Law and Economics Commons^™

Artificial Intelligence And Patent Ownership, W. Michael Schuster

Washington and Lee Law Review

Invention by artificial intelligence (AI) is the future of innovation. Unfortunately, as discovered through Freedom of Information Act requests, the U.S. patent regime has yet to determine how it will address patents for inventions created solely by AI (AI patents). This Article fills that void by presenting the first comprehensive analysis on the allocation of patent rights arising from invention by AI. To this end, this Article employs Coase Theorem and its corollaries to determine who should be allowed to secure these patents to maximize economic efficiency. The study concludes that letting firms using AI to create new technologies (as …

Collapsing Illusions: Standards For Setting Efficient Contract And Other Defaults, Steven J. Burton

Indiana Law Journal

In this Essay, Professor Burton analyzes and evaluates four commonly used standards for setting efficient default rules and standards. Based on two theoretical insights, he shows that three of them collapse upon analysis into the fourth, a Coasian standard that turns out to be a dead end. The theoretical upshot is that the Coase Theorem often is a good reason to use defaults rather than mandatory rules or standards. But neither the theorem nor reference to a transaction-costless world sustains particular defaults. To set an efficient default, the law should guide courts toward supplying terms that parties should have adopted …

¡Las Preferencias Dependen Del Punto De Referencia!: Un Desafío Al Análisis Económico –Y Coaseano– Del Derecho, Daniel A. Monroy

Daniel A Monroy C

The “coasean” theory of Law and the theory of Law & Economics (L&E) in general, implicitly assume the truthfulness of certain behavioral assumptions: the "preference exogeneity" and "reference independence". In this context, this paper points out some objections to these assumptions, and in this order, the paper shows multiple and deep inconsistencies with regard to: (i) how the L&E predicts individual behavior and the effects of legal rules, and (ii) –from a normative point of view– the way that economic theory recommends the lawmakers decisions. The paper also shows some L&E challenges associated with the behavioral assumption that people value …

Remedies And The Psychology Of Ownership, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Forest Jourden

Jeffrey J. Rachlinski

No abstract provided.

Coasean Bargaining In Consumer Bankruptcy, Edward R. Morrison

Faculty Scholarship

During my first weeks as a graduate student in economics, a professor described the Coase Theorem as “nearly a tautology:” Assume a world in which bargaining is costless. If there are gains from trade, the Theorem tells us, the parties will trade. The initial assignment of property rights will not affect the final allocation because the parties will bargain (costlessly) to an efficient outcome. “How can that be a theorem?,” I remember thinking at the time.

Coase Minus The Coase Theorem--Some Problems With Chicago Transaction Cost Analysis, Pierre Schlag

Pierre Schlag

In law as well as economics, the most well-known aspect of Coase’s “The Problem of Social Cost,” is the Coase Theorem. Over the decades, that particular notion has morphed into a crucial component of Chicago law and economics—namely, transaction cost analysis. In this Article, I deliberately bracket the Coase Theorem to show that “The Problem of Social Cost” contains far more interesting and unsettling lessons—both for law as well as for economics. Indeed, while Coase’s arguments clearly target the Pigouvian attempts to “improve on the market” through government correctives, there is, lurking in those arguments, a much more profound critique …

Draft Of The Concept Of "Harm" In Copyright - 2013, Wendy J. Gordon

Scholarship Chronologically

This essay examines the tort of copyright infringement. It argues that the ideas of "harm" and "fault" already play a role in the tort’s functioning, and that an ideally reformulated version of the tort should perhaps give a more significant role to “harm.” The essay therefore examines what “harm” can or should mean, reviewing four candidates for cognizable harm in copyright law (rivalry-based losses, foregone fees, loss of exclusivity, and subjective distress) and canvassing three philosophical conceptions of “harm” (counterfactual, historical-worsening, and noncomparative). The essay identifies the appropriateness vel non of employing, in the copyright context, each harm-candidate and each …

Costs Of Codification, Dru Stevenson

Dru Stevenson

Between the Civil War and World War II, every state and the federal government shifted toward codified versions of their statutes. Academia has so far ignored the systemic effects of this dramatic change. For example, the consensus view in the academic literature about rules and standards has been that precise rules present higher enactment costs for legislatures than would general standards, while vague standards present higher information costs for courts and citizens than do rules. Systematic codification – featuring hierarchical format and numbering, topical arrangement, and cross-references – inverts this relationship, lowering transaction costs for legislatures and increasing information costs …

Understanding "The Problem Of Social Cost", Enrico Baffi

enrico baffi

This paper examines the positions of Coase and Pigou in regard to the problem of external effects (externalities). Assessing their two most important works, it appears that Coase has a more relevant preference for an evaluation of total efficiency, while Pigou, with some exceptions, is convinced that it is almost always socially desirable to reach marginal efficiency through taxes or liability. It is interesting that the economist of Chicago, who has elaborated on the renowned theorem, thinks that is not desirable to reach efficiency at the margin every time, and that it is often preferable to evaluate the total, which …

Coase Minus The Coase Theorem--Some Problems With Chicago Transaction Cost Analysis, Pierre Schlag

Publications

In law as well as economics, the most well-known aspect of Coase's "The Problem of Social Cost," is the Coase Theorem. Over the decades, that particular notion has morphed into a crucial component of Chicago law and economics--namely, transaction cost analysis.

In this Article, I deliberately bracket the Coase Theorem to show that "The Problem of Social Cost" contains far more interesting and unsettling lessons--both for law as well as for economics. Indeed, while Coase's arguments clearly target the Pigouvian attempts to "improve on the market" through government correctives, there is, lurking in those arguments, a much more profound critique …

Coase V. Pigou: A Still Difficult Debate After Fifty Years, Enrico Baffi

enrico baffi

This paper examine the positions of Coase and Pigou about the problem of the externalities. From the reading of their most two important works it appears that Coase has a more relevant preference for a evaluation of efficiency at the total, while Pigou, with some exception, is convinced that is possible to reach marginal efficiency through taxes. It’s interesting that Coase, who has elaborated the famous theorem, is convinced that is not i to reach the efficiency at the margin every time and that sometimes is necessary a valuation at the total, that tells us which solution is more welfare …

A New Experiment On Rational Behavior, Myles R. Macdonald

CMC Senior Theses

Behavioral economics is widely recognized as a rising field in economics, one whose discoveries and implications are not yet completed or understood. At the same time, economic theory plays an enormous role in our governmental and legal system. In particular, the Coase Theorem and its implications have affected nearly every area in the field of law and economics. This paper proposes a experimental test of Coasean bargaining in situations using two competitive players whose payoffs depend on minimizing their costs of mitigating the externality. A rational player’s action can be predicted ahead of time, and the rationality of the game’s …

Making Coasean Property More Coasean, Thomas W. Merrill, Henry E. Smith

Faculty Scholarship

In his pioneering work on transaction costs, Ronald Coase presupposed a picture of property as a bundle of government-prescribed use rights. Not only is this picture not essential to Coase’s purpose, but its limitations emerge when we apply Coase’s central insights to analyze the structure of property itself. This leads to the Coase corollary: in a world of zero transaction costs, the nature of property does not matter to allocative efficiency. However, as with the Coase theorem, the real implication is for our world of positive transaction costs: we need to subject the notion of property to a comparative institutional …

Of Coase, Calabresi, And Optimal Tax Liability, Kyle D. Logue, Joel Slemrod

Articles

The Article proceeds as follows. Part II offers a primer on the Coase Theorem, beginning with the classic case of neighbor externalizing on neighbor (farmer and rancher), and it explains the basic invariance propositions. Part III shifts the focus to Coasean situations involving buyers and sellers in a market or contractual relationship, buyers and sellers whose market interactions cause harm to third parties. Using supply-and-demand diagrams, we illustrate (in a new way) some of the most basic findings of the economic analysis of law, including both the Coasean invariance and efficiency propositions and the Calabresian least-cost avoider idea. Also in …

The Coase Theorem And Arthur Cecil Pigou, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

In "The Problem of Social Cost" Ronald Coase was highly critical of the work of Cambridge University Economics Professor Arthur Cecil Pigou, presenting him as a radical government interventionist. In later work Coase's critique of Pigou became even more strident. In fact, however, Pigou's Economics of Welfare created the basic model and many of the tools that Coase's later work employed. Much of what we today characterize as the "Coase Theorem," including the relevance of transaction costs, externalities, and bilateral monopoly, was either stated or anticipated in Pigou's work. Further, Coase's extreme faith in private bargaining led him to fail …

Application Of The Public-Trust Doctrine And Principles Of Natural Resource Management To Electromagnetic Spectrum, Patrick S. Ryan

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

The Electromagnetic spectrum is among our most valuable natural resources. Yet while the past few decades have seen a rich body of environmental law develop for other natural resources, this movement has largely passed over the electromagnetic spectrum. This Article argues that to remedy that situation, the public-trust doctrine, which is now a cornerstone of modern environmental law, should be extended to the electromagnetic spectrum. This extension would not be a leap: the public-trust doctrine has already been used to guarantee the public access to various bodies of water (not just navigable water), and to protect recreational lakes and beaches, …

Remedies And The Psychology Of Ownership, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Forest Jourden

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Post-Revolutionary Law And Economics:A Foreword To The Symposium, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

The Lanec (short for Law and Economics) movement of the 1970s hit the legal landscape like a nuclear device and permanently irradiated it. A couple of decades later, as we sift through the fallout, we are entitled to ask whether anything fundamental has changed. Every contributor to this Symposium seems to answer yes. Maybe they're like the book reviewer who believes deep in her heart that the book is worthless, but if she reveals it the editor will conclude that there is no point in printing her review. Let me put my own biases on the table. In general I …

Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen And Economists Do Not, Stewart Schwab

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Firm The Market and The Law by Ronald Coase

The Problem Of Transaction Costs, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.

Coase And The Courts: Economics For The Common Man, Barbara Ann White

All Faculty Scholarship

The arguments collectively known as the Coase Theorem criticize the judicial policy of requiring businesses to ‘internalize’ their external costs of production, i.e., pay for the social costs their production incurs such as environmental or noise pollution. Coase argues that the policy of internalization often leads to economic inefficiency rather than efficiency maximization, contrary to what Pigouvian economic analysis asserts. The right to be free of the external costs of production ought to be based, instead, on Coase’s total product rule: Courts should allocate rights according to what maximizes overall total production and thereby maximize social welfare.

Coasian analysis has …

The Brilliant, The Curious, And The Wrong, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Politics Of The Coase Theorem And Its Relationship To Modern Legal Thought, Donald H. Gjerdingen

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Rethinking The Theory Of Legal Rights, Jules S. Coleman, Jody S. Kraus

Faculty Scholarship

In the economic approach to law, legal rights are designed, in part, to overcome the conditions under which markets fail. In correcting for market failure, economic analysis endorses two rules for assigning legal rights. The first specifies the allocation of rights under conditions of rational cooperation, full information and zero transaction costs. Provided that exchange is available and that obstacles to exercising it are insignificant, rational cooperators will negotiate around inefficiencies. Under these conditions, legal rights are not assigned in order to establish optimal levels of resource deployment directly; rather, they establish well-defined entitlements or negotiation points which create a …

The Coase Theorem And The Psychology Of Common-Law Thought, Donald H. Gjerdingen

Articles by Maurer Faculty

The Coase Theorem is a simple proposition-in the absence of transaction costs, a Pareto optimal result will occur regardless of the initial placement of legal liability. Despite this apparent simplicity, however, Coase's economic parable has provoked intense debate in the legal community. Why does the theorem grate on the hardened intuitions of so many lawyers? The thesis of this Article is that a connection exists between the adoption or rejection of a given school of legal thought and the use of certain psychological constructs. Specifically, this Article argues that the constructs underlying the Coase Theorem are incompatible with those underlying …

The Problem Of Social Cost Revisited, Donald H. Regan

Articles

SOME years ago, in a paper entitled "The Problem of Social Cost," Professor Ronald Coase asserted and argued for a proposition which has since acquired the convenient sobriquet "the Coase Theorem." The proposition is: That in a world of perfect competition, perfect information, and zero transaction costs, the allocation of resources in the economy will be efficient and will be unaffected by legal rules regarding the initial impact of costs resulting from externalities. Note that there are two claims being made, which it is well to separate for purposes of discussion. The first claim is that, under the conditions described, …