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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law

The Nonfinancial Returns Of Crowdfunding, Andrew A. Schwartz Jan 2015

The Nonfinancial Returns Of Crowdfunding, Andrew A. Schwartz

Publications

Securities crowdfunding — the sale of unregistered securities to the public over the Internet — has come under attack before it has even begun. Legal scholars in particular have expressed concern that investors will lose any money they invest in crowdfunding companies. Even assuming that this may be true from a purely financial perspective, these critics are missing an important point: Crowdfund investors with negative returns will not simply have lost their money, but rather they will have spent it (at least in part) on nonpecuniary benefits, including entertainment, political expression and community building. These nonfinancial returns of crowdfunding are …


Private And Public Ordering In Safe Asset Markets, Anna Gelpern, Erik F. Gerding Jan 2015

Private And Public Ordering In Safe Asset Markets, Anna Gelpern, Erik F. Gerding

Publications

An influential literature in economics explores the phenomenon of “safe assets” – when participants across financial markets act “as if” certain debt is risk free – as well as its role in the global financial crisis and its implications for post-crisis reform.

We highlight the role of private ordering in constructing safe assets. Private ordering, including contractual devices and transaction structures, contributes to the creation of these debt contracts, to their collective treatment in financial markets as low risk investments, and to the making of deep and liquid markets in them. These contracts and transaction structures also provide a template …


The Digital Shareholder, Andrew A. Schwartz Jan 2015

The Digital Shareholder, Andrew A. Schwartz

Publications

Crowdfunding, a new Internet-based securities market, was recently authorized by federal and state law in order to create a vibrant, diverse, and inclusive system of entrepreneurial finance. But will people really send their money to strangers on the Internet in exchange for unregistered securities in speculative startups? Many are doubtful, but this Article looks to first principles and finds reason for optimism.

Well-established theory teaches that all forms of startup finance must confront and overcome three fundamental challenges: uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs. This Article systematically examines this “trio of problems” and potential solutions in the context of crowdfunding. …


The Next British Invasion Is Securities Crowdfunding: How Issuing Non-Registered Securities Through The Crowd Can Succeed In The United States, Robert H. Steinhoff Jan 2015

The Next British Invasion Is Securities Crowdfunding: How Issuing Non-Registered Securities Through The Crowd Can Succeed In The United States, Robert H. Steinhoff

University of Colorado Law Review

Securities crowdfunding is the novel concept of using the power of the Internet to raise business capital through the "crowd." British companies and investors have proven adept at using the relatively new medium of crowdfunding as a means of providing much needed capital to startups and other small businesses. This Comment examines securities crowdfunding in the United Kingdom in an effort to show how this means of capital formation might succeed in the United States once the SEC implements proposed rules exempting crowdfunded securities from registration. Other commentators have already provided ample criticism of the crowdfunding exemption in the JOBS …


Corporate Legacy, Andrew A. Schwartz Jan 2015

Corporate Legacy, Andrew A. Schwartz

Publications

Many public companies have shed takeover defenses in recent years, on the theory that such defenses reduce share price. Yet new data presented here shows that practically all new public companies--those launching their initial public offering (IPO)--go public with powerful takeover defenses in place. This behavior is puzzling because the adoption of takeover defenses presumably lowers the price at which the pre-IPO shareholders can sell their own shares in and after the IPO. Why would founders and early investors engage in this seemingly counterproductive behavior? Building on prior attempts to solve this mystery, this Article claims that IPO firms adopt …