Securities Law Commons^™

Designing Dual-Class Sunsets: The Case For A Transfer-Centered Approach, Marc T. Moore

William & Mary Business Law Review

Dual-class stock (DCS) structures, and their implications for managerial accountability and corporate governance more broadly, have become prevalent concerns for corporate lawyers and policymakers. Recent academic and practitioner debates on DCS have tended to focus less on the general merits and drawbacks of DCS versus one share/one vote structures, and more on the specific common-ground concern as to whether and how such structures are subjected to contingent reversal or “sunset”. This Article compares the relative advantages and disadvantages of time-, ownership- and transfer-centered models of DCS sunset provisions. It argues in favor of the transfer-centered model on the grounds that: …

Could Distributed Ledger Shares Lead To An Increase In Stockholder-Approved Mergers And Subsequently An Increase In Exercise Of Appraisal Rights?, Alyson Brown

William & Mary Business Law Review

Blockchain, the distributed ledger technology underlying cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, is poised to revolutionize industries and processes across disciplines. In particular, government agencies and companies are looking for ways to leverage blockchain’s efficiencies to facilitate safe record-keeping. Municipalities are employing blockchain-issued deeds to accurately record property ownership. Progressive legal professionals are employing blockchainissued “smart-contracts” to more accurately record contract terms. Intellectual property attorneys and related government agencies are researching blockchain-issued copyrights and patents.

This Note examines how utilizing blockchain technology in securities trading to maintain accurate stockholder ledgers will allow for current market forces to be reflected in stockholder voting. Further, …

Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz

William & Mary Law Review

This Article makes two arguments that, combined, demonstrate an important synergy: first, including bondholders in corporate governance could help to reduce systemic risk because bondholders are more risk averse than shareholders; second, corporate governance should include bondholders because bonds now dwarf equity as a source of corporate financing and bond prices are increasingly tied to firm performance.

The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act Of 1989: Disenfranchising Shareholders In Order To Protect Them, Jayne W. Barnard

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Supreme Court And The Shareholder Litigant: Basic, Inc. V. Levinson In Context, Jayne W. Barnard

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Fictitious Registration Of Stock Ownership - Hartford V. Walston Examined, Thomas H. Jolls

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Investment Securities, Thomas H. Jolls

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.