Securities Law Commons^™

Forum Selection Provisions And The Preclusion Of Derivative Claims Under Section 14(A) Of The Securities Exchange Act: Should Federal Courts Intervene?, Noah P. Mathews

Fordham Law Review

This Note examines whether a forum selection provision in a corporation’s bylaws that requires shareholders to bring derivative claims in the Delaware Court of Chancery is enforceable when invoked by directors to dismiss derivative claims under the Securities Exchange Act (the “Exchange Act”)—claims over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. In Seafarers Pension Plan ex rel. Boeing Co. v. Bradway, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that enforcing this type of bylaw would violate the act’s antiwaiver provision, which voids any stipulation that allows a person to waive compliance with the act. In Lee ex …

Gamestopped: How Robinhood’S Gamestop Trading Halt Reveals The Complexities Of Retail Investor Protection, Neal F. Newman

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

Should brokers have the unfettered right to restrict investor trading? GameStop, a brick-and-mortar video game retailer, had been experiencing declining revenues since 2016. However, GameStop saw its share price climb almost 1000 percent in the span of a one- week period from January 21, 2021 to January 27, 2021 due to retail investors buying significant amounts of GameStop shares during that period. Melvin Capital, a hedge fund, ended up losing billions as they were betting that GameStop shares would lose value instead of increase—a practice referred to as short selling. On January 28, 2021, brokers inexplicably halted trading on GameStop …

The Solution To Shadow Trading Is Not Found In Current Insider Trading Law: A Proposed Amendment To Rule 10b5-2, Jamel Gross-Cassel

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

Shadow trading is a lucrative way to exploit a loophole in insider trading law. Insiders abuse this loophole to make six-figure profits and escape liability when done at the right companies. Those who shadow trade use material, nonpublic information to trade not in the securities of their own company, which would be illegal, but in the securities of a closely related company where the information is just as impactful. Efforts to close this loophole rely on the individual insider trading policies of the involved companies. These policies vary in language, making liability for shadow trading dependent on specific language or …

Goodbye Buybacks? Why Recent Stock Buyback Reform Proposals Go Beyond What Is Necessary, Joshua Zelen

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

This note provides an overview of the intensifying debate around the impact that stock buybacks have on economic inequality and the proposals designed to reform the practice. With the advent of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 1982 promulgation of Rule 10b-18, corporations began allocating vast portions of their profits to stock buybacks. In recent years, this practice has become increasingly more common and has surpassed previous historical benchmarks.

Critics of stock buybacks primarily view the practice as a misuse of excess corporate funds that could instead be allocated to improve employee working conditions, benefits, and future outcomes. Opponent’s concerns …

Here To Stay: Wrestling With The Future Of The Quickly Maturing Spac Market, Matthew Diller, Rick Fleming, Stephen Fraidin, Aj Harris, Gregory F. Laufer, Mark Lebovitch, Gregg A. Noel, Hester M. Peirce, Usha R. Rodrigues, Mike Stegemoller, Verity Winship, Douglas Ellenoff

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Fixing Esg: Are Mandatory Esg Disclosures The Solution To Misleading Ratings?, Javier El-Hage

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

This Note provides an overview of the debate around the current state of ESG disclosure practices, and the perceived need for the SEC to establish a system of mandatory ESG disclosures. Part I explores the inherent difficulty of defining ESG, the problematic nature of quantifying and measuring ESG factors, and the tools currently being used by market-leading ratings firms and investment vehicles. In particular, this part addresses the inconsistencies of ESG self-reporting, the influence of this practice on the ensuing ratings, and the potential for investors to be misled as a result.

Part II of the Note explores the possible …

The Seventh Circuit Missed The Bullseye In Walleye, Peter Rosenberg

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

The structure of agency relationships in a transaction should have no bearing on the outcome when the only difference between two hypothetical transactions is solely the facial structure. In the same vein, investor protection is at the forefront of the securities laws; commonly used limiting language for market announcements should not be enough to absolve a company from fraudulent disclosures, e.g., “preliminary results.”

In Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., a Seventh Circuit decision, the Court did the opposite and found that, based on pleadings at the motion to dismiss stage, an issuer is not liable for the misstatements …

Breaking Up The Focus On Relationships For Nonpecuniary Insider Trading Personal Benefits, Bradley Larkin

Fordham Law Review

In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the “personal benefit” requirement as an objective test for insider trading to help determine when confidential information is tipped for an improper purpose. Under this test, a tipper acts improperly by receiving a personal benefit for sharing confidential, nonpublic information, even if the tipper does not trade using the information. For instance, when a tipper leaks confidential information to a trading friend or relative, the tipper benefits personally because this amounts to trading on the confidential information and then gifting the profits. The personal benefit requirement is applied differently among the circuits, however, …

What Would We Do Without Them: Whistleblowers In The Era Of Sarbanes-Oxley And Dodd-Frank, Sean Griffith, Jane A. Norberg, Ian Engoron, Alice Brightsky, Tracey Mcneil, Jennifer M. Pacella, Judith Weinstock, Jason Zuckerman

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Reviving Reliance, Ann M. Lipton

Fordham Law Review

This Article explores the misalignment between the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws and the private causes of action available to investors to enforce those requirements. Historically, federally mandated disclosures were designed to allow investors to set an appropriate price for publicly traded securities. Today’s disclosures, however, also enable stockholders to participate in corporate governance and act as a check on managerial misbehavior. To enforce these requirements, investors’ chief option is a claim under the general antifraud statute, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. But courts are deeply suspicious of investors’ attempts to use the Act …

Keeping Shareholder Activism Alive: A Comparative Approach To Outlawing Dead Hand Proxy Puts In Delaware, Danielle A. Rapaccioli

Fordham Law Review

Current trends in shareholder activism have brought to light the competing interests of management and stockholders. With a rise in shareholder activism, firms are continuing to include change in control provisions, known as proxy puts, in their debt agreements to counter activist success. Recent litigation regarding the use of these provisions has created a debate as to whether these provisions are valid under Delaware law. Moreover, companies and lending institutions have morphed these provisions into a more restrictive form, known as “dead hand proxy puts.” The controversy analyzed in this Note arises out of the use of dead hand proxy …

The Conscious Parallelism Of Wolf Packs: Applying The Antitrust Conspiracy Framework To Section 13(D) Activist Group Formation, William R. Tevlin

Fordham Law Review

Section 13(d) of the Williams Act requires all persons and groups that acquire 5 percent or more of an issuer’s outstanding stock to disclose their holdings to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Whether a group is formed under section 13(d) often is unclear. The legal precedent is ambiguous; courts give more weight to certain forms of circumstantial evidence than others without explaining why. With the substantial increase of hedge fund activism—in particular, the wolf pack tactic—further clarity or uniformity is necessary. A “wolf pack” is a loose association of hedge funds that employs parallel activist strategies toward a target corporation …

Correcting Corporate Benefit: How To Fix Shareholder Litigation By Shifting The Doctrine On Fees, Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

The current controversy in corporate law concerns whether firms can discourage litigation by shifting its cost to shareholders. But corporate law courts have long engaged in fee-shifting—from shareholder plaintiffs to the corporation—under the “corporate benefit” doctrine. This Article examines fee-shifting in share-holder litigation, arguing that current practices are unsound from the perspective of both doctrine and public policy. Unfortunately, the fee-shifting bylaws recently enacted in response to the problem of excessive shareholder litigation fare no better. The Article therefore offers a different approach to fee-shifting, articulating three specific reforms of the corporate benefit doctrine to quell the current crisis in …

Confronting The Peppercorn Settlement In Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis And A Proposal For Reform, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven D. Solomon

Faculty Scholarship

Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%. The value of this litigation, however, is questionable. The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. The attorneys that bring these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a court-awarded fee. This leads critics to charge that merger litigation benefits only the lawyers who bring the claims, not the shareholders they represent. In response, defenders of merger litigation argue that the lawsuits serve a useful oversight function and that the improved disclosures that result …

Whose Trojan Horse? The Dynamics Of Resistance Against Ifrs, Martin Gelter, Zehra Kavame Eroglu

Faculty Scholarship

The introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) has been debated in the United States since at least the accounting scandals of the early 2000s. While publicly traded firms around the world are increasingly switching to IFRS, often because they are required to do so by law or by their stock exchange, the Securities Exchange Com-mission (“SEC”) seems to have become more reticent in recent years. Only foreign issuers have been permitted to use IFRS in the United States since 2007. By contrast, the EU has mandated the use of IFRS in the consolidated financial statements of publicly traded firms …

Creatively Financed Legal Education In A Marketized Environment: How Faculty Leveraged Buyouts Can Maximize Law Schools’ Stakeholder Values, David Groshoff

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

“This [financial aid] money is not necessarily going to educate more students or to improve education. It’s a scholarship ultimately going into profits.”1

The New Section 1202 Tax-Free Business Sale: Congress Rewards Small Businesses That Survived The Great Recession, Beckett G. Cantley

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

On September 27, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Creating Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (“SBJA”) that contains a temporary amendment to Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) § 1202. The amendment permits original shareholders of eligible corporation stock to sell the stock without being taxed on the sale. The temporary amendment initially only applied to certain stock acquired after the enactment of the SBJA and before January 1, 2011, but the amendment was extended on December 17, 2010 for another year ending January 1, 2012. With the impending sunset of the 15% capital gains rate at the end of 2012, …

How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Richard Squire

Faculty Scholarship

Corporations insure against liability in shareholder lawsuits by buying tiered coverage from multiple insurers who each cover a distinct segment of the potential damages range. Rather than negotiating to settle individually with the plaintiff, the insurers seek to reach a single, collectively binding settlement agreement. This combination of segmented coverage and collective settlements produces a conflict of interests: the corporation’s managers and some insurers are better off if the case settles pre-trial for the expected damages, while other insurers are better off going to trial. To force reluctant insurers to settle, courts have created a duty that can require an …

The Collapse Of An Empire? Rating Agency Reform In The Wake Of The 2007 Financial Crisis, Elizabeth Devine

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

In 1996, Thomas Friedman’s remarks echoed the sentiments of many. The rating agency business was booming, and it seemed like the agencies themselves could do no wrong.

Lessons For Competition Law From The Economic Crisis: The Prospect For Antitrust Responses To The “Too-Big-To-Fail” Phenomenon, Jesse W. W. Markham, Jr.

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

This article examines whether, and the extent to which, antitrust law could contribute to a broader regulatory effort to control the too-big-to-fail problem. The article begins by exploring the nature of the problem. Against this backdrop, it considers antitrust policy and rules to evaluate whether antitrust might play a meaningful role. The article concludes that antitrust law, if vigorously enforced with an emphasis on avoiding too-big-to-fail problems, can be a useful public policy tool to address the problem. However, it can come nowhere near solving it or preventing recurrences of recent systemic failures.

Deconstructing Corporate Governance: Director Primacy Without Principle?, René Reich-Graefe

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

For almost eighty years now, corporate law scholarship has centered around two elementary analytical findings made in what has once been described as the “last major work of original scholarship”within the field.

Revisiting The Inadvertent Investment Company, Brian Vito

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

While the topic of financial regulation has recently experienced a resurgence in interest, one area that historically has received little attention and continues to exist in relative obscurity is the application of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Company Act”) to commodity pools, as opposed to mutual funds, hedge funds and private equity funds. The purpose of this article is to distinguish the boundary between an investment company, as that term is defined in the Company Act, and a commodity pool, as the term is used to refer to an investment pool not within the auspices of the Company …

323 Non-Managing Underwriters’ Role In Securities Offerings: Just Eye Candy?, Elena Marty-Nelson

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

While there is considerable scholarship on the due diligence defense of lead underwriters in defective corporate securities offerings, there is surprisingly little analysis of the due diligence defense of non-managing underwriters. This article challenges the common perception that lead and non-managing underwriters necessarily “sink or swim” together for purposes of due diligence. An analysis of the statutory structure of Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 reveals that non-managing underwriters are not inextricably tethered to the lead. Rather, non-managing underwriters who actively question the lead’s due diligence investigation should be able to meet their own affirmative defense even when …

When Is It Wrong To Trade Stocks On The Basis Of Non-Public Information?: Public Views Of The Morality Of Insider Trading, Stuart P. Green, Matthew B. Kugler

Fordham Urban Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Symposium: The Regulation Of Investment Funds, Andrew J. Donohue, Paul N. Roth, Mattew B. Siano, J.W. Verret

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

Symposium: The Regulation Of Investment Funds

Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence From The Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurance Market, Tom Baker, Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

This Article examines how liability insurers transmit and transform the content of corporate and securities law. Directors' & Officers' (D&O) liability insurers are the financiers of shareholder litigation in the American legal system, paying on behalf of the corporation and its directors and officers when shareholders sue. The ability of the law to deter corporate actors thus depends upon the insurance intermediary. How, then, do insurers transmit and transform the content of corporate and securities law in underwriting D& 0 coverage?In this Article, we report the results of an empirical study of the D&O underwriting process. Drawing upon in-depth interviews …

Constraining Dominant Shareholders' Self-Dealing: The Legal Framework In France, Germany, And Italy , Pierre-Henri Conac, Luca Enriques, Martin Gelter

Faculty Scholarship

All jurisdictions supply corporations with legal tools to prevent or punish asset diversion by those, whether managers or dominant shareholders, who are in control. As previous research has shown, these rules, doctrines and remedies are far from uniform across jurisdictions, possibly leading to significant differences in the degree of investor protection they provide. Comparative research in this field is wrought with difficulty. It is tempting to compare corporate laws by taking one benchmark jurisdiction, typically the US, and to assess the quality of other corporate law systems depending on how much they replicate some prominent features. We take a different …

The Missing Monitor In Corporate Governance: The Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurer, Tom Baker, Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

This article reports the results of empirical research on the monitoring role of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) companies in American corporate governance. Economic theory provides three reasons to expect D&O insurers to serve as corporate governance monitors: first, monitoring provides insurers with a way to manage moral hazard; second, monitoring provides benefits to shareholders who might not otherwise need the risk distribution that D&O insurance provides; and third, the "bonding" provided by risk distribution gives insurers a comparative advantage in monitoring. Nevertheless, we find that D&O insurers neither monitor corporate governance during the life of the insurance …

Uncovering A Gatekeeper: Why The Sec Should Mandate Disclosure Of Details Concerning Directors' And Officers' Liability Insurance Policies, Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

This Article explores the connection between corporate governance and directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance. It argues that D&O insurers act as gatekeepers and guarantors of corporate governance, screening and pricing corporate governance risks to maintain the profitability of their risk pools. As a result, in a well-working insurance market, D&O insurance premiums would convey the insurer's assessment of a firm's governance quality. Simply stated, firms with better corporate governance would pay relatively low D&O premiums, while firms with worse corporate governance would pay more. This simple relationship could signal important information to investors and other capital market participants. Unfortunately, the …

Is Unlimited Liability Really Unattainable: Of Long Arms And Short Sales, Mark R. Patterson

Faculty Scholarship

Unlimited shareholder liability would radically change the way we look at corporations. In an unlimited-liability world, one part at least of the veil between corporation and shareholder would no longer exist. As a result, the relationship between corporation and shareholder would be, both in law and in fact,much closer than it is currently. The two parts of this change-the legal and the factual-would reinforce each other. The legal change would be reflected in court decisions enforcing unlimited liability Regardless of the exact contours that decisions in this area took initially, there would be at least some shareholders-mutual funds, for example--whom …