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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Barbarians Inside The Gates: Raiders, Activists, And The Risk Of Mistargeting, Zohar Goshen, Reilly S. Steel
Barbarians Inside The Gates: Raiders, Activists, And The Risk Of Mistargeting, Zohar Goshen, Reilly S. Steel
Faculty Scholarship
This Article argues that the conventional wisdom about corporate raiders and activist hedge funds — raiders break things and activists fix them — is wrong. Because activists have a higher risk of mistargeting — mistakenly shaking things up at firms that only appear to be underperforming — they are much more likely than raiders to destroy value and, ultimately, social wealth.
As corporate outsiders who challenge the incompetence or disloyalty of incumbent management, raiders and activists play similar roles in reducing “agency costs” at target firms. The difference between them comes down to a simple observation about their business models: …
Enhancing Efficiency At Nonprofits With Analysis And Disclosure, David M. Schizer
Enhancing Efficiency At Nonprofits With Analysis And Disclosure, David M. Schizer
Faculty Scholarship
The U.S. nonprofit sector spends $2.54 trillion each year. If the sector were a country, it would have the eighth largest economy in the world, ahead of Brazil, Italy, Canada, and Russia. The government provides nonprofits with billions in tax subsidies, but instead of evaluating the quality of their work, it leaves this responsibility to nonprofit managers, boards, and donors. The best nonprofits are laboratories of innovation, but unfortunately some are stagnant backwaters, which waste money on out-of-date missions and inefficient programs. To promote more innovation and less stagnation, this Article makes two contributions to the literature.
First, this Article …
Activist Directors And Agency Costs: What Happens When An Activist Director Goes On The Board?, John C. Coffee Jr., Robert J. Jackson Jr., Joshua Mitts, Robert Bishop
Activist Directors And Agency Costs: What Happens When An Activist Director Goes On The Board?, John C. Coffee Jr., Robert J. Jackson Jr., Joshua Mitts, Robert Bishop
Faculty Scholarship
We develop and apply a new and more rigorous methodology by which to measure and understand both insider trading and the agency costs of hedge fund activism. We use quantitative data to show a systematic relationship between the appointment of a hedge fund nominated director to a corporate board and an increase in informed trading in that corporation’s stock (with the relationship being most pronounced when the fund’s slate of directors includes a hedge fund employee). This finding is important from two different perspectives. First, from a governance perspective, activist hedge funds represent a new and potent force in corporate …
Sunrise, Sunset: An Empirical And Theoretical Assessment Of Dual-Class Stock Structures, Andrew William Winden
Sunrise, Sunset: An Empirical And Theoretical Assessment Of Dual-Class Stock Structures, Andrew William Winden
UF Law Faculty Publications
A battle is brewing for control of America’s most dynamic companies. Entrepreneurs are increasingly seeking protection from interference or dismissal by public investors through the adoption of dual-class stock structures in initial public offerings. Institutional investors are pushing back, demanding that sucks structures be abandoned or strictly limited through subset provisions. The actual terms of dual-class stock structures, however, have been remarkably understudied, so the debate between proponents of prohibition and private ordering is ill-informed. This paper presents the first empirical analysis of the initial, or sunrise, and terminal, or sunset, provisions found in the charters of dual-class companies, with …
Managing Risk On A $25 Million Bet: Venture Capital, Agency Costs, And The False Dichotomy Of The Corporation, Robert P. Bartlett Iii
Managing Risk On A $25 Million Bet: Venture Capital, Agency Costs, And The False Dichotomy Of The Corporation, Robert P. Bartlett Iii
ExpressO
An implicit dichotomy of the corporation exists in legal scholarship. On one side of the dichotomy rests the publicly-held corporation suffering from a significant conflict of interest between its managers and dispersed shareholders; on the other side, the closely-held corporation plagued by inter-shareholder conflict.
This Article argues that understanding the agency problems that can exist within a firm demands a rejection of this traditional dichotomy and the theories of the firm built upon it. Using venture capital finance, this Article demonstrates for the first time how this dichotomy obscures how all firms - public and private - often face the …