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Full-Text Articles in Legal History

Statutory Interpretation In Econotopia, Nathan B. Oman Sep 2019

Statutory Interpretation In Econotopia, Nathan B. Oman

Nathan B. Oman

Much of the debate in the recent revival of interest in statutory interpretation centers on whether or not courts should use legislative history in construing statutes. The consensus in favor of this practice has come under sharp attack from public choice critics who argue that traditional models of legislative intent are positively and normatively incoherent. This paper argues that in actual practice, courts look at a fairly narrow subset of legislative history. By thinking about the power to write that legislative history as a property right and legislatures as markets, it is possible to use Coase's Theorem and the concept …


Dworkin V. The Philosophers: A Review Essay On Justice In Robes, Michael S. Green Sep 2019

Dworkin V. The Philosophers: A Review Essay On Justice In Robes, Michael S. Green

Michael S. Green

In this review essay, Professor Michael Steven Green argues that Dworkin's reputation among his fellow philosophers has needlessly suffered because of his refusal to back down from his "semantic sting" argument against H. L. A. Hart. Philosophers of law have uniformly rejected the semantic sting argument as a fallacy. Nevertheless Dworkin reaffirms the argument in Justice in Robes, his most recent collection of essays, and devotes much of the book to stubbornly, and unsuccessfully, defending it. This is a pity, because the failure of the semantic sting argument in no way undermines Dworkin's other arguments against Hart.


How Should Elected Judges Interpret Statutes?, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl Sep 2019

How Should Elected Judges Interpret Statutes?, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

No abstract provided.


Constitution Day 2012: The American Judiciary, Robert Berry Jan 2012

Constitution Day 2012: The American Judiciary, Robert Berry

Librarian Publications

Robert Berry, research librarian for the social sciences at the Sacred Heart University Library, has written an essay about the role of the American Judiciary in interpreting laws of the United States government. The essay was written for the occasion of Constitution Day 2012 at Sacred Heart University.


How Should Elected Judges Interpret Statutes?, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl May 2011

How Should Elected Judges Interpret Statutes?, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

Popular Media

No abstract provided.


Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court And The Use Of Legislative History, David S. Law, David Zaring Apr 2010

Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court And The Use Of Legislative History, David S. Law, David Zaring

William & Mary Law Review

Much of the social science literature on judicial behavior has focused on the impact of ideology on how judges vote. For the most part, however, legal scholars have been reluctant to embrace empirical scholarship that fails to address the impact of legal constraints and the means by which judges reason their way to particular outcomes. This Article attempts to integrate and address the concerns of both audiences by way of an empirical examination of the Supreme Court’s use of a particular interpretive technique— namely, the use of legislative history to determine the purpose and meaning of a statute. We analyzed …


All Judges Are Political—Except When They Are Not: Acceptable Hypocrisies And The Rule Of Law, Keith J. Bybee Jan 2010

All Judges Are Political—Except When They Are Not: Acceptable Hypocrisies And The Rule Of Law, Keith J. Bybee

College of Law - Faculty Scholarship

This paper contains the introduction to the new book, All Judges Are Political—Except When They Are Not: Acceptable Hypocrisies and the Rule of Law (Stanford University Press, 2010).

The book begins with the observation that Americans are divided in their beliefs about whether courts operate on the basis of unbiased legal principle or of political interest. This division in public opinion in turn breeds suspicion that judges do not actually mean what they say, that judicial professions of impartiality are just fig leaves used to hide the pursuit of partisan purposes.

Comparing law to the practice of common courtesy, the …


Dworkin V. The Philosophers: A Review Essay On Justice In Robes, Michael S. Green Jan 2007

Dworkin V. The Philosophers: A Review Essay On Justice In Robes, Michael S. Green

Faculty Publications

In this review essay, Professor Michael Steven Green argues that Dworkin's reputation among his fellow philosophers has needlessly suffered because of his refusal to back down from his "semantic sting" argument against H. L. A. Hart. Philosophers of law have uniformly rejected the semantic sting argument as a fallacy. Nevertheless Dworkin reaffirms the argument in Justice in Robes, his most recent collection of essays, and devotes much of the book to stubbornly, and unsuccessfully, defending it. This is a pity, because the failure of the semantic sting argument in no way undermines Dworkin's other arguments against Hart.


Statutory Interpretation In Econotopia, Nathan B. Oman Oct 2004

Statutory Interpretation In Econotopia, Nathan B. Oman

Faculty Publications

Much of the debate in the recent revival of interest in statutory interpretation centers on whether or not courts should use legislative history in construing statutes. The consensus in favor of this practice has come under sharp attack from public choice critics who argue that traditional models of legislative intent are positively and normatively incoherent. This paper argues that in actual practice, courts look at a fairly narrow subset of legislative history. By thinking about the power to write that legislative history as a property right and legislatures as markets, it is possible to use Coase's Theorem and the concept …


John Marshall: Remarks Of October 6, 2000, William H. Rehnquist Mar 2002

John Marshall: Remarks Of October 6, 2000, William H. Rehnquist

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Use That The Future Makes Of The Past: John Marshall's Greatness And Its Lessons For Today's Supreme Court Justices, Jack M. Balkin Mar 2002

The Use That The Future Makes Of The Past: John Marshall's Greatness And Its Lessons For Today's Supreme Court Justices, Jack M. Balkin

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


A Judge For All Seasons, R. Kent Newmyer Mar 2002

A Judge For All Seasons, R. Kent Newmyer

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Essential Elements Of Judicial Independence And The Experience Of Pre-Soviet Russia, Thomas E. Plank Dec 1996

The Essential Elements Of Judicial Independence And The Experience Of Pre-Soviet Russia, Thomas E. Plank

William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal

Judicial independence, which first developed in the Anglo-American legal system, is valued by many countries as an important condition for the rule of law. Its existence in any legal system, however, depends on concrete institutional arrangements. In this Article, Professor Plank identifies four institutional elements necessary to establish and maintain an independent judiciary: fixed tenure (with limited exceptions), fixed and adequate compensation, minimum qualifications, and limited civil immunity. The presence of these elements ensures an independent judiciary in many countries. The lack of permanent tenure for judges in most American states, however, raises serious questions about their independence.

To test …


Overview Of The Role Of Precedent In The Legal System Of The United States, Ana Elena Fierro Jan 1995

Overview Of The Role Of Precedent In The Legal System Of The United States, Ana Elena Fierro

LLM Theses and Essays

Traditionally, legal systems have been classified as either Common Law or Civil Law; scholars distinguish these systems based on their origins, as well their attitudes towards stare decisis. Common law considers precedent as a source of binding rules, while civil law does not. However, some scholars consider the methods for legal reasoning to be almost the same in every legal system. These scholars maintain that regardless of the source of law in a particular country, once a judge determines that the facts of one case are similar to those regulated by a certain rule, the judge will apply that particular …


Philosophy, History, And Judging, Donald P. Boyle Jr. Oct 1988

Philosophy, History, And Judging, Donald P. Boyle Jr.

William & Mary Law Review

No abstract provided.