existing structure of the firm does not resolve or mitigate. Despite the significant changes in the internal structure of the corporation over the last half century that have been described by business historians, there remains a deep internal strain between shareholders, on the one hand, and managers and employees, on …

Social Investing And The Law Of Trusts, John H. Langbein, Richard A. Posner

Michigan Law Review

In Part I, after presenting a brief primer on the economics of securities markets, we analyze the economic and policy issues presented by social investing. We conclude that the usual forms of social investing involve a combination of reduced diversification and higher administrative costs not offset by net consumption gains to the investment beneficiaries. Social investing may therefore be economically unsound even though there is no reason to expect a portfolio constructed in accordance with the usual principles of social investment to yield a below-average rate of return - provided that administrative costs are ignored.

Part II relates our policy …

A Reconsideration Of The Stock Market Exception To The Dissenting Shareholder's Right Of Appraisal, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note engages in such a reassessment. It contends, first, that appraisal has not been an unreasonable burden on corporations and that adjustments in the appraisal procedure can eliminate remaining inequities. Next, it asserts that the stock market exception inadequately protects the dissenting shareholder, since a market might, for a variety of reasons, price a shareholder's stock at less than its intrinsic value. Finally, this Note concludes that an appraisal procedure with modifications, and not the stock market exception, reflects the appropriate balance of corporate and shareholder interests.

Providing An Effective Remedy In Shareholder Suits Against Officers, Directors, And Controlling Persons, Michael H. Woolever

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Corporate officers, directors, and controlling persons occupy a fiduciary relationship toward the corporation and its shareholders in the exercise of control over corporate affairs. This fiduciary obligation requires that officers, directors, and controlling persons act in good faith and perform their offices in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders and not to their own advantage. When this duty is breached, a shareholder may bring an action against these fiduciaries, either in his own name or derivatively for the benefit of the corporation. Under present law, however, it may be impossible for an American court to secure jurisdiction …

Perlman V. Feldmann: A Case Study In Contemporary Corporate Legal History, Jan G. Deutsch

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The author gives the following introduction to this article: “When I was a law student, taking a course in introductory corporate law, what was heard around the halls was that most of corporate law would be learned if one understood Perlman v. Feldmann. I agree with that statement, and I have agreed more strongly each year I myself have taught introductory corporate law. Indeed, I now believe one would also learn a good deal about the significance of-the corporation in American life during the past two decades. Unfortunately, however, it seems to me-on the basis of having read everything …

Res Judicata In The Derivative Action: Adequacy Of Representation And The Inadequate Plaintiff, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

It is the purpose of this Note to examine the adequacy of representation in a derivative suit and to consider the appropriateness of applying res judicata to foreclose the corporate cause of action. Discussion will focus on the following areas: (1) the problem of the inadequate plaintiff; (2) the efficacy of judicially created devices designed to ensure the adequacy of representation; and, (3) the feasibility of partially exempting the derivative cause of action from the operation of res judicata.

Shareholder Derivative Actions: A Modest Proposal To Revise Federal Rule 23.1, Robert A. Kessler

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The purpose of this article is to suggest the addition of two words, "if necessary"-or better yet, the phrase "if necessary under the law of the forum state"-to clause (1) of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1. This Rule sets forth the requirements for a shareholder's derivative action in the federal courts.

Warrants In Bond-Warrant Units: A Survey And Assessment, Henry B. Reiling

Michigan Law Review

This Article surveys the warrant in the context of a bond-warrant unit (the typical medium of issuance), and in four main subdivisions assesses (I) the warrant's role in corporate finance, and several major implications and features of its use today for (II) shareholders of the prospective issuer, (III) warrant holder, and (IV) issuer. The present status of the warrant as a highly significant mode of financing requires that particular attention be given to the justification for the issuance of warrants in the light of earlier authoritative criticism, and to the tax consequences and concepts now attending their use. Fortunately, several …

The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections On Campaign Gm, Donald E. Schwartz

Michigan Law Review

Proxy contests are generally fought for control of a corporation. The rules governing this form of corporate combat seek to provide shareholders with adequate information about the rival forces for control so that they can intelligently choose between them. The information furnished in proxy materials and discussions at annual meetings have traditionally been devoted almost entirely to subjects such as finance, production, acquisitions, and the like.

Corporations-Class Actions Under Section 16(B) Of The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934-Federal Rule 23, Richard. J. Archer

Michigan Law Review

Pursuant to section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 an action was commenced by a shareholder to recover for the corporation profits realized by another shareholder through "short swing" transactions in securities of the corporation, the estimated profits being $50,770. Plaintiff's attorney filed an affidavit stating the reasons why recovery of the full amount was doubtful and made application for , leave to settle and compromise for $5,000. The corporation's attorney agreed to this proposal. Held, the merits of the compromise cannot be considered until in conformance with Rule 23 ( c), actual notice of the …

Corporations-The Fair And Equitable Test In Recapitalizations, Robert O. Hancox

Michigan Law Review

Changes in capital structures of corporations which modify rights of security holders generally occur under one of two circumstances: (1) reorganization of insolvent corporations which affects the rights of creditors as well as shareholders and necessitates judicial supervision; and (2) recapitalization of solvent corporations involving only the relative rights of the different classes of shareholders. It is the author's present purpose to focus attention on the effect of the latter type of modification on the most zealously guarded right of the preferred shareholder--the right to accrued dividends on cumulative preferred stock.

Taxation-Income Tax-Dealings By Corporation In Its Own Stock, John N. Seaman

Michigan Law Review

From 1921 to 1929, appellee corporation bought shares of its own stock, not for retirement, but to sustain the market, to increase the number of shareholders by resale in smaller blocks, and for other reasons. This stock was held as treasury stock. In 1929 it was sold by the corporation, at a profit. From 1920 to 1934 the Treasury Regulations exempted the proceeds of such a transaction from income tax, treating the purchase and sale as separate decrease and increase in the capital, and not as resulting in income. But in 1934 the regulation was changed, so as to tax …

Corporations - Capital, Capital Stock And Stock, Frederick K. Brown

Michigan Law Review

The recent case of Haggard v. Lexington Utilities Co. is typical of the nominalistic confusion occasioned by the use of the terms "capital" and "capital stock." Whatever progress the courts have made toward making them words of precise signification has not been reflected in the drafting of statutes, where they are employed to represent a bewildering number of connotations. The courts have recognized this and have not sought to make them words of art with a single, definitive meaning but through the mechanics of statutory interpretation have sought to divine the legislative intent.

Purchase Of Shares Of Corporation By A Director From A Shareholder, Harold R. Smith

Michigan Law Review

As suggested by the title to this paper, a discussion of the relationship between the directors of a corporation and the corporate entity is not within its scope. Neither is the lrelationship between the directors-and the entire body of the shareholders. These two subjects are generally treated in another branch of the law of corporations and generally are not governed by the same rules of law.' The purchase of shares of stock by a director from a nonofficial shareholder naturally brings into question the relationship between the director and the shareholder in his individual capacity, and not in his capacity …

Watered Stock Commissions Blue Sky Laws Stock Without Par Value, William W. Cook

Michigan Law Review

Stockholders' exemption from liability for corporate debts is a modern invention. It was not until 18x1 that New York extended that exemption to stockholders in manufacturing corporations.' Massachusetts did not grant it until 1830.2 England did not allow it to stockholders in business and manufacturing cornpanies until I855. s As President Eliot of Harvard has pointed out, this privilege of limited liability is "the corporation's most precious characteristic."'

Respective Rights Of Preferred And Common Stockholders In Surplus Profits, George Jarvis Thompson

Michigan Law Review

The movement in the field of co5perative commercial undertakings has been; school-book-like, a movement from the simple to the complex, from the common-la* sitaation of persons associating together to conduct a busines for profit to the modern statutory association and the corporation possessing an enormous capital ,derived from a host of individuals whose respective interests are represented -by various -classes -of transferable shares.