Securities Law Commons^™

Comment Letter On Sec’S Proposed Rule On Conflicts Of Interest Associated With The Use Of Predictive Data Analytics By Broker-Dealers And Investment Advisers, File Number S7-12-23, Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci, Christina M. Sautter

Faculty Works

This comment letter responds to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s proposed rule Release Nos. 34-97990; IA-6353; File Number S7-12-23 - Conflicts of Interest Associated with the Use of Predictive Data Analytics by Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers. Our comments draw on our scholarship relating to laypersons’ participation in securities markets and the corporate sector as well as on the role of technology in corporate governance.

We express concerns that the SEC’s proposed regulation undermines individuals’ ability to access capital markets in an efficient and cost-effective manner. In the era of excessive concentration of equities ownership and power, often with negative societal …

Conflicts Of Interest At An Organization’S Highest Authority: How The District Of Columbia’S Rules Of Professional Conduct Can Fail To Protect Private Organizations, Christopher Deubert

Catholic University Law Review

This Article examines how the District of Columbia’s incomplete incorporation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct into its own Rules of Professional Conduct has created a scenario in which wrongdoing inside a private organization can flourish. In 2002, following the Enron scandal, the American Bar Association (ABA) revisited and revised its Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The ABA nevertheless took a conservative route, rejecting rules long proposed by experts which would have permitted attorneys aware of corporate crimes, fraud, and other wrongdoing to report their concerns to individuals or entities outside the organization’s reporting structure. Additional scandals unfolded contemporaneous …

Requiring Broker-Dealers To Disclose Conflicts Of Interest: A Solution Protecting And Empowering Investors, Daniel P. Guernsey Jr.

University of Miami Law Review

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) instructed the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to analyze the gaps in the regulatory regimes of investment advisers and broker-dealers. After analyzing the differences between the two regimes, the SEC proposed a rule that essentially created a fiduciary duty for broker-dealers equivalent to that of investment advisers. In theory, a uniform fiduciary duty would increase investor protection; however, such a drastic overhaul of broker-dealer regulation has attendant consequences. Indeed, as seen from the federal government’s previous attempts to create a broker-dealer fiduciary duty, increasing broker-dealer regulatory requirements limits lower-capital …

Third-Party Institutional Proxy Advisors: Conflicts Of Interest And Roads To Reform, Matthew Fagan

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

With the rise of institutional activist investors in recent decades—including a purported 495 activist campaigns against U.S. corporations in 2016 alone—the role that third-party institutional proxy advisors play in corporate governance has greatly increased. The United States Office of Government Accountability estimates that clients of the top five proxy advisory firms account for about $41.5 trillion in equity throughout the world. For several years, discussions have developed regarding conflicts of interest faced by proxy advisors. For example, Institutional Shareholder Services, the top proxy advisory firm in the world, frequently provides advice to institutional investors on how to vote proxies while …

Conflicts & Capital Allocation, Benjamin P. Edwards

Scholarly Works

The regulatory structure for financial advice now tolerates incentives motivating financial advisors to manipulate and deceive retail investors. While scholars thus far have argued for ways to improve investor protections, the literature has largely ignored how these flawed incentives affect the economy.

This Article contends that these flawed incentives cause financial advisors to negatively affect capital allocation throughout the overall economy.

This Article draws on literature about manipulation and deception in principal-agent relationships to show how conflicts of interest cause the market for financial advisor services to generate excessive intermediation, driving harms to the real economy. This Article uses case …

The Challenge Of Fiduciary Regulation: The Investment Advisors Act After Seventy-Five Years, Roberta S. Karmel

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

Seventy-five years after its enactment the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 has advanced from a relatively weak statute merely registering advisers with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to a more robust law imposing fiduciary responsibilities on advisers. Over the years, the number of investment advisers and the number of their clients have increased greatly. The SEC therefore has been pressured by Congress to develop a harmonized fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and advisers and also to develop and enforce a greater degree of oversight over the advisory industry. These developments have raised the questions of how to fund such efforts …

Fraud Is Already Illegal: Section 621 Of The Dodd-Frank Act In The Context Of The Securities Laws, Nathan R. Schuur

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, lawmakers and the public focused on abuses in the securitization industry. Abacus, a Synthetic CDO created by Goldman Sachs & Co., became a symbol of what many felt was a corrupt system when it became known that Goldman and Fabrice Tourre, a Vice President at its Correlation Trading Desk, had assisted a hedge fund in designing the security to fail. Perceived failings of the securities laws to prevent transactions like Abacus spurred Congress to enact Section 621 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which prohibits conflicts of interest in asset-backed securitizations. But the law is …

Why Governance Might Work In Mutual Funds, Michael C. Schouten

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Jones v. Harris Associates L.P. has highlighted the potential for agency conflicts in mutual funds, whose advisors have the de facto power to award themselves high fees. While the surrounding debate has focused on the extent to which market competition replaces the need for fee litigation, there appears to be a growing consensus that fund governance, through the use of voice, is unlikely to be effective. The use of voice is commonly said to be hampered by collective action problems. More recently, scholars have argued that it is further weakened by the easy availability …

Principles, Prescriptions, And Polemics: Regulating Conflicts Of Interest In The Canadian Investment Fund Industry, Dan Awrey

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Conflicts of interest permeate the Canadian investment fund industry. In response, securities regulators have promulgated National Instrument 81-107 Independent Review Committee for Investment Funds. In the view of securities regulators, NI 81-107 reflects a "principles-based" approach toward the regulation of conflicts of interest. This Article articulates a theoretical conception of principles-based securities regulation, one which transcends the formalism of the traditional "rules" versus "principles" debate to reveal a new regulatory paradigm. Thereafter, the author explores whether and to what extent NI 81-107 truly reflects this principles-based paradigm, manifesting the potential to tap into its inherent wisdom while at the same …

A Proposal To Revise The Sec Instructions For Reporting Waivers Of Corporate Codes Of Ethics For Conflicts Of Interest, Madoka Mori

ExpressO

Enron’s collapse focused attention on the application of that company’s Code of Ethics to related-party transactions. That focus produced Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which intends to regulate conflicts of interest between officers and their companies through codes of ethics that public companies adopt. Pursuant to SOX Section 406(a), the Securities Exchange Commission issued new regulations requiring each public company to disclose whether it has a code of ethics, and if a company has not adopted such a code, to explain why it has chosen not to do so. SEC rules also require each company that has …

Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, Bernard S. Black

Michigan Law Review

This article argues that shareholder monitoring is possible: It's an idea that hasn't been tried, rather than an idea that has failed. I defer to a second article currently in draft the question of whether more monitoring by institutional shareholders is desirable. Will direct shareholder oversight, or indirect oversight through shareholder-nominated directors, improve corporate performance, prove counterproductive, or, perhaps, not matter much one way or the other? What are the benefits and risks in giving money managers - themselves imperfectly monitored agents - more power over corporate managers? If more shareholder voice is desirable, how much more and …

Chinese Wall Or Emperor's New Clothes? Regulating Conflicts Of Interest Of Securities Firms In The U.S. And The U.K., Norman S. Poser

Michigan Journal of International Law

This article has two principal theses. The first is that, while Chinese Walls of securities firms are undoubtedly useful in some instances in preventing the flow of confidential information, the evidence that they actually do this is insufficient to justify basing a legal defense on the existence of a wall in a particular firm. In fact, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that at some firms the Chinese Wall is nothing but a convenient fiction aimed at avoiding liability for market abuses. The article's second thesis is that the isolation of information within a department of a firm which …

The Regulation Of Insider Trading In The United States, United Kingdom, And Japan, Barbara Ann Banoff

Michigan Journal of International Law

Part I of this article will briefly discuss the American laws regulating insider trading; Part II will discuss the law of the United Kingdom; and Part III will discuss the regulation-or, more accurately, the non-regulation-of insider trading in Japan.