Litigation Commons^™

Good Representatives, Bad Objectors, And Restitution In Class Settlements, Jay Tidmarsh, Tladi Marumo

Journal Articles

his Article uses two recent decisions -one prohibiting incentive awards to class representatives and one permitting disgorgement of side payments to class objectors - to explore deeper connections between class­action settlements and the law of restitution. The failure to correctly apply the law of restitution led both courts astray. First, courts can approve incentive awards, as long as an award properly reflects the benefit that the representative's efforts bestowed on the class. Second, restitution provides a basis to disgorge improper side payments to objectors, but only under conditions different from those that the court described. More broadly, attention to the …

Election Subversion And The Writ Of Mandamus, Derek T. Muller

Journal Articles

Election subversion threatens democratic self-governance. Recently, we have seen election officials try to manipulate the rules after an election, defy accepted legal procedures for dispute resolution, and try to delay results or hand an election to a losing candidate. Such actions, if successful, would render the right to vote illusory. These threats call for a response. But rather than recommend the development of novel tools to address the problem, this Article argues that a readily available mechanism is at hand for courts to address election subversion: the writ of mandamus. This Article is the first comprehensive piece to situate the …

Groups And Rights In Institutional Reform Litigation, David Marcus

Notre Dame Law Review

Lawsuits pursue institutional reform when plaintiffs ask courts to issue broad, systemic remedies to improve the performance of malfunctioning government programs. Once thought in decline, this litigation persists. Plaintiffs continue to seek judicial protection from dysfunctional prisons, immigration enforcement regimes, foster care systems, and other institutions. But an important aspect of the substantive law that institutional reform litigation involves has gone overlooked. This substantive law often vests rights in groups. An institutional reform lawsuit does not always—or even often—bundle large numbers of individual rights violations. Rather, a group of incarcerated people or children in foster care sues to vindicate a …

Nominal Damages As Vindication, Sadie Blanchard

Journal Articles

A recent Supreme Court decision inspired a resurgence of interest in an old mystery: how can nominal damages vindicate a plaintiff for past harm? The Court relied on the longstanding common law practice of entitling a plaintiff to sue for violation of her rights, even without demonstrating harm in fact, and to recover nominal damages. Courts have long asserted that awarding nominal damages in such suits vindicates the plaintiff. But they have not explained just how awarding $1 provides vindication, and serious observers scoff at the idea that it does. This Article offers a theory of vindication through nominal damages …

Sonner V. Premier Nutrition Corp., Ruth Dapper, Bryce Young

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

When sitting in diversity jurisdiction, must a federal court apply federal equitable principles when deciding state law claims, even if state law may provide a different outcome? That was the question before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the case of Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp. Although the Ninth Circuit’s published opinion relies on “seventy-five years” of unchanged law, the opinion joins a long list of cases that continue to help clarify the tenets from Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and inform the courts and practitioners on the relationship between state and federal authority …

Substantive Remedies, Hanoch Dagan, Avihay Dorfman

Notre Dame Law Review

Often, private law remedies enforce or vindicate infringed underlying rights. Substantive remedies are different. Substantive remedies do not aim at restoring these rights; nor do they seek to change them. Instead, substantive remedies adjust the remedial response for a right violation so as to ensure post-wrong justice. They require the law of remedies not merely to look back, but rather to take a second look at the parties’ post-wrong situation. At times, such a second look affects the type of remedy awarded (damages in lieu of injunctive relief); in other cases—for instance, the tort doctrine of crushing liability—it imposes a …

Class Action Squared: Multistate Actions And Agency Dilemmas, Elysa M. Dishman

Notre Dame Law Review

As the Supreme Court continues to restrict the reach of private class actions, numerous commentators have championed public enforcement actions by state attorneys general (AGs) as a superior alternative to hold corporations accountable for misconduct. While AG actions fill some of the void left by the forced retreat of the private class action, few scholars have seriously considered whether the agency problems that exist in private class actions also occur in AG actions. And, until now, no scholar has recognized the unique agency problems that arise when AGs act together in multistate actions.

Multistate actions are made up of two …

The Remand Power And The Supreme Court's Role, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

Notre Dame Law Review

“Reversed and remanded.” Or “vacated and remanded.” These familiar words, often found at the end of an appellate decision, emphasize that an appellate court’s conclusion that the lower court erred generally does not end the litigation. The power to remand for further proceedings rather than wrap up a case is useful for appellate courts because they may lack the institutional competence to bring the case to a final resolution (as when new factual findings are necessary) or lack an interest in the fact-specific work of applying a newly announced legal standard to the particular circumstances at hand. The modern Supreme …

Does Docket Size Matter? Revisiting Empirical Accounts Of The Supreme Court's Incredibly Shrinking Docket, Michael Heise, Martin T. Wells, Dawn M. Chutkow

Notre Dame Law Review

Drawing on data from every Supreme Court Term between 1940 and 2017, this Article revisits, updates, and expands prior empirical work by Ryan Owens and David Simon (2012) finding that ideological, contextual, and institutional factors contributed to the Court’s declining docket. This Article advances Owens and Simon’s work in three ways: broadening the scope of the study by including nine additional Court Terms (through 2017), adding alternative ideological and nonideological variables into the model, and considering alternative model specifications. What emerges from this update and expansion, however, is less clarity and more granularity and complexity. While Owens and Simon emphasized …

Prior Art In The District Court, Stephen Yelderman

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article is an empirical study of the evidence district courts rely upon when invalidating patents. To construct our dataset, we collected every district court ruling, verdict form, and opinion (whether reported or unreported) invalidating a patent claim over a six-and-a-half-year period. We then coded individual invalidity rulings based on the prior art supporting the court’s decision, observing 3320 invalidation events relying on 817 distinct prior art references.

The nature of the prior art relied upon to invalidate patents is relevant to two distinct sets of policy questions. First, this data sheds light on the value of district court litigation …

State Standing And National Injunctions, Bradford Mank, Michael E. Solimine

Notre Dame Law Review

Most of the growing literature on national injunctions makes only passing mention, if at all, of states being plaintiffs or of the appropriateness of state standing and how it might bear on the geographic scope of an injunction. This Essay undertakes to fill that gap in a more extended way. Part I of the Essay addresses the issue of state standing in suits against the federal government, and argues that such standing is well grounded in the traditional parens patriae powers of states and should be permitted to protect the health, welfare, and natural resources of their citizens. That is, …

The Private Rights Of Public Governments, Seth Davis

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay charts the analytical and doctrinal confusion arising from the category of “proprietary” interests in state standing law. This category might be taken literally to include only the ownership of property and interests that stem from it. It might refer to interests that are analogous to those that a private corporation might litigate, or instead to any type of financial injury a state might suffer. Other possibilities would limit “proprietary” interests to those interests recognized under the common law, or only those interests recognized under private law. Perhaps the most that can be said is that “proprietary” interests should …

Quasi-Sovereign Standing, F. Andrew Hessick

Notre Dame Law Review

Judges have concluded that states do not have standing based on their quasi-sovereign interests to sue the United States for not obeying the law. Two different reasons have been given. First, because a state can assert quasi-sovereign interests only in its capacity of representing its residents, a state has standing to press those interests only if it can demonstrate that its residents have suffered an injury in fact. On this view, states do not have general standing to sue the federal government for disobeying the law; they have standing only if they can show that the disobedience injured a resident. …

Reining In State Standing, Ann Woolhandler, Michael G. Collins

Notre Dame Law Review

In upholding standing in Massachusetts v. EPA, Justice Stevens said that states “are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction.” While one might agree that the states are not normal litigants, that abnormality might well suggest that states should get standing less easily than private parties.

As a historical matter, states were limited in the kinds of cases they could bring in the federal courts. States typically could not litigate their sovereignty interests (their powers to govern to the exclusion of other governments), nor could they litigate their parens patriae interests (the interests of their citizens) …

State Standing For Nationwide Injunctions Against The Federal Government, Jonathan R. Nash

Notre Dame Law Review

Recent years have seen a substantial increase of cases in which states seek, and indeed obtain, nationwide injunctions against the federal government. These cases implicate two complicated questions: first, when a state has standing to sue the federal government, and second, when a nationwide injunction is a proper form of relief. For their part, scholars have mostly addressed these questions separately. In this Essay, I analyze the two questions together. Along the way, I identify drawbacks and benefits of nationwide injunctions, as well as settings where nationwide injunctions may be desirable and undesirable. I present arguments that, although I do …

Standing For Nothing, Robert A. Mikos

Notre Dame Law Review

A growing number of courts and commentators have suggested that states have Article III standing to protect state law. Proponents of such “protective” standing argue that states must be given access to federal court whenever their laws are threatened. Absent such access, they claim, many state laws might prove toothless, thereby undermining the value of the states in our federal system. Furthermore, proponents insist that this form of special solicitude is very limited—that it opens the doors to the federal courthouses a crack but does not swing them wide open. This Essay, however, contests both of these claims, and thus, …

An Organizational Account Of State Standing, Katherine M. Crocker

Notre Dame Law Review

Again and again in regard to recent high-profile disputes, the legal community has tied itself in knots over questions about when state plaintiffs should have standing to sue in federal court, especially in cases where they seek to sue federal-government defendants. Lawsuits challenging everything from the Bush administration’s environmental policies to the Obama administration’s immigration actions to the Trump administration’s travel bans have become mired in tricky and technical questions about whether state plaintiffs belonged in federal court.

Should state standing cause so much controversy and confusion? This Essay argues that state plaintiffs are far more like at least one …

State Standing's Uncertain Stakes, Aziz Z. Huq

Notre Dame Law Review

I offer a quite modest contribution to debates on state standing. I do not offer “right answers.” Rather, I posit that it is useful to understand the “stakes” of state standing. By “stakes,” I mean the practical consequences of resolving, one way or another, the unsettled doctrinal choices respecting the ability of states to initiate a matter in federal courts. Why, that is, does state standing matter? An inquiry into stakes can usefully proceed stepwise. A first task is to identify the subset of state standing cases that presently elicit division among the Justices. A second task is to articulate …

State Standing And Cooperative Federalism, Ernest A. Young

Notre Dame Law Review

State lawsuits challenging federal policy generally encounter arguments that the states lack standing to sue, either under Article III’s “case or controversy” clause or under various prudential standing doctrines. These arguments have often taken novel forms—such as claims that states’ injuries are “self-inflicted” or offset by other benefits of federal policies—that have few precedents or analogs in the standing jurisprudence governing suits by private individuals. The United States has taken the position, in other words, that states should have special disabilities in filing lawsuits that would not apply to ordinary litigants. Likewise, prominent academics have argued that uniquely narrow standing …

Foreword: Some Puzzles Of State Standing, Tara L. Grove

Notre Dame Law Review

When should states have standing? In recent years, there has been an explosion in literature on that question. Yet, even today, there seem to be as many questions as answers. In this Foreword to the Notre Dame Law Review's 2019 Federal Courts, Practice, and Procedure Symposium on state standing, I discuss a few such puzzles. First, should states have “special” standing when they sue the federal government—that is, greater access to federal court than private parties? Second, and conversely, should states have at least “equal” access to federal court, or should they face more barriers than private parties? These …

Are Interlocutory Qualified Immunity Appeals Lawful?, Michael E. Solimine

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

For half a century the Supreme Court has held that defendants in civil rights actions can avoid monetary liability if they demonstrate a qualified immunity for their actions. And for thirty years, the Court has held that district court denials of the qualified immunity defense are immediately appealable under the collateral order exception to the final order requirement. Controversial from the start, the qualified immunity defense has recently come under renewed stress, with calls from individual Justices and by leading voices in academia to either significantly modify or even abolish the defense. While primarily dealing with substantive aspects of the …

The Demise Of § 1983 Malicious Prosecution: Separating Tort Law From The Fourth Amendment, Erin E. Mcmannon

Notre Dame Law Review

The common-law tort of malicious prosecution originally developed to provide a remedy for plaintiffs who were unjustly prosecuted in a criminal proceeding. Today, malicious prosecution actions can be brought to redress wrongful civil actions as well. The “central thrust” of an action for malicious prosecution is a right not to be involved in an unjustified litigation.

This Note suggests that the confusion in this area of law derives from the use of the language of malicious prosecution tort law to describe what really amounts to a Fourth Amendment seizure claim under § 1983. There is no constitutional right to be …

The Discrimination Presumption, Joseph A. Seiner

Notre Dame Law Review

Employment discrimination is a fact in our society. Scientific studies continue to show that employer misconduct in the workplace is pervasive. This social science research is further supported by governmental data and litigation statistics. Even in the face of this evidence, however, it has never been more difficult to successfully bring a claim of employment discrimination. After the Supreme Court’s controversial decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, all civil litigants must sufficiently plead enough facts to give rise to a plausible claim. Empirical studies show that this plausibility test has been rigidly applied in …

The New Oral Argument: Justices As Advocates, Tonja Jacobi, Matthew Sag

Notre Dame Law Review

No abstract provided.

Evidence Without Rules, Bennett Capers

Notre Dame Law Review

Much of what we tell ourselves about the Rules of Evidence—that they serve as an all-seeing gatekeeper, checking evidence for relevance and trustworthiness, screening it for unfair prejudice—is simply wrong. In courtrooms every day, fact finders rely on “evidence”—for example, a style of dress, the presence of family members in the gallery, and of course race—that rarely passes as evidence in the formal sense, and thus breezes past evidentiary gatekeepers unseen and unchecked. This Article calls much needed attention to this other evidence and demonstrates that such unregulated evidence matters. Jurors use this other evidence to decide whether to find …

The Unconstitutionality Of The Protecting Access To Care Act Of 2017’S Cap On Noneconomic Damages In Medical Malpractice Cases, Kaeleigh P. Christie

Journal of Legislation

No abstract provided.

Clarifying The “Probate Lending” Debate: A Response To Professors Horton And Chandrasekher, Jeremy Kidd Ph.D.

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

The debate over third-party funding of legal claims just got more interesting. The debate already had plot twists, such as free-market scholars lining up in opposition to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and alongside proplaintiff scholars who they oppose in tort reform debates. Now add to the mix a recent paper by Professors Horton and Chandrasekher that introduced an entirely new angle to the debate: funding of probate disputes. Now that this parallel area of funding has been identified, comparing and contrasting probate funding with litigation funding should illuminate the incentives that funders/recipients face in both scenarios. By pointing out …

Artis V. District Of Columbia—What Did The Court Actually Say?, Doron M. Kalir

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

This Comment does not follow the many constitutional and jurisprudential intricacies of the fascinating battle of Artis v. District of Columbia. Instead, it intends to point to what seems to be a glaring misunderstanding of the majority opinion by the dissent. This Comment also raises the possibility that the majority itself did not understand the full implications of its own opinion, as evidenced by its response to the dissent. If this is indeed the state of affairs, an inevitable question arises: What did the Court actually say in Artis v. District of Columbia?

"Innocence" And The Guilty Mind, Stephen F. Smith

Journal Articles

For decades, the “guilty mind” requirement in federal criminal law has been understood as precluding punishment for “morally blameless” (or “innocent”) conduct, the goal being to define the mental element in terms that will protect offenders from conviction unless they had adequate notice of the wrongfulness of their conduct. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Elonis v. United States signals a significant shift in mens readoctrine, recognizing for the first time the potential for disproportionately severe punishment as a justification for heightened mens rea requirements. This long-overdue doctrinal move makes perfect sense because punishment without culpability and excessive punishment …

The Rank-Order Method For Appellate Subset Selection, Michael J. Hasday

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

This Essay proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the “fatal flaws” of random assignment and direct selection: outlier panels and judicial gaming, respectively. Part II introduces the rank-order method and explains how this method is superior to either random assignment or direct selection. Part III provides detailed examples of how the rank-order method works in practice. Part IV concludes.