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Articles 1 - 19 of 19
Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence
The Rhetorical Canons Of Construction: New Textualism's Rhetoric Problem, Charlie D. Stewart
The Rhetorical Canons Of Construction: New Textualism's Rhetoric Problem, Charlie D. Stewart
Michigan Law Review
New Textualism is ascendant. Elevated to prominence by the late Justice Antonin Scalia and championed by others like Justice Neil Gorsuch, the method of interpretation occupies an increasingly dominant place in American jurisprudence. Yet, this Comment argues the proponents of New Textualism acted unfairly to reach this lofty perch. To reach this conclusion, this Comment develops and applies a framework to evaluate the rhetoric behind New Textualism: the rhetorical canons of construction. Through the rhetorical canons, this Comment demonstrates that proponents of New Textualism advance specious arguments, declare other methods illegitimate hypocritically, refuse to engage with the merits of their …
High-Stakes Interpretation, Ryan D. Doerfler
High-Stakes Interpretation, Ryan D. Doerfler
All Faculty Scholarship
Courts look at text differently in high-stakes cases. Statutory language that would otherwise be ‘unambiguous’ suddenly becomes ‘less than clear.’ This, in turn, frees up courts to sidestep constitutional conflicts, avoid dramatic policy changes, and, more generally, get around undesirable outcomes. The standard account of this behavior is that courts’ failure to recognize ‘clear’ or ‘unambiguous’ meanings in such cases is motivated or disingenuous, and, at best, justified on instrumentalist grounds.
This Article challenges that account. It argues instead that, as a purely epistemic matter, it is more difficult to ‘know’ what a text means—and, hence, more difficult to regard …
The Scrivener’S Error, Ryan D. Doerfler
The Scrivener’S Error, Ryan D. Doerfler
Northwestern University Law Review
It is widely accepted that courts may correct legislative drafting mistakes, i.e., so-called scrivener’s errors, if and only if such mistakes are “absolutely clear.” The rationale is that if a court were to recognize a less clear error, it might be “rewriting” the statute rather than correcting a technical mistake.
This Article argues that the standard is much too strict. The current rationale ignores that courts can “rewrite,” i.e., misinterpret, a statute both by recognizing an error and by failing to do so. Accordingly, because the current doctrine is designed to protect against one type of mistake (false positives) but …
Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn - Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes To You, Stephen Ross
Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn - Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes To You, Stephen Ross
Stephen F Ross
The purpose of this paper is to explore what, if anything, Congress should do about the canons of statutory construction to prevent judges who are more conservative (or perhaps, in a future era, more progressive) than the majority of the legislature from employing those canons to distort or frustrate legislative policy preferences.
Beyond Severability, Lisa Marshall Manheim
Beyond Severability, Lisa Marshall Manheim
Articles
Severability is a wrecking ball. Even the most cautious use of this doctrine demolishes statutes in contravention of legislative intent and without adequate justification. It does so through the imposition of an artificially restrictive framework: one that requires that courts respond to a statute’s constitutional flaw by disregarding that statute either in whole or in part. In the last few years alone, this framework has flattened the Voting Rights Act, threatened the Bankruptcy Code, and nearly toppled the Affordable Care Act.
Yet courts apply severability reflexively, never demanding justification for its destructive treatment. Scholars, meanwhile, assiduously debate the particulars of …
The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley
The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley
Articles
The presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action is a cornerstone of administrative law, accepted by courts and commentators alike as both legally appropriate and obviously desirable. Yet the presumption is puzzling. As with any canon of statutory construction that serves a substantive end, it should find a source in history, positive law, the Constitution, or sound policy considerations. None of these, however, offers a plausible justification for the presumption. As for history, the sort of judicial review that the presumption favors - appellate-style arbitrariness review - was not only unheard of prior to the twentieth century, but …
Representation Reinforcement: A Legislative Solution To A Legislative Process Problem, Anita S. Krishnakumar
Representation Reinforcement: A Legislative Solution To A Legislative Process Problem, Anita S. Krishnakumar
Faculty Publications
One of the most valuable—and disturbing—insights offered by public choice theory has been the recognition that wealthy, well-organized interests with narrow, intense preferences often dominate the legislative process while diffuse, unorganized interests go under-represented. Responding to this insight, legal scholars in the fields of statutory interpretation and administrative law have suggested that the solution to the problem of representational inequality lies with the courts. Indeed, over the past two decades, scholars in these fields have offered up a host of John Hart Ely-inspired representation reinforcing "canons of construction," designed to encourage judges to use their role as statutory interpreters to …
Linguistics In Law, Alani Golanski
Linguistics In Law, Alani Golanski
Alani Golanski
The "new textualism" is amenable to the use of linguists in legal cases. New textualists seek to interpret statutes "objectively," according to the "plain meaning" of the statutory terms; these jurists and scholars see plain-meaning analysis as linguistics, and linguistics as science. Law and linguistics pursue different ends, however, and linguists construing statutes will miss legally decisive issues. Modern linguistics theory is an area of central concern to cognitive psychologists as well as philosophers of mind and language. While not hegemonic, Chomsky's psychological program influences modern linguistics, and the linguist's approach often leads in a different direction from that taken …
"Intensional Contexts" And The Rule That Statutes Should Be Interpreted As Consistent With International Law, John M. Rogers
"Intensional Contexts" And The Rule That Statutes Should Be Interpreted As Consistent With International Law, John M. Rogers
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
Striving for consistency—for consistency, that is, properly understood—must characterize legal reasoning in order for the reasoning to deserve to be called "legal." It may conceivably be "good" or "moral" for identically situated persons to be treated differently by institutions with power, but doing so can hardly be called "legal." Very careful attention must be given, of course, to what is meant by "identically situated," as no two different persons can be 100% identically situated. Their names, for instance, are different. By identical, we must mean no relevant distinction, or no distinction that serves a purpose that we can articulate and …
Work Of Knowledge , Abner S. Greene
Work Of Knowledge , Abner S. Greene
Faculty Scholarship
Interpretation involves the acquisition of knowledge. We are continually confronted with the results of purposive action. Sometimes these results are written texts, such as statutes or novels. Other times these results are events in the physical world, actions that we observe or the results of actions about which we are told. To make sense of these results of purposive action, that is, to make the results be more than just a jumble of sense impressions, the observer must find a way of organizing the material with which he or she is presented. These methods of organizing the results of purposive …
The Stare Decisis "Exception" To The Chevron Deference Rule, Rebecca White
The Stare Decisis "Exception" To The Chevron Deference Rule, Rebecca White
Scholarly Works
In this article, the author discusses how Chevron intersects with one important competing norm - stare decisis. Stare decisis counsels the Court to adhere to its own decisions, particularly statutory ones, absent substantial justification for departure. To what extent should stare decisis apply when an agency's interpretation of a statute, otherwise deserving of deference under Chevron, conflicts with a prior interpretation of the statute by the Supreme Court?
This article suggests the following answer: If the Court's prior opinion upheld the agency's interpretation as one reasonable reading of the statute, but not the only one possible, and the agency thereafter …
The Canons Of Statutory Construction And Judicial Constraints: A Response To Macey And Miller, Lawrence C. Marshall
The Canons Of Statutory Construction And Judicial Constraints: A Response To Macey And Miller, Lawrence C. Marshall
Vanderbilt Law Review
Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller claim to have set out to provide a positivist explanation for why judges ever invoke canons in the course of interpreting statutes.' In truth, though, their question is a far broader one. What they really seek to explain is why judges ever use any interpretive tools in the course of interpreting statutes. Why, Macey and Miller want to know, don't judges simply decide what result in the case will best promote a good outcome on the grounds of public policy, intrinsic fairness, economic efficiency or wealth maximization? This question is perplexing to Macey and …
Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn - Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes To You, Stephen F. Ross
Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn - Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes To You, Stephen F. Ross
Journal Articles
The purpose of this paper is to explore what, if anything, Congress should do about the canons of statutory construction to prevent judges who are more conservative (or perhaps, in a future era, more progressive) than the majority of the legislature from employing those canons to distort or frustrate legislative policy preferences.
The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Burdens, And A Misleading Version Of Democracy, Jeffrey W. Stempel
The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Burdens, And A Misleading Version Of Democracy, Jeffrey W. Stempel
Scholarly Works
No one theory or school of thought consistently dominates judicial application of statutes, but the basic methodology employed by courts seems well-established if not always well-defined. Most mainstream judges and lawyers faced with a statutory construction task will look at (although with varying emphasis) the text of the statute, the legislative history of the provision, the context of the enactment, evident congressional purpose, and applicable agency interpretations, often employing the canons of construction for assistance. Although orthodox judicial thought suggests that the judge's role is confined to discerning textual meaning or directives of the enacting legislature, courts also often examine …
The Canons Of Construction In Georgia: "Anachronisms" In Action, R. Perry Sentell Jr.
The Canons Of Construction In Georgia: "Anachronisms" In Action, R. Perry Sentell Jr.
Scholarly Works
Two initial observations may be tendered concerning the canons of interpretations: The literature, almost uniformly, discredits them; the courts, almost uniformly, employ them. The purpose of this effort is to reflect some sense of background, and illustratively to marshal the Georgia experiences with what are perhaps the three most famous canons of interpretation.
The Role Of International Law As A Canon Of Domestic Statutory Construction, Ralph G. Steinhardt
The Role Of International Law As A Canon Of Domestic Statutory Construction, Ralph G. Steinhardt
Vanderbilt Law Review
From the beginning of our constitutional life, the Supreme Court has articulated principles that structure the juridical relationship between international law and domestic law. These principles purportedly offer rules of decision for resolving in domestic courts the potential in-consistencies between external and internal sources of law, and they do so with the surface simplicity of axioms. Treaties, for example, cannot trump constitutional norms.' Customary international law can provide a rule of decision at least in the absence of controlling legislative or executive acts. In the case of an irreconcilable conflict between a treaty and a statute, the latter-in-time prevails. When …
Warrantless Arrest Jurisdiction In Texas: An Analysis And A Proposal., Gerald S. Reamey, J. Daniel Harkins
Warrantless Arrest Jurisdiction In Texas: An Analysis And A Proposal., Gerald S. Reamey, J. Daniel Harkins
St. Mary's Law Journal
Within the State of Texas, there exist a great number of “peace officers” who are granted a wide range of power and authority. This includes the power to make warrantless arrests and searches pursuant to those arrests. Significant ambiguity exists regarding a peace officer’s jurisdiction. The confusion is largely due to imprecise statutory language and varying judicial interpretations. Article 998 of Texas Revised Civil Statutes, for example, bestowed on city police officers the same powers, authority, and jurisdiction as city marshals. The statute, though, neglected to define the extent of that jurisdiction, or even what “jurisdiction” meant in that context. …
The Position Of Statutory Construction In Present Day Law Practice, John W. Macdonald
The Position Of Statutory Construction In Present Day Law Practice, John W. Macdonald
Vanderbilt Law Review
Even the title assigned to this article emphasizes a point of view. We will consider the position of statutory construction not from the aspect of judges, appellate or trial, who must decide cases. Instead we are to look at the subject from the point of view of the practitioner, the lawyer himself. The practice of law is of course varied. And there are many fields of knowledge which control that practice. Some of these obviously do not involve law at all. The lawyer is a litigator, an advocate in court or before quasi-judicial bodies. He is also a counsellor, an …
Remarks On The Theory Of Appellate Decision And The Rules Or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, Karl N. Llwellyn
Remarks On The Theory Of Appellate Decision And The Rules Or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, Karl N. Llwellyn
Vanderbilt Law Review
One does not progress far into legal life without learning that there is no single right and accurate way of reading one case, or of reading a bunch of cases. For
(1) Impeccable and correct doctrine makes clear that a case "holds"with authority only so much of what the opinion says as is absolutely necessary to sustain the judgment. Anything else is unnecessary and "distinguishable" and noncontrolling for the future. Indeed, if the judgment rests on two, three or four rulings, any of them can be rightly and righteously knocked out, for the future, as being thus "unnecessary." Moreover, any …