Religion Law Commons^™

In Contracts We Trust (And No One Can Change Their Mind)! There Should Be No Special Treatment For Religious Arbitration, Michael J. Broyde, Alexa J. Windsor

Faculty Articles

The recent article In God We Trust (Unless We Change Our Mind): How State of Mind Relates to Religious Arbitration ("In God We Trust") proposes that those who sign arbitration agreements that consent to a religious legal system as the basis of the rules of arbitration be allowed to back out of such agreements based on their constitutional right to free exercise. This article is a response and is divided into two sections. In the first section, we show that such an exemption would violate the Federal Arbitration Act's (FAA) basic rules preventing the states from heightened regulation of arbitration …

Brief Of Constitutional Law Scholars As Amici Curiae In Support Of Petitioners, David F. Forte, Ronald J. Colombo, Richard Epstein, Carl H. Esbeck, Robert P. George, Mary Ann Glendon, Brian Mccall, Stacy Scaldo, Steven Smith

Law Faculty Briefs and Court Documents

Lurking behind the regulatory issues presented by this appeal is a concerted effort to displace the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. ("RFRA"), with a novel approach that would trivialize a law's burden on religion. The Court should not indulge it.

The critics' argument suffers from several analytical defects that can be remedied by (1) a proper constitutional understanding of RFRA's relationship to the Establishment Clause; (2) an accurate understanding of how the Religion Clauses safeguard third-party interests; and (3) the correct application of these understandings to the Final Rules.

Untangling Entanglement, Stephanie H. Barclay

Journal Articles

The Court has increasingly signaled its interest in taking a more historical approach to the Establishment Clause. And in its recent American Legion decision, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that the three-prong Lemon test is essentially dead letter. Such a result would make sense for the first two prongs of the Lemon test about secular purpose and the effects. Many scholars have observed that these aspects of the prong are judicial creations far afield of the Establishment Clause history. But what of the entanglement prong of the test? If we rejected all applications of this prong of the analysis, would …

Religion And The Rehnquist Court, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

This summary Article pays predominant attention to what the Rehnquist Court has altered. It slights a significant range of continuity. That includes the Court's strong rejection of laws that discriminate among religions or that target religious practices and the Court's inhospitable response to religious exercises that are sponsored by public schools. Although "continuity" may be a misleading term for subjects a court has not addressed, the Supreme Court has not touched the law regarding judicial involvement in church property disputes since Rehnquist became Chief Justice, and nothing it has decided presages an obvious shift in that jurisprudence.