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Articles 1 - 30 of 65
Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence
Are They All Textualists Now?, Austin Peters
Are They All Textualists Now?, Austin Peters
Northwestern University Law Review
Recent developments at the U.S. Supreme Court have rekindled debates over textualism. Missing from the conversation is a discussion of the courts that decide the vast majority of statutory interpretation cases in the United States—state courts. This Article uses supervised machine learning to conduct the first-ever empirical study of the statutory interpretation methods used by state supreme courts. In total, this study analyzes over 44,000 opinions from all fifty states from 1980 to 2019.
This Article establishes several key descriptive findings. First, since the 1980s, textualism has risen rapidly in state supreme court opinions. Second, this rise is primarily attributable …
The Problem Of Extravagant Inferences, Cass Sunstein
The Problem Of Extravagant Inferences, Cass Sunstein
Georgia Law Review
Judges and lawyers sometimes act as if a constitutional or statutory term must, as a matter of semantics, be understood to have a particular meaning, when it could easily be understood to have another meaning, or several other meanings. When judges and lawyers act as if a legal term has a unique semantic meaning, even though it does not, they should be seen to be drawing extravagant inferences. Some constitutional provisions are treated this way; consider the idea that the vesting of executive power in a President of the United States necessarily includes the power to remove, at will, a …
A Textualist Defense Of A New Collateral Order Doctrine, Adam Reed Moore
A Textualist Defense Of A New Collateral Order Doctrine, Adam Reed Moore
Notre Dame Law Review Reflection
As a general rule, federal appellate courts have jurisdiction over “final decisions.” Though the rule seems simple enough, the Court’s current approach to interpreting “final decisions,” the collateral order doctrine, is anything but straightforward. That is because the Court has left the statutory text by the wayside. The collateral order doctrine is divorced from statutory text and is instead based on policy considerations.
Commentators (and, at times, the Court) have offered an alternative reading of “final decisions”: the final-judgment rule. This rule would allow appeals from final judgments only. But this alternative is not the product of close textual analysis. …
The Misunderstood History Of Textualism, Tara Leigh Grove
The Misunderstood History Of Textualism, Tara Leigh Grove
Northwestern University Law Review
This Article challenges widespread assumptions about the history of textualism. Jurists and scholars have sought for decades to distinguish “modern textualism” from the so-called “plain meaning school” of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—an approach that both textualists and non-textualists alike have long viewed as improperly “literal” and “wooden.” This Article shows that this conventional historical account is incorrect. Based on a study of statutory cases from 1789 to 1945 that use the term “plain meaning” or similar terms, this Article reveals that, under the actual plain meaning approach, the Supreme Court did not ignore context but looked to …
Ordinary Meaning And Ordinary People, Kevin Tobia, Brian G. Slocum, Victoria Frances Nourse
Ordinary Meaning And Ordinary People, Kevin Tobia, Brian G. Slocum, Victoria Frances Nourse
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This Article considers the relationship between ordinary meaning and ordinary people in legal interpretation. Many jurists give interpretive weight to the law's ordinary meaning (i.e., general, nontechnical meaning). Modern textualists adopt a strong commitment to ordinary meaning and justify it by alluding to ordinary people: people understand law to communicate ordinary meanings. This Article begins from this textualist premise and empirically examines the meaning that legal texts communicate to the public. Five original empirical studies reveal that ordinary people consider genre carefully, and regularly take phrases in law to communicate technical legal meanings, not only ordinary ones. Building on the …
Textualism In Practice, Anita S. Krishnakumar
Textualism In Practice, Anita S. Krishnakumar
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
It is by now axiomatic to note that textualism has won the statutory interpretation wars. But contrary to what textualists long have promised, the widespread embrace of textualism as an interpretive methodology has not resulted in any real clarity or predictability about the interpretive path—or even the specific interpretive tools—that courts will invoke in a particular case. Part of the reason for this lack of predictability is that textualism-in-practice often differs significantly from the approach that textualism-in-theory advertises; and part of the reason is that textualism-in-theory is sometimes in tension with itself. In light of textualism’s ascendance—and now dominance—on the …
Dueling Textualisms Or Multimodal Analysis? Using Bostock To Show Why No One Is Really A Textualist, Anne Marie Lofaso
Dueling Textualisms Or Multimodal Analysis? Using Bostock To Show Why No One Is Really A Textualist, Anne Marie Lofaso
Law Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Bridges Of Law, Ideology, And Commitment, Steven L. Winter Walter S. Gibbs Distinguished Professor Of Constitutional Law
Bridges Of Law, Ideology, And Commitment, Steven L. Winter Walter S. Gibbs Distinguished Professor Of Constitutional Law
Law Faculty Research Publications
Law has a distinctive temporal structure—an ontology—that defines it as a social institution. Law knits together past, present, purpose, and projected future into a demand for action. Robert Cover captures this dynamic in his metaphor of law as a bridge to an imagined future. Law’s orientation to the future necessarily poses the question of commitment or complicity. For law can shape the future only when people act to make it real. Cover’s bridge metaphor provides a lens through which to explore the complexities of law’s ontology and the pathologies that arise from its neglect or misuse. A bridge carries us …
Rejecting Word Worship: An Integrative Approach To Judicial Construction Of Insurance Policies, Jeffrey W. Stempel, Erik S. Knutsen
Rejecting Word Worship: An Integrative Approach To Judicial Construction Of Insurance Policies, Jeffrey W. Stempel, Erik S. Knutsen
University of Cincinnati Law Review
Insurance coverage litigation is a quest for discerning meaning: Does the insurance policy cover the loss at issue? Construing the insurance policy, courts attempt to give legal effect to what the document purports to command. But what were the intentions and expectations of insurer and insured? Do those intentions even matter? Or is only the written text of the policy relevant to the coverage result? Courts addressing these questions typically frame the interpretative choice as one of strict textualism versus contextual functionalism.
In many, perhaps even most situations, text and context align to create an “easy” case. If a factory …
When Statutory Interpretation Becomes Precedent: Why Individual Rights Advocates Shouldn’T Be So Quick To Praise Bostock, Elena Schiefele
When Statutory Interpretation Becomes Precedent: Why Individual Rights Advocates Shouldn’T Be So Quick To Praise Bostock, Elena Schiefele
Washington and Lee Law Review
Justice Neil Gorsuch’s approach to textualism, which this Note will call “muscular textualism,” is unique. Most notably exemplified in Bostock v. Clayton County, muscular textualism is marked by its rigorous adherence to what Justice Gorsuch perceives to be the “plain language” of the text. Because Justice Gorsuch’s opinions exemplify muscular textualism in a structured and consistent manner, his appointment to the Supreme Court provides the forum from which he can influence the decision-making process of other members of the judiciary when they seek guidance from Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, it is important for both advocates and judges to understand …
The Constitution And Democracy In Troubled Times, John M. Greabe
The Constitution And Democracy In Troubled Times, John M. Greabe
Law Faculty Scholarship
Does textualism and originalism approach positively impact democracy?
The Elastics Of Snap Removal: An Empirical Case Study Of Textualism, Thomas O. Main, Jeffrey W. Stempel, David Mcclure
The Elastics Of Snap Removal: An Empirical Case Study Of Textualism, Thomas O. Main, Jeffrey W. Stempel, David Mcclure
Scholarly Works
This article reports the findings of an empirical study of textualism as applied by federal judges interpreting the statute that permits removal of diversity cases from state to federal court. The “snap removal” provision in the statute is particularly interesting because its application forces judges into one of two interpretive camps—which are fairly extreme versions of textualism and purposivism, respectively. We studied characteristics of cases and judges to find predictors of textualist outcomes. In this article we offer a narrative discussion of key variables and we detail the results of our logistic regression analysis. The most salient predictive variable was …
A Textualist Interpretation Of The Visual Artists Rights Act Of 1990, Brian L. Frye
A Textualist Interpretation Of The Visual Artists Rights Act Of 1990, Brian L. Frye
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
For numberless generations, jurisprudes waged total war in the
conflict among textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism.
Textualists insisted that courts must interpret statutes based on the
meaning of their text, intentionalists insisted on the intention of the
legislature, and purposivists insisted on the purpose of the statute.
Eventually, textualism prevailed. Courts universally recognize
that they are obligated to interpret statutes in light of their text, or
at least pretend that the text of the statute determined their
interpretation. And the few remaining heretics are swiftly identified
and corrected by their superiors. As Justice Kagan famously
observed, “We’re all textualists now.” Whether …
Immunity From Suit For International Organizations: The Judiciary's New Que Of Separating Lawsuit Sheep From Lawsuit Goats, Ylli Dautaj
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies
I. Introduction
II. Immunity from Suit in Public International Law
(A) Sovereign Immunity
(i) Sources of Sovereign Immunity
(ii) Legal Theory on Sovereign Immunity
(iii) Doctrinal Evolution of Sovereign Immunity
(B) Jurisdictional Immunity for International Organizations
(C) Sovereign Immunity and Immunity for International Organizations
Domestically
III. Jam v. Int'l Finance Corporation:
A New Dawn for International Organizations in the United States
(A) Jam v. Int'l Finance Corporation: Majority View
(B) Jam v. Int'l Finance Corporation: Dissenting Opinion by Justice Breyer
IV. The Exception that Proves but does not Swallow the rule on Virtually
Absolute Immunity: Criticism of the Majority in …
The Dilemma Of Interstatutory Interpretation, Anuj C. Desai
The Dilemma Of Interstatutory Interpretation, Anuj C. Desai
Washington and Lee Law Review
Courts engage in interstatutory cross-referencing all the time, relying on one statute to help interpret another. Yet, neither courts nor scholars have ever had a satisfactory theory for determining when it is appropriate. Is it okay to rely on any other statute as an interpretive aid? Or, are there limits to the practice? If so, what are they? To assess when interstatutory cross-referencing is appropriate, I focus on one common form of the technique, the in pari materia doctrine. When a court concludes that two statutes are in pari materia or (translating the Latin) “on the same subject,” the court …
Complexity, Judgment, And Restraint, Gerard E. Lynch
Complexity, Judgment, And Restraint, Gerard E. Lynch
Faculty Scholarship
I am honored to have been asked to give this year’s James Madison Lecture. I hesitate to single out any of my extraordinary predecessors at this podium – there are too many great judges to list, and too much risk of slighting any. So I will note only that the list includes both judges for whom I clerked more than forty years ago, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., and Chief Judge Wilfred Feinberg, of the court on which I now serve. That long-ago law clerk could not have dreamed of being someday in a position once occupied by those two …
Snap Removal: Concept; Cause; Cacophony; And Cure, Jeffrey W. Stempel, Thomas O. Main, David Mcclure
Snap Removal: Concept; Cause; Cacophony; And Cure, Jeffrey W. Stempel, Thomas O. Main, David Mcclure
Scholarly Works
So-called “snap removal” – removal of a case from state to federal court prior to service on a forum state defendant – has divided federal trial courts for 20 years. Recently, panels of the Second, Third and Fifth Circuits have sided with those supporting the tactic even though it conflicts with the general prohibition on removal when the case includes a forum state defendant, a situation historically viewed as eliminating the need to protect the outsider defendant from possible state court hostility.
Consistent with the public policy underlying diversity jurisdiction – availability of a federal forum to protect against defending …
Statutory Realism: The Jurisprudential Ambivalence Of Interpretive Theory, Abigail R. Moncrieff
Statutory Realism: The Jurisprudential Ambivalence Of Interpretive Theory, Abigail R. Moncrieff
Law Faculty Articles and Essays
In the renaissance of statutory interpretation theory, a division has emerged between "new purposivists," who argue that statutes should be interpreted dynamically, and "new textualists," who argue that statutes should be interpreted according to their ordinary semantic meanings. Both camps, however, rest their theories on jurisprudentially ambivalent commitments. Purposivists are jurisprudential realists when they make arguments about statutory meaning, but they are jurisprudential formalists in their views of the judicial power to engage in dynamic interpretation. Textualists are the inverse; they are formalistic in their understandings of statutory meaning but realistic in their arguments about judicial power. The relative triumph …
Supreme Silence And Precedential Pragmatism: King V. Burwell And Statutory Interpretation In The Federal Courts Of Appeals, Michael J. Cedrone
Supreme Silence And Precedential Pragmatism: King V. Burwell And Statutory Interpretation In The Federal Courts Of Appeals, Michael J. Cedrone
Marquette Law Review
This Article studies statutory interpretation as it is practiced in the federal
courts of appeal. Much of the academic commentary in this field focuses on the
Supreme Court, which skews the debate and unduly polarizes the field. This
Article investigates more broadly by looking at the seventy-two federal
appellate cases that cite King v. Burwell in the two years after the Court issued
its decision. In deciding that the words “established by the State” encompass
a federal program, the Court in King reached a pragmatic and practical result
based on statutory scheme and purpose at a fairly high level of …
The Rhetorical Canons Of Construction: New Textualism's Rhetoric Problem, Charlie D. Stewart
The Rhetorical Canons Of Construction: New Textualism's Rhetoric Problem, Charlie D. Stewart
Michigan Law Review
New Textualism is ascendant. Elevated to prominence by the late Justice Antonin Scalia and championed by others like Justice Neil Gorsuch, the method of interpretation occupies an increasingly dominant place in American jurisprudence. Yet, this Comment argues the proponents of New Textualism acted unfairly to reach this lofty perch. To reach this conclusion, this Comment develops and applies a framework to evaluate the rhetoric behind New Textualism: the rhetorical canons of construction. Through the rhetorical canons, this Comment demonstrates that proponents of New Textualism advance specious arguments, declare other methods illegitimate hypocritically, refuse to engage with the merits of their …
A Matter Of Interpretation: Federal Courts And The Law, Charles R. Priest
A Matter Of Interpretation: Federal Courts And The Law, Charles R. Priest
Maine Law Review
Justice Scalia's engaging essay, “Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws,” and the four comments it provokes, should provide lawyers, judges, and other lawmakers with an interesting evening. Instead of presenting a theoretical view of the role of the federal courts in interpretation, Justice Scalia sketches out a case for “textualism.” “Textualism” is one of several currently contending methods of interpreting statutes and the United States Constitution, and is currently popular among federal judges who see their role as restricting government's powers to those expressly stated in the …
"We Are All Textualists Now": The Legacy Of Justice Antonin Scalia, Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain
"We Are All Textualists Now": The Legacy Of Justice Antonin Scalia, Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain
St. John's Law Review
(Excerpt)
One of my favorite extra-judicial activities is meeting with law students, and it is a pleasure to be with you today. But it is a special privilege to come back to the Jamaica campus of St. John’s College from which I graduated 60 years ago, long before the Law School had moved here from Schermerhorn Street in Brooklyn, and when there was only one building on this former golf course.
I was honored to call Justice Scalia a role model and friend. What I hope to convey to you today, however, is the effect Justice Scalia’s tenure on the …
Change, Creation, And Unpredictability In Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use In The Roberts Court's First Decade, Nina A. Mendelson
Change, Creation, And Unpredictability In Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use In The Roberts Court's First Decade, Nina A. Mendelson
Michigan Law Review
In resolving questions of statutory meaning, the lion’s share of Roberts Court opinions considers and applies at least one interpretive canon, whether the rule against surplusage or the presumption against state law preemption. This is part of a decades-long turn toward textualist statutory interpretation in the Supreme Court. Commentators have debated how to justify canons, since they are judicially created rules that reside outside the statutory text. Earlier studies have cast substantial doubt on whether these canons can be justified as capturing congressional practices or preferences; commentators have accordingly turned toward second-order justifications, arguing that canons usefully make interpretation constrained …
Text Over Intent And The Demise Of Legislative History, Thomas W. Merrill, Michael S. Paulsen, Saikrishna Prakash, Lawrence B. Solum, Sandra Segal Ikuta
Text Over Intent And The Demise Of Legislative History, Thomas W. Merrill, Michael S. Paulsen, Saikrishna Prakash, Lawrence B. Solum, Sandra Segal Ikuta
Faculty Scholarship
The following is the transcript of a 2016 Federalist Society panel entitled: Text Over Intent and the Demise of Legislative History. The panel originally occurred on November 17, 2016 during the National Lawyers Convention in Washington, D.C. The participants were: Prof. Thomas W. Merrill, Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Prof. Michael S. Paulsen, Distinguished University Chair and Professor, University of St. Thomas School of Law; Prof. Saikrishna Prakash, James Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law; Prof. Lawrence B. Solum, Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The moderator was …
Eliminating Circuit-Split Disparities In Federal Sentencing Under The Post-Booker Guidelines, Elliot Edwards
Eliminating Circuit-Split Disparities In Federal Sentencing Under The Post-Booker Guidelines, Elliot Edwards
Indiana Law Journal
This Note will explore the rarely discussed consequences that result when courts of appeals freely interpret the Sentencing Guidelines. This Note will not address appellate review of sentences in general, nor will it discuss disparities caused by trial courts. Instead, the discussion below will address a very specific situation, namely when a court of appeals vacates a sentence because, in its estimation, the trial court misapplied the Guidelines. Part I will relate the history of the recent sentencing re-form movement in America, noting particularly which bodies have the authority to decide sentencing policy. Part II will then analyze the interpretive …
High-Stakes Interpretation, Ryan D. Doerfler
High-Stakes Interpretation, Ryan D. Doerfler
All Faculty Scholarship
Courts look at text differently in high-stakes cases. Statutory language that would otherwise be ‘unambiguous’ suddenly becomes ‘less than clear.’ This, in turn, frees up courts to sidestep constitutional conflicts, avoid dramatic policy changes, and, more generally, get around undesirable outcomes. The standard account of this behavior is that courts’ failure to recognize ‘clear’ or ‘unambiguous’ meanings in such cases is motivated or disingenuous, and, at best, justified on instrumentalist grounds.
This Article challenges that account. It argues instead that, as a purely epistemic matter, it is more difficult to ‘know’ what a text means—and, hence, more difficult to regard …
Judges’ Varied Views On Textualism: The Roberts-Alito Schism And The Similar District Judge Divergence That Undercuts The Widely Assumed Textualism-Ideology Correlation, Scott A. Moss
Publications
No abstract provided.
Conservatives And The Court, Robert F. Nagel
The Tragedy Of Justice Scalia, Mitchell N. Berman
The Tragedy Of Justice Scalia, Mitchell N. Berman
All Faculty Scholarship
Justice Antonin Scalia was, by the time of his death last February, the Supreme Court’s best known and most influential member. He was also its most polarizing, a jurist whom most students of American law either love or hate. This essay, styled as a twenty-year retrospective on A Matter of Interpretation, Scalia’s Tanner lectures on statutory and constitutional interpretation, aims to prod partisans on both sides of our central legal and political divisions to better appreciate at least some of what their opponents see—the other side of Scalia’s legacy. Along the way, it critically assesses Scalia’s particular brand of …
Juxtaposition And Intent: Analyzing Legal Interpretation Through The Lens Of Literary Criticism, Joel Graczyk
Juxtaposition And Intent: Analyzing Legal Interpretation Through The Lens Of Literary Criticism, Joel Graczyk
Marquette Law Review
Disagreement exists within both the literary and legal communities about authorial intent’s proper role in interpretation. In an effort to balance textualism’s strict limits with intentionalism’s risk of constructed meaning, this Comment approaches the debate from a literary perspective focused on the text but open to limited evidence of the author’s intended meaning. Some literary critics suggest that evidence of an author’s understanding of and associations with particular words can provide a useful tool for objective interpretation. A judge drawing on such evidence could analyze statutory text by juxtaposing a statute’s language with limited evidence of the enacting legislature’s understanding …