Securities Law Commons^™

The Unreasonableness Of Reasonable: Rethinking The Reasonable Investor Standard, Alexandra Li

Northwestern University Law Review

This Note explores the “reasonable investor” standard in light of recent developments in pandemic-era securities litigation. Scholars have long criticized the reasonable investor standard for determining materiality. Given the dramatic backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, the limitations of the standard are becoming ever more evident. This Note provides a brief history of the development of the current standard and highlights some of its problems through two recent COVID-19 securities fraud cases. This Note argues that the reasonable investor standard is no longer sufficient to protect investors. Through examining tort law and First Amendment jurisprudence, this Note differentiates between the “reasonable” …

Insider Tainting: Strategic Tipping Of Material Nonpublic Information, Andrew Verstein

Northwestern University Law Review

Insider trading law is meant to be a shield, protecting the market and investors from unscrupulous traders, but it can also be a sword. Insofar as we penalize trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information, it becomes possible to share information strategically in order to disable or constrain innocent investors. A hostile takeover can be averted, or a bidding war curtailed, because recipients of such information must then refrain from trading. This Article offers the first general account of “insider tainting,” an increasingly pervasive phenomenon of weaponizing insider trading law.

Commitment And Entrenchment In Corporate Governance, K.J. Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale, Simone M. Sepe

Northwestern University Law Review

Over the past twenty years, a growing number of empirical studies have provided evidence that governance arrangements protecting incumbents from removal promote managerial entrenchment, reducing firm value. As a result of these studies, “good” corporate governance is widely understood today as being about stronger shareholder rights.

This Article rebuts this view, presenting new empirical evidence that challenges the results of prior studies and developing a novel theoretical account of what really matters in corporate governance. Employing a unique dataset that spans from 1978 to 2008, we document that protective arrangements that require shareholder approval—such as staggered boards and supermajority requirements …

An Fda For Financial Innovation: Applying The Insurable Interest Doctrine To Twenty-First-Century Financial Markets, Eric A. Posner, E. Glen Weyl

Northwestern University Law Review

The financial crisis of 2008 was caused in part by speculative investment in complex derivatives. In enacting the Dodd–Frank Act, Congress sought to address the problem of speculative investment, but it merely transferred that authority to various agencies, which have not yet found a solution. We propose that when firms invent new financial products, they be forbidden to sell them until they receive approval from a government agency designed along the lines of the FDA, which screens pharmaceutical innovations. The agency would approve financial products if they satisfy a test for social utility that focuses on whether the product will …

Jury Certification Of Federal Securities Fraud Class Actions, Thomas Kayes

Northwestern University Law Review

The rough equivalence of certification and ultimate outcome is class action dogma. If certification is granted, then the plaintiff “wins” by settlement because the risk of incurring class-wide liability by going to trial is too great. If certification is denied, the defendant “wins” because the case may not be worth litigating without the possibility of a class-wide recovery. This Note is about where the dogma is wrong. There are now cases where a denial of certification, just like a grant, presents to the defendant the risk of incurring class-wide liability at trial. This is because those cases are capable of …

Congressional Arbitrage At The Executive's Expense: The Speech Or Debate Clause And The Unenforceable Stock Act, Anna Fodor

Northwestern University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Better Bounty Hunting: How The Sec's New Whistleblower Program Changes The Securities Fraud Class Action Debate, Amanda M. Rose

Northwestern University Law Review

No abstract provided.