Securities Law Commons^™

Entrenched Managers & Corporate Social Responsibility, Shane M. Shelley

ExpressO

A growing number of academics have suggested U.S. corporate governance laws bestow too much power on managers. Much of the research focuses on the relationship between corporate governance arrangements, which supply a means to managerial power, and the financial performance of corporations. This exclusive focus on financial performance may be misguided. Although profits serve as a proxy for the benefits corporations provide society, they do not always adequately reflect the costs of the activities that generated them. In this sense, financial performance may not give an accurate, or at least complete, picture of the real value of corporations. Whether managers …

Overvalued Equity And The Case For An Asymmetric Insider Trading Regime, Thomas A. Lambert

ExpressO

The forty-year debate over whether insider trading should be regulated has generally proceeded in all-or-nothing terms: Either all insider trading should be permitted (subject only to private restrictions imposed by issuers themselves), or none should. This Article argues for an asymmetric insider trading policy under which insider trading that decreases the price of an overvalued stock is generally permitted, but insider trading that increases the price of an undervalued stock is generally prohibited. Concluding that the net investor benefits of price-decreasing insider trading exceed those of price-enhancing insider trading, the Article argues that an asymmetric insider trading regime likely represents …

Rediscovering The Economics Of Loss Causation , Richard Kaplan, Madge Thorsen, Scott Hakala

ExpressO

Abstract This article explores the economic principles and theories underlying loss causation in the context of securities fraud litigation. It explains the difference between “investment loss” and recoverable “inflationary loss” and posits that the latter consists of the difference between inflation in stock prices caused by the fraud at the time of purchase and inflation in the price at the time of sale. It reviews scenarios in which inflationary loss due to fraud may occur and would be recognized as a matter of economic theory as well as a matter of law. It urges that Dura v. Broudo Pharmaceuticals, 125 …

Breaking The Bank: Revisiting Central Bank Of Denver After Enron And Sarbanes-Oxley, Celia Taylor

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

Can Regulation Of Insider Trading Be Effective?, Alexandre Padilla

ExpressO

While there is a very prolific literature showing that the regulation of insider trading is by and large ineffective when it comes to discourage individuals from trading on non-public information, almost no work has been done on whether insider trading regulation can be effective. This paper attempts to fill that gap by investigating whether the regulation of insider trading can be effective. First, we show why insider trading regulation cannot be effective. Second, we see to what extend the empirical studies are consistent with our analysis.

What Makes Asset Securitization "Inefficient"?, Kenji Yamazaki

ExpressO

Despite the damage caused by the recent Enron scandal , the asset securitization market has been vibrant and has become a popular financing alternative . A number of academics emphasize its merits and suggest that it is a more favorable way of financing, and Congress’s proposal to make sales of asset in securitization immune from characterization as secured transactions under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 (the “Reform Act”) almost materialized when the Enron scandal hit the scene. Conversely, there have been accusations that securitization is not a legitimate way of financing because, for example, it fosters fraudulent transactions.

Why …

Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets And The Dog That Did Not Bark, Henry G. Manne

ExpressO

This Essay briefly reexamines the great debates on the role of insider trading in the corporate system from the perspectives of efficiency of capital markets, harm to individual investors, and executive compensation. The focus is on the mystery of why trading by all kinds of insiders as well as knowledgeable outsiders was studiously ignored by the business and investment communities before the advent of insider trading regulation. It is hardly conceivable that officers, directors, and controlling shareholders would have remained totally silent in the face of widespread insider trading if they had seen the practice as being harmful to the …

Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, And The Dog That Did Not Bark, Henry G. Manne

ExpressO

This Essay briefly reexamines the great debates on the role of insider trading in the corporate system from the perspectives of efficiency of capital markets, harm to individual investors, and executive compensation. The focus is on the mystery of why trading by all kinds of insiders as well as knowledgeable outsiders was studiously ignored by the business and investment communities before the advent of insider trading regulation. It is hardly conceivable that officers, directors, and controlling shareholders would have remained totally silent in the face of widespread insider trading if they had seen the practice as being harmful to the …

Price, Path & Pride: Third-Party Closing Opinion Practice Among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary Investigation), Jonathan C. Lipson

ExpressO

This article presents the first in-depth exploration of third-party closing opinions, a common but curious – and potentially troubling -- feature of U.S. business law practice. Third-party closing opinions are letters delivered at the closing of most large transactions by the attorney for one party (e.g., the borrower) to the other party (e.g., the lender) offering limited assurance that the transaction will have legal force and effect.

Hundreds, if not thousands, of legal opinions are delivered every week. Yet, lawyers often complain that they create needless risk and cost, and produce little benefit. Closing opinions thus pose a basic question: …

The Legal Status Of “Dump & Sue”: Should Plaintiffs And Their Attorneys Be Prohibited From Trading The Stock Of Companies They Sue? – A Law And Economics Approach, Moin A. Yahya

ExpressO

There is some evidence that plaintiffs and their attorneys are profitably short-selling the stock of the companies they intend to sue. The status of such short sales is undecided in the law. Lawsuits against companies can cause large drops in market value, and hence such an action by the plaintiff should cause concern. Plaintiffs, however, are not traditional insiders, and they do not owe the shareholders any fiduciary duties. They can therefore consent to their attorneys also short-selling the stock of the defendant corporation. The attorneys need to receive such permission to avoid misappropriating the information concerning their client’s decision …

The "Duty" To Be A Rational Shareholder, David A. Hoffman

ExpressO

How and when do courts determine that corporate disclosures are actionable under the federal securities laws? The applicable standard is materiality: would a (mythical) "reasonable investor" have considered the disclosures important. As I establish through empirical and statistical testing of 500 cases analyzing the materiality standard, judicial findings of immateriality are remarkably common, and have been stable over time. Materiality's scope results in the dismissal of a large number of claims, and creates a set of cases in which courts attempt to explain and defend their vision of who is, and is not, a "reasonable investor." Thus, materiality provides an …

The New Dividend Puzzle, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Expensing Isn't The Only Option: Alternatives To The Fasb's Stock Option Expensing Proposal, Benjamin A. Templin

ExpressO

This paper reviews the arguments for and against the Financial Accounting Standard Board's (FASB) proposal to require that corporations expense options. It identifies two major goals of the proposed rule -- 1) clarity in financial statements and 2) a reduction of corporate fraud by removing the incentive of options. To address these two goals, I adopt a framework of Information Reforms v. Rules of the Game Reforms. The article starts with a history of FASB Statement No. 123 Accounting for Stock-based Compensation and also analyzes the Congressional legislation that attempts to block the measure, the Stock Option Accounting Reform Act. …

Securing Truth For Power: Informational Strategy And Regulatory Policy Making, Cary Coglianese

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

Comparisons Among Firms: (When) Do They Justify Mandatory Disclosure?, Sharon Hannes

ExpressO

Comparisons among firms play a major role in securities analysis. This essay asks if this fact justifies the mandatory nature of securities regulation. Once a firm approaches the public securities markets, federal securities regulations compel it to disclose financial information to the public. A seminal theory argues that firms would not otherwise commit to maintain optimal disclosure levels, since a disclosing firm bears all disclosure costs but does not gain all disclosure benefits.

This paper examines the robustness of this argument in relation to disclosure benefits which arise from comparisons among firms. Financial data of peer firms allows shareholders to …

Dividends, Noncontractibility, And Corporate Law, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

A Property-Based Theory Of Security Interests: Taking Debtor's Choices Seriously, Steven L. Harris, Charles W. Mooney Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.