Religion Law Commons^™

In Contracts We Trust (And No One Can Change Their Mind)! There Should Be No Special Treatment For Religious Arbitration, Michael J. Broyde, Alexa J. Windsor

Faculty Articles

The recent article In God We Trust (Unless We Change Our Mind): How State of Mind Relates to Religious Arbitration ("In God We Trust") proposes that those who sign arbitration agreements that consent to a religious legal system as the basis of the rules of arbitration be allowed to back out of such agreements based on their constitutional right to free exercise. This article is a response and is divided into two sections. In the first section, we show that such an exemption would violate the Federal Arbitration Act's (FAA) basic rules preventing the states from heightened regulation of arbitration …

First Amendment “Harms”, Stephanie H. Barclay

Indiana Law Journal

What role should harm to third parties play in the government’s ability to protect religious rights? The intuitively appealing “harm” principle has animated new theories advanced by scholars who argue that religious exemptions are indefensible whenever they result in cognizable harm to third parties. This third-party harm theory is gaining traction in some circles, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s pending cases in Little Sisters of the Poor and Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. While focusing on harm appears at first to provide an appealing, simple, and neutral principle for avoiding other difficult moral questions, the definition of harm …

Brief Of Constitutional Law Scholars As Amici Curiae In Support Of Petitioners, David F. Forte, Ronald J. Colombo, Richard Epstein, Carl H. Esbeck, Robert P. George, Mary Ann Glendon, Brian Mccall, Stacy Scaldo, Steven Smith

Law Faculty Briefs and Court Documents

Lurking behind the regulatory issues presented by this appeal is a concerted effort to displace the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. ("RFRA"), with a novel approach that would trivialize a law's burden on religion. The Court should not indulge it.

The critics' argument suffers from several analytical defects that can be remedied by (1) a proper constitutional understanding of RFRA's relationship to the Establishment Clause; (2) an accurate understanding of how the Religion Clauses safeguard third-party interests; and (3) the correct application of these understandings to the Final Rules.

American Legion V. American Humanist Ass'n: Exempting Longstanding Governmental Religious Displays From Establishment Clause Scrutiny And How The Endorsement Test Could Have Prevented It, M. Allison Hyde

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.

Untangling Entanglement, Stephanie H. Barclay

Journal Articles

The Court has increasingly signaled its interest in taking a more historical approach to the Establishment Clause. And in its recent American Legion decision, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that the three-prong Lemon test is essentially dead letter. Such a result would make sense for the first two prongs of the Lemon test about secular purpose and the effects. Many scholars have observed that these aspects of the prong are judicial creations far afield of the Establishment Clause history. But what of the entanglement prong of the test? If we rejected all applications of this prong of the analysis, would …

Is There Any Silver Lining To Trinity Lutheran Church, Inc. V. Comer?, Caroline Mala Corbin

Michigan Law Review Online

Trinity Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Comer is a significant setback for a strong separation of church and state. Missouri denied a playground grant to Trinity Lutheran because of a state constitutional provision that bans financial aid to churches. The church sued. The Supreme Court held not only that the Establishment Clause allowed the government to give taxpayer money to Trinity Lutheran, but that the Free Exercise Clause required it. The decision's many flaws are not the focus of this short Essay. Instead, this Essay dissects the Supreme Court's reasoning in order to apply it to current controversies in related areas …

Religion Lessons From Europe: Intolerant Secularism, Pluralistic Neutrality, And The U.S. Supreme Court, Antony Barone Kolenc

Pace International Law Review

Case law from the European Court of Human Rights demonstrates to the U.S. Supreme Court how a pluralistic neutrality principle can enrich the American society and harness the value of faith in the public sphere, while at the same time retaining the vigorous protection of individual religious rights. The unfortunate alternative to a jurisprudence built around pluralistic neutrality is the inevitability of intolerant secularism—an increasingly militant separation of religious ideals from the public life, leading ultimately to a repressive society that has no room in its government for religious citizens. The results of intolerant secularism are seen in a recent …

Putting Faith In Europe: Should The U.S. Supreme Court Learn From The European Court Of Human Rights?, Antony Barone Kolenc

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Of Flags And Menorahs: The Power Of Individual And Governmental Symbolic Speech, Mark F. Kohler

Akron Law Review

The aim of this article will be to explore the nature of symbolic speech, both individual and governmental. Using Johnson and Allegheny County as a backdrop, four themes will emerge from the article. First, both individuals and government speak and speak powerfully through symbols and symbolic conduct. Second, medium-based regulation of individual speech should receive careful judicial scrutiny. Third, unlike individual symbolic expression, governmental symbolic speech is subject to substantial content-based restrictions. Finally, careful distinctions must be drawn between government-initiated symbolic speech and governmental endorsement of individual symbolic speech.

Revival: Toward A Formal Neutrality Approach To Economic Development Transfers To Religious Institutions, Ryan A. Doringo

Akron Law Review

Part I of this Note explores the contours of the complicated history of the Establishment Clause by examining the creation of the Lemon test and the inconsistencies of the test’s subsequent application. The Note then explores Justice O’Connor’s endorsement modification to that test. Part I concludes with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s move toward embracing a principle formal neutrality. Part II provides a factual history of the transfer at issue and a detailed summary of the District Court’s opinion in Wirtz. Part III of the Note explains that the Constitution does not preclude economic development transfers to religious institutions. …

A Look At The Establishment Clause Through The Prism Of Religious Perspectives: Religious Majorities, Religious Minorities, And Nonbelievers, Samuel J. Levine

Chicago-Kent Law Review

As a number of commentators have observed, the Supreme Court's record in adjudicating the free exercise claims of religious minorities—in particular, unfamiliar and unpopular religious minorities—is vulnerable to the critique that the Court's rhetoric and, at times, the Court's holdings demonstrate an inability or unwillingness to look beyond majoritarian religious perspectives. Building on this scholarship, this article analyzes the Court's adjudication of Establishment Clause cases in the context of different religious perspectives, including those of religious minorities, religious minorities, and nonbelievers.

In exploring these questions, this article traces the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence through several decades, examining a number of …

Religion And The Rehnquist Court, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

This summary Article pays predominant attention to what the Rehnquist Court has altered. It slights a significant range of continuity. That includes the Court's strong rejection of laws that discriminate among religions or that target religious practices and the Court's inhospitable response to religious exercises that are sponsored by public schools. Although "continuity" may be a misleading term for subjects a court has not addressed, the Supreme Court has not touched the law regarding judicial involvement in church property disputes since Rehnquist became Chief Justice, and nothing it has decided presages an obvious shift in that jurisprudence.

Revenue Bonds And Religious Education: The Constitutionality Of Conduit Financing Involving Pervasively Sectarian Institutions, Trent Collier

Michigan Law Review

The Establishment Clause - and particularly the issue of government funding of religious education - is one of the murkiest areas of Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has acknowledged as much, and the sharp divide in the Court's most recent forays into Establishment Clause territory illustrates the point that the current jurisprudential standards allow for a broad range of interpretation. There is some hope that the Supreme court will provide further clarification of its Establishment Clause standard in the near future. For now, however, it appears that the dominant mode of the Establishment Clause analysis is the examination of …

How To Apply The Religious Freedom Restoration Act To Federal Law Without Violating The Constitution, Gregory P. Magarian

Michigan Law Review

Learned commentators have called the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA" or "the Act") "perhaps the most unconstitutional statute in the history of the nation" and "the most egregious violation of the separation of powers doctrine in American constitutional history." In the 1997 case of City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court struck down the Act in its applications to state and local governments, declaring that "RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance." The Act's applications to federal law, however, survived Boerne, which means that plaintiffs with religious freedom claims against …

Reply: Did The Fourteenth Amendment Repeal The First?, Jed Rubenfeld

Michigan Law Review

To get right to the point: Mr. Hacker does not disagree that the Establishment Clause would, in the absence of the Fourteenth Amendment, have prohibited Congress from passing a nationwide religion law like RFRA. He believes, however, that the Fourteenth Amendment has in part repealed the First. Of course, he doesn't want to say repealed. The language of repeal is not pleasant to the ears of those who would like to forget about First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism. The Fourteenth Amendment did not "repeal any aspect of the text of the [Establishment] Clause," Hacker says, but only "change[d] profoundly the meaning of …

A Response To Professor Rubenfeld, Jonathan D. Hacker

Michigan Law Review

Professor Jed Rubenfeld has offered in these pages an ingenious explanation for why the Supreme Court was right to strike down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in City of Boerne v. Flores. Rubenfeld finds in the First Amendment's Establishment Clause a historical and inherent principle he calls "antidisestablishmentarianism": a prohibition on acts of Congress that "disestablish" religion in the several states. Rubenfeld reads the Establishment Clause as proscribing not only congressional acts that "establish" religion but also all congressional acts that "dictate a position on religion for states," including laws designed to ensure that states abide by the requirements …

Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why Rfra Really Was Unconstitutional, Jed Rubenfeld

Michigan Law Review

Two months ago, the Supreme Court struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), handing down its most important church-state decision, and one of its most important federalism decisions, in fifty years. Through RFRA, Congress had prohibited any state actor from "substantially burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion" unless imposing that burden was the "least restrictive means" of furthering "a compelling governmental interest." RFRA was a response to Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, in which the Supreme Court abandoned the very same compelling interest test that RFRA mandated. Smith, overturning decades-old precedent, held …

Constitutional Law-Church And State-Shared Time: Indirect Aid To Parochial Schools, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

For over forty years, public schools have been participating in shared time programs pursuant to which non-public school children attend public schools for instruction in one or more subjects during the regular school day. Since ninety per cent of the pupils in nonpublic elementary and secondary schools are in Roman Catholic schools, shared time-or, as it is also known, dual enrollment raises questions of an establishment of religion in contravention of the provisions of the first amendment to the Constitution. To date, no court has faced this constitutional issue and only three state courts have ruled upon the validity of …

The Establishment Clause And The Ecumenical Movement, Robert C. Casad

Michigan Law Review

In recent years the Roman Catholic Church has begun to give tentative official support to the view that eventual reconciliation with the Protestants is feasible and desirable. The acceptance of the ecumenical ideal by the Roman Catholic Church removes virtually all doubt that in the ecumenical movement organized Christianity is facing an upheaval of major importance, comparable perhaps to the Reformation. It is not likely to lose force after a few years, as so many minor religious movements do. It is definitely under way, gaining momentum year by year. It is bound to have far-reaching effects and give rise to …

Prayer, Public Schools And The Supreme Court, Paul G. Kauper

Michigan Law Review

A more complete understanding of the case, while doing much to temper the initial outburst of disapproval, did not by any means dispel all criticism of the decision or allay all the apprehensions aroused by it. Believing that the Supreme Court's opinion was premised on a fundamentally erroneous interpretation of the establishment clause of the first amendment, Bishop James A. Pike headed a movement to amend the Constitution so as to restore what he regarded as the true and intended meaning of its pertinent language. In the meantime, the Supreme Court has agreed to review and has heard argument on …